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PETER LANG

Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • New York • Paris • Wien

**Challenges to
European Education:
Cultural Values, National Identities,
and Global Responsibilities**

edited by Thyge Winther-Jensen (Ed.)



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Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften

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PREFACE

In recent years, fields of study such as History, Law, and the social and political sciences have produced an impressive range of analyses which will have an impact on the general perception of the unique features of European civilization. To mention but a few examples, the theses of Edgar Morin on the identity of Europe as justly resident in its multipolar diversity; those of Krzysztof Pomian on European civilization as a „civilization of transgression;” and Hartmut Kaelble's analyses of a „specifically European manner of social evolution” all belong to this category of historically grounded, thought-provoking research on Europe conceived of as a unique socio-cultural entity. The conclusions of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, showing that Europe's very originality throughout history resides in its extraordinary capacity of innovation and creation, and not least the theses of Rémi Brague, according to which the universality of European civilization arises from reiterated appropriations of the Other, of the contributions of other cultures, and in particular of classical antiquity, further illustrate the breadth and the fruitfulness of socio-historical approaches of this kind.

Alongside these works, the outcome of Comparative Education research on Europe appears somewhat meager.

Admittedly, there is a growing number of studies on the curriculum and on its redefinition in the sense of deliberate consideration of a European dimension, analyses of the teaching profession and the training of teachers in Europe, and surveys on the different programs mounted by the Commission of European Communities. Furthermore, a critical research tradition focusing on the elaboration of educational politics at the level of the European Union has begun to emerge.

In contrast, what is largely lacking in the analysis of education in Europe are both the historical dimension and a macro-comparative, cross-civilizational perspective. A perspective which, in other words, by comparing different civilizations or socio-economic regions, would throw into

relief that which -- beyond national differences -- is common to the educational systems of Europe and thus constitutes the specificity of a distinct European education.

The unsatisfactory state of this literature was one of the reasons that the Comparative Education Society in Europe, as early as 1992, decided to focus its 16th Congress, held at Copenhagen in 1994, not only on education in Europe but on the specifically European dimension in education. The book the reader now holds is the outcome of this Congress. In addition to reflecting the results of the Congress, its 25 chapters, divided into five sections, represent an important step toward filling this gap in the existing literature.

I would like to give my thanks to all those who participated in the preparation of this book. Quite particularly, I want to thank Professor Thyge Winther-Jensen, who not only served as Congress Convenor, but also assumed the main responsibility for the editing of this book. He was judiciously supported in this task -- especially in the selection of the chapters -- by Donatella Palomba, Professor at the University of Rome „Tor Vergata,” and Miguel A. Pereyra, Professor at the University of Granada. I would also like to thank Trevor Corner and Marianne Høyen who developed the first comprehensive manuscript at Copenhagen, as well as Peter Knost and Jörn Taubert, who assisted in the forming of the manuscript and compiled the index. My particular thanks, finally, go to Jack Michael Halverson who invested considerable time and effort into the final editing of the complete volume.

Jürgen Schriewer
President of the Comparative Education Society in Europe

Berlin,

July 1996

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INTRODUCTION

Thyge Winther-Jensen

Europe Today

The following articles examine important educational issues for today's Europe. In November of 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, symbolically bringing the Cold War to an end. The idea of a new, unified Europe built on a common cultural heritage, common values, and common global responsibilities was imagined at that time as the foundation of education for the 21st century. In the wake of the upheaval, contacts between East and West were improving at all levels. There was a spirit of optimism and freedom, a widening of our European horizons, and an inspiring vision of a new and better Europe.

Only 2 or 3 years later, however, the situation had changed dramatically. The European scene now seemed chaotic.

First of all, Europe appeared to be much more *diversified* than before 1989. In the East a number of new states had emerged; almost forgotten ethnic minorities claimed their rights and in the former Yugoslavia ethnic and economical conflicts had even resulted in a tragic and destructive civil war.

In the West the new situation caused a considerable degree of confusion. To the already existing problems of unemployment, work and the impact of new technology, new ones were added. Institutions and organizations, dating back to the Cold War era, were not adequate to cope with the new situation. Migration increased. Europe as a mental and physical

entity had to be reconsidered. Nationalism, which almost everybody regarded as dead and buried, was back on stage again. The optimism that prevailed two years earlier had become much less prevalent.

What in 1990 seemed to be an opportunity to build a new order in Europe, now seemed to have become a more chaotic situation than ever.

The Inheritance

Social scientists have drawn our attention to the thesis that the Europe of today might be in a state of crisis comparable to those of the 16th and 17th centuries. At that time Europe was confronted with the contrast between *order* and *chaos* for the first time, and it was realized that unless something was done about the problem of order the consequence would be chaos and collapse.

During the next two centuries our modern age was created. A new order was established within the frames of nation-states and empires. But it had its costs. War was declared on diversity. Local traditions, communities and languages were suppressed, if not annihilated, and the individual came under strong pressure for conformity. Some of the worst crimes during the last 200 years were committed in the name of order.

The strategies that were used to build the new order were of different kinds. The one most widely used was the strategy of assimilation. Education became an important weapon in this strategy during the whole age. „This was the age,” as Bereday puts it, „when the French, Belgians and the English on the frontier of their empires in India and Africa were busily turning the local population into brown Englishmen or black Belgians or Frenchmen. This was the period when successive Russian Tsars automatically assumed that Eastern European Slavs could be Russified.”¹

Another strategy was simply to annihilate troublesome minorities. The „ethnic cleansings” in former Yugoslavia is one of the latest examples of this brutal and inhuman strategy.

Today it is increasingly recognized that the aims and strategies of the modern age are not sufficiently able to counteract the problems we are up

¹ G.Z.F. Bereday, *Comparative Education* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 7.

against on the threshold to 21st century. Let me suggest some reasons. In the 19th century it looked as if a few larger nations or empires would assimilate the smaller ones. The latest development points in a quite opposite direction. We see nations, yesterday regarded as united, today split by regional conflicts. When The League of Nations was founded after World War I, it consisted of 26 nations, while the United Nations of today comprises nearly 200 members. We currently see ethnic minorities claiming their rights to be taught their own culture in their own language.

A second reason is the difficulty we have with assimilation strategy itself. The concept of assimilation takes it for granted that one culture is superior to another. But no European culture today has the arrogance to maintain its superiority to other cultures -- and even if it had, probably no one would care about it.

Thirdly, there is the declining role of the nation-state. During our modern age, nation and society have gradually become identified with each other. The nation-states with their educational, administrative, and political institutions created order in the social life of their citizens.

However, today's world can hardly be contained within the limits of the nation-state, as it used to be defined, either politically, economically, culturally or even linguistically. Economy today is global, culture has become cross-national and the market continues to transgress the borders of the nation-state. Migration and the flow of labor will bring us in closer contact with our neighbor and with the stranger.

Education played an important role in the creation of the nation-state. „Economic incentives, political power and the schools helped to mold nation-states out of communities speaking different languages and holding different beliefs. Frequently the geographical boundaries which served to separate one community from another were ignored in creating a 'national territory.'²

However, no nation-state is able to defend itself alone any longer. This doesn't mean that the nation-state will not be present in the history of tomorrow, but that it will probably have a different, and more subordinate, role.

² B. Holmes, ed., *Diversity and Unity in Education* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 1.

As mentioned above, the formation of the nation-state had its costs; during the same period, however, many of the ideas were born which today are considered indispensable for a dignified human life: religious and political freedom, tolerance, human rights, equality of opportunity and social responsibility. The human being gradually came to be considered as not only a subject or a citizen but an *individual* with inviolable rights against nation and society. These ideas are included in European education today.

Alongside these efforts, however, toward the creation of the nation-state and the securing of the rights of the individual, there has been throughout history an effort to make an *entity* out of Europe as a whole, however difficult these two efforts were to reconcile. The Christian church and the Convention of Augsburg in 1548 are early examples of the quest for unity. But in the beginning of the 20th century Europe was experiencing a period of „intense nationalism and imperial expansion and there was little hope of concerted European action in any sphere of human activity.“³ Two World Wars turned Europe into a vast battlefield and it was impossible to escape the conclusion that the root causes of the troubles of the nation-states „were to be found in the intense forms of nationalism which had been allowed to flourish to the point of obscuring the fact that, whilst there was (and always must be) inner diversity within the concert of Europe, Western Europe must remain fundamentally an entity if it was to have any chance of survival into the next century.“⁴

The Post-1945 Period

The postwar efforts to create *entity* began on September 5, 1944 (two days after the liberation of Brussels from German occupation), when Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg came together to replace the former Belgo-Luxembourg Treaty with a new economic alliance, *Benelux*. Four years later, in 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed, whereby Great Britain, France and Benelux guaranteed one another mutual aid over a period of fifty years in military, economic, social and cultural matters. One

³ V. Mallinson, *The Western European Idea in Education* (London: Pergamon, 1981), p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*

month later the Convention creating the *Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)* was signed in Paris. In 1960 the OEEC was transformed into the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)*, including the United States and Canada as full members. Japan joined the organization in 1964.

The Brussels Treaty was followed by the foundation of the *Council of Europe* in 1949, with the aim of achieving „a greater unity between Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.” The council today has 39 members, with Russia as the latest member (1996).

Two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, launched the so-called Schuman Plan, intended to secure a balanced economic development program for all of Western Europe, but also to move Europe into a stronger political unity. The plan led in 1951 to the creation of the *European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*. Only six nations -- Benelux, France, Italy and Western Germany -- were prepared to join at that time.

In order to establish both a comprehensive customs union and to organize information concerning atomic energy, an inter-governmental committee was established under the presidency of Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium) to produce a blueprint which formed the basis for the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), ratified by the „Six” in the *Treaties of Rome* in 1957. In 1973 the „Six” became the „Nine,” when Great Britain, Eire and Denmark (members of the former EFTA) joined the EEC. After 1973 other nations became new members: Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986) and Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995). Finally, on February 7, 1992, the *Maastricht Treaty* was signed which took a further step towards the creation of a political union. During the postwar period, Europe has also increasingly been involved and taken up its responsibility in *global* organizations like OECD, UN, UNESCO and NATO.

What, then, has the role of education been in this process? In the Treaty of Rome vocational training was one of the few areas mentioned, but the community policy on education was rather modest until the late 1980s. The objectives of the 1976 Community Education Action Program

emphasized projects and the exchange of information on the periphery of educational activity,⁵ but a redefinition of the educational aspects of vocational education provided the opportunity to include the terminal phases of education, including all higher education, in the community policy. The 1976 education policy also reflected political and cultural unity. The aim was to encourage a European dimension in education in the content of education in each of the member states. The Action Program cleared the ground for student mobility programs like ERASMUS, COMETT and Youth for Europe (YES). But the Resolution of the Council and the minister meeting within the Council on the European dimension in education was not issued until 1988 with the purpose „to strengthen the European dimension in education by launching a series of concerted measures for the period 1988 to 1992.“ The articles 126, 127 and 128 of the Maastricht Treaty provided legal basis for the community to embark on a policy in matters concerning education, vocational training and culture, but still fully recognizing the responsibility of the member states with regard to the content and structure of education and to cultural diversity.

This short overview of the period since World War II reminds us that the quest for unity is still a conspicuous element in European policy and education is increasingly being involved as part of it; it might also remind us that „the history of Western Europe can never be taken as being the sum of the separate national histories placed in juxtaposition. For Western Europe as a meaningful entity was in existence long before the emergence of separate national states. Christian Europe had first to flourish to make possible the emergence of national politico-economic aspirations. By the same token, the nations themselves, taken as themselves, offer no valid explanation for the European idea. For that we must look beyond the individual nations and examine in some detail their common cultural heritage of which the practice of Christianity has been one of the most important elements.“⁶ It should also be pointed out that it has been men of Eastern rather than Western origin who in early history made Western Europe what it is today. Here lies a challenge to the „Western“ European idea in education.

⁵ M. McLean, *Britain and a Single Market Europe* (London: Kogan Page, 1990), p. 4.

⁶ Mallinson, *The Western European Idea in Education*, p. 13.

If Europe has to build a new social order in the next century for the reasons mentioned, what are our expectations to this so-called postmodern age? How to create an order out of chaos not based on suppression and violence? Are we moving towards a new supra-national entity? If so, of what kind will it be? I don't think many of us really believe in the creation of a united supra-national entity in the classical sense. But what other alternatives do we have? Are we moving into an order governed less by states than by the market and with only occasional and temporary „islands of order"? Or will we remain in the past in a „Europe of native states," as some politicians argue for?

Contents and Purpose

None of the following articles gives a final answer to such questions, for the simple reason that there are no such answers. But all of them illuminate an aspect of education in Europe, show us some of the possibilities and limitations of European education and point out some of the dangers we have to face if education is to be involved in a „new order" project. With such a reservation in mind the volume could assist and guide future decisions in European educational policies.

For practical reasons the articles have been arranged in five sections, each of which contains articles which represent a major challenge to education in Europe today:

1. The Cultural Heritage of the European: Some Perspectives.
2. Education and Cultures: Multicultural and Intercultural.
3. The European Dimension in Education.
4. Education and Society: Policy, Quality and Control.
5. Education in Europe from a Global Point of View.

There are no particularly clear or fixed boundaries between the five sections. However, in general terms, the first section deals with the European as an *individual* in different contexts of its cultural heritage; the second section with the *diversity* -- national, regional and ethnic -- within Europe; the third with the difficulties related to the creation of *unity*, concentrating on „the European dimension" in education; the fourth with some important aspects of the *relationship* between education and society in

some contemporary European cases; the fifth and final section is reserved for the „illumination” of the European situation in a *global* context through perspectives and experiences acquired outside Europe.

Section I

The Cultural Heritage of the European: Some Perspectives

FORMATION, EDUCATION AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

Per Øhrgaard

The present author does not belong to the educational profession. I am not qualified to take part in discussions of certain educational theories and practical procedures, and yet my own work has much to do with education. Not only do I teach students in a university, but from time to time I also include in my lectures treatises whose educational content is obvious.

In comparison to the expertise of those in the field of education, however, I am but a layman: a literary scholar whose field is German literature, and from this particular field I will present some quotations in the belief that they are generally applicable. If en route some of my remarks make the reader think that the discussions of these matters have been done with for a long while, then take comfort in the thought that, nevertheless, you will get to know how much the general debate lags behind your own reflections. My starting point is Goethe, with some quotations from the 1820s.

Matters within the moral domain can be controlled no better than steam engines. The bustle of commerce, the rustle and whiz of paper money, debts swelling to pay old debts; all this constitutes the enormous elements a young man of today is exposed to. Fortunate is he, if by nature he is endowed with a moderate and tranquil disposition so that he neither demands too much of the world nor allows himself to be governed by it.

This reflection is found in Goethe's last novel *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (WM's Wanderings), published in 1829. It is surrounded with observations of a similar kind, such as the following:

What I must consider the greatest disaster of our time, which refuses to let anything ripen, is the habit that people immediately devour what happened before, let the day be devoured by the day and in this way constantly live from hand to mouth without seriously accomplishing anything. Already now we have newspapers at all hours of the day! Some bright person might easily squeeze in one more. In this way everything that every single person performs, concerns himself with, composes, nay, all that he undertakes, is disclosed to the public. No one can allow himself to be happy or suffer unless it is intended for passing away the time for other people, and in this way everything jumps from house to house, from town to town, from country to country, finally from continent to continent, all of it at great velocity.

Deploring the decline of the present time is certainly not new; neither was it a novel idea in the 1820s. It is, I suppose, one of the oldest occupations of mankind. What I consider worthy of emphasizing in Goethe's reflections is partly that they are sections of a major project of a novel dealing with education in general (with *Bildung*, as the Germans say), and partly that Goethe specifically states *what* makes his time different from the preceding one. It is the acceleration and the disclosure: in other words, changes in both time and space, and these changes are very closely linked together. The faster life goes, the more it becomes the proof of the existence of everything that it can appear in the newspapers. The legitimacy of an event, an action, even a biography no longer lies in its relationship to God, eternity, in short metaphysics, but must instead be understood in its relations to topicality, to the public: no one can be happy or suffer, unless this serves as a pastime for others, Goethe says.

But Goethe does not simply turn his back on his own age. He relates to it in a very critical way, but he is fully aware of the fact that it cannot be ignored. The steam engine -- the technology of the modern world which changed life just as radically as have the computers of today -- cannot be stopped, and therefore it serves no purpose to fan a futile rebellion against the spiritual and moral changes brought about by the present day. You

must be aware of them, must try to stick to your own course, develop strategies to „save“ as much as possible of what has any value. It is not a goal in itself to be contrary to the spirit of the day, but we can be forced to try to resist it. One more quotation from Goethe:

The most inferior person can be complete, as long as he moves within the limits of his capability and proficiency; but even beautiful assets are darkened, abolished and annihilated if the average objective so rigidly demanded is missing. This disaster will be seen more and more often in our time, for who will be able to live up to the demands made by an altogether intensified present which even moves at the highest speed?

Goethe used to be presented as the great „Olympian“ who united the qualities of his era and his cultural circle, the universal man -- as often as not with the addition: the *last* universal man. This was an admission of the fact that Goethe's diagnosis of his own time was correct, but at the same time an assertion of the knowledge that this particular circumstance shows us that he was still in possession of a broad view of things. Contemporary presentations are not so sure about this: they stress the ruptures also found in his life and dismiss the talk about the „Olympic.“

Goethe himself was well aware of these ruptures; the quotations make this quite clear. For what does Goethe emphasize as the fixed point in this confused world? Not much: he only says that we should consider fortunate the man who *by nature* is endowed with a moderate and quiet personality. Evidently only natural predisposition can be of any help in the fight against the casual character of the time and its claim to „participation.“ But if you look more closely at the context, a good deal of education is also of some help. Like its predecessor of thirty years earlier, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (WM's Apprenticeship), *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* is an educational novel, actually containing a famous section about the so-called „pedagogical province“ in which young people are taken expertly in hand by clever adults, but also, in a sense, taken out of time, isolated, in order to develop peacefully. Sentences like the ones quoted above are naturally not written without an educational intention. In this part of the world Goethe stands as the most important representative of the particular mixture of education, training and growth, which in German is called *Bildung*, and in Danish *dannelse*: a kind of all-around education and

formation emphasizing personal development. He holds this position, despite the fact that he did not use the word very often, and rarely with the emphasis used by some of his contemporaries and especially by many of his successors. He used it in passing, if at all, or sometimes as a definition, but above all he described specific processes of education: a fictitious one in the novel about Wilhelm Meister, his own in his autobiography *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, whose title also speaks of fiction. It is, of course, a decisive fact that we speak of epic presentations: Bildung is not just the final outcome, and it is better described through examples than doctrines.

Bildung, as understood by Goethe, was a synthesis of the faith in the importance of learning and education in the age of Enlightenment and Rousseau's criticism of the very same enlightenment. For Bildung is not only socialization and adjustment, but also personal growth. Bildung does not necessarily bring the individual in total agreement with his time and surroundings, but brings the individual on speaking terms with them. It makes communication possible; it acts as intermediary between the objective world seen by the individual and the subjective demands on his life made by the said individual. This has brought about much theory, but not from Goethe's hand. He spoke of Bildung in an epic sequence. Generations of interpreters of the novel about Wilhelm Meister have been busy wondering exactly *what* it is that Wilhelm Meister learns in the course of his education. It can, in fact, hardly be described, for he actually only learns how to learn, how to keep an open mind for the impressions he receives, and how to bring them in harmony with his own scheme of life that he but slowly becomes conscious of. As one of the above-mentioned quotations says, the novel is about finding the balance between the demands the individual puts on the world and the fact that everybody must adjust to given conditions. It is not the latter assertion that is the new idea, it is, of course, the former one; and it presupposes a dynamic world like the one leading up to 1789.

Looking at literary history after Goethe, however, one discovers that it doesn't last long before this beautiful picture of man begins to crack. Indeed, it may be that it exists only in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, which was written in the 1790s and does not know much of steam engines as yet. Already its successor, the *Wanderjahre*, from which I quoted, has given up the all-around education, the all-around breadth of view as something

which can be achieved by a single person. *Wanderjahre* tells us about the conscious division of work as the requirement of the time; Wilhelm Meister, who originally wanted to realize universality as an artist, at the end pursues an education as a surgeon, but he also discovers that while as an artist he could, at the most, put ideas into his own head and that of a few others, as a surgeon he actually saves the lives of people. The human being of this new age, the 19th century, must learn to see himself as a cog in the machine -- yet hopefully a necessary and useful cog! -- and no longer or only very indirectly as a microcosmos.

After his death things do not improve. Literature becomes critical. To be sure there is an abundance of novels about *Bildung*, but the best of them become more and more doubtful, fulfilment is no more felt by the heroes in connection with society. Rather, they withdraw from it or become its victims or seek religious fields, e.g. the many eccentrics in German literature, *Madame Bovary* by Flaubert or the characters in Dostoyevsky's work. There are more *Illusions perdues* than „Great Expectations.“ If the attempt to create a private mythology fails, or it isn't possible to become attached to existing religion, nihilism as a way of life becomes predominant and leaves its stamp on the characters in the novels.

That is not all: at the end of the 19th century, and even more so in the course of the 20th century, the prevailing epic coherence breaks up, development itself becomes problematic, and so does the conception of the „individual.“ More and more often do we read novels in which the character is not an individual in the sense of *Bildung*: a person who becomes able to interpret his various experiences as a coherent and meaningful biography, but a creature who meets with something, who notices this or that, but no longer can claim the right to assert that he can interpret his world. The protagonist in Kafka is not Josef K., but *Der Prozess*, the trial itself. Hermann Broch calls his characters *Schlafwandler* (Sleepwalkers), Robert Musil creates *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (The Man without Qualities) as the adequate figure of the new age; André Gide translated this conception into „*l'homme disponible*.“ Even in works in which the author has tried to keep the mythical patterns -- as did Joyce in *Ulysses*, and Thomas Mann in *Joseph und seine Brüder* -- they have been broken and spoken of ironically. Marcel Proust, like a second Don Giovanni, sets out *A la recherche du temps perdu*, compensating with quantity for the lost quality

in his life. By describing the works in this way I do not by any means want to say anything negative about their artistic value; on the contrary, their quality is the very fact that they have after all been able to *shape* the more and more shapeless reality.

While great art tells us about unsuccessful education, about the lack of a center, about the disintegration of the world, then our educational practice is still based on the picture of mankind created by the Enlightenment. The ideal is the man of authority, the person who -- again according to Goethe -- „as little as possible allows himself to be governed by his surroundings, and as much as possible decides for himself.“ The ideal is to create good citizens, and in a democratic age „good citizens“ means free, independent individuals who can see how their own lives are put together, and see this in connection with a meaningful social order -- or, if it isn't meaningful, are able to intervene in the disorder and reshape the world. It is no wonder that the literary instruction that became dominant in the 19th century schools and which was used to mark young people, was often in conflict with contemporary literature; for the latter did show the young generation a picture different from the educational picture of them.

By and large the neo-humanist picture of mankind has been kept, in spite of Marx's demonstrations of the social patterns and their determination, in spite of Darwin's ascertainment of the biological determination, in spite of Freud's assertion that „the ego is not master in its own house.“ Sometimes one can even feel that upbringing, teaching and education are no longer there as a following-up of prevailing scholarly paradigms, but in spite of them. And we cannot very well ignore the fact that the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century have had a preserving influence on the official picture of mankind in the societies that were lucky enough not to become their victims. Here we approach the set of problems known as the transformation of Utopias into Dystopias, the failing belief in the continued progress in knowledge, education and virtue and respectability. The pedagogical provinces of the 20th century have moved to a *Brave New World* or to *1984*. Fascist and Stalinist practice has created resistance -- and thank God for that! One can ask oneself, however, if this resistance hasn't after all been powerless against other changes that did not proclaim themselves as openly as the above-mentioned, i.e. against the steam engines of our time.

The main aim of the Danish school speaks of making the pupils independent and critical, good, democratic citizens, presupposing that this is not just a question of adjusting the pupils to a specific legal order, but in fact a question of personal development aiming at taking responsibility for oneself and for society. Democracy is understood to be a way of life, an attitude, not just a set of rules. One could not find another definition than the classical one in the slightly humanized (if one compares them to Stalinism) socialistic states after 1945: in a canonic East German book about culture and society from the 1970s, socialist man is outlined in phrases that might have come directly from Goethe and perhaps did: the individual is a part of the whole, at the same time reflecting this „whole“ in his own all-around development . . . In Jürgen Habermas' notion of *herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation* (control-free communication) it is almost the learned man's republic that appears again: the world as one big academy. Personally I am much attracted by these thoughts and ideas, but it is impossible to avoid seeing the larger problems connected with the assertion of this authority while at the same time research work in every field is far more inclined to ascertain man's dependence than his freedom. Naturally, contemporary philosophers and teachers are fully aware of these problems! Therefore they encourage critical thinking. On the other hand, man does not live on criticism alone, and great practical problems are connected with even the best-intentioned upbringing to become dissociated from dominant tendencies. I rejoice whenever I see that, for example, the Danish school integrates environmental problems and ethnic conflicts in its schedules, thus trying to teach children a sensible handling of the resources of the earth and tolerance of so-called strangers. This is far better than my own childhood's cheerful proclaiming of the values of our own society as being God-given and eternal, including the uncritical biographies of great colonizers found in our English textbooks. But I can also see the greater consciousness of problems as threatening the fundamental *joie de vivre*: everything deals with the urge to conserve, to save, to resist, to avoid -- or it may deal with the fact that the development of one's own personality must disregard anything but one's own self. It has often been said that my generation grew up in the shadow of the atomic bomb, but I don't remember that this menace became second nature to us, at least not in the same way as I hear and see that the new dangers do, making not only the adults

but even the children concerned or scared. Maybe we shall see many new convents in the future: retreats for those who think that they can only live up to their own moral codex by withdrawing from the world -- and we shall certainly see many examples of the opposite attitude: of cynicism developing when young people discover that the demands of the current world can only be met at the cost of ideas about universal and personal ethics.

In the wake of the disintegration of the individual comes the disintegration of society. For it is not so that the relation between a collective and an individual is an either/or relation: either the reign of a strong collectivism or of individualism. On the contrary: society and the individual are dependent on each other -- also in a negative way: if one part is missing, the other degenerates. A strong society requires strong individuals, and the developing of such individuals demands the existence of a society which creates a framework and builds structures. The development in the former socialist countries shows us that it is not a long way from extreme collectivism to the just as extreme individualism regardless of the surroundings. *Les extrêmes se touchent* (the extremes come together), because the collective as a coercive measure has already developed the evasive actions which, given a free hand, will blow society to pieces. In our own societies the dependence on traditional narcotics may perhaps soon look quite harmless in comparison to the one created by the possibility to shut oneself away in one's „own“ illustrated universe, and quite literally ignore an „objective“ outer world: virtual reality, cyberspace, instead of what we used to call reality.

Now, at least two objections can rightly be directed against this sombre panorama: the first is that since things evidently have gone wrong from at least the time of Goethe, and the world has not come to an end yet, the fear that it will do so in the near future is perhaps somehow exaggerated; and we can point to the fact that the transformation of the world into an electronic network -- which some may deplore -- has also played its positive role in the disintegration of totalitarian structures in, for example, the communist world. The second objection is this: that there has never been a common basis for the educator and the one who is supposed to be educated or learn something, which the educational idea implies; there was merely the power of the „system“ to declare itself universal. The majority of the

people taken through the educational system of the countries was socialized in this way, not so seldom socialized away from their origin and basis altogether, be it ethnic or class-determined.

However, if a development continues long enough, quantity at a certain point will turn into a new quality, and the socializing function of education and of the school is strongly declining. At least in my country, school no longer has the power and status giving priority to its own interpretation of the world rather than to any other brought by the students themselves. The school is based on the idea that there *is* a common foundation, it is not capable of *creating* one. It may look different in other European countries. That things in Denmark look the way they do is owing to the fact that society agreed on a consensus that the object of the school was not to find the most talented youngsters, but to give as many as possible a chance in life. In its conception of itself the Danish school system is not a selective mechanism, but on the contrary has an integrating function.

This talk about my own country is by no means intended as an advertisement, but should call attention to another side of Goethe's words quoted before. He not only spoke of the changes of the time, that its speed accelerated and threatened to leave the human beings behind, but he spoke also of space doing the same: everything jumped „at great velocity“ not only from moment to moment but from „house to house, from town to town, from country to country, from continent to continent“: in other words, everything became internationalized (and Goethe was the first person to use the expression „world literature“ as designation for a new kind of literature, no longer characterized only by a national peculiarity, but by its relation to the whole world).

Goethe's -- and his contemporaries' -- notion of *Bildung* became of great importance in his native country, among other things because one of its most momentous representatives, Wilhelm von Humboldt, was also minister of culture in Prussia and in that capacity laid the foundation of the Berlin university during this time. It also became important in Denmark, not only because Denmark then had a very close interaction with German culture, but also, I believe, because Denmark, like most German territories at that time, was a comparatively manageable entity. Almost fifty years after Goethe, the great Danish critic Georg Brandes summarized in 1878 his impressions of Berlin in a remark indicating that *Bildung* was still alive

(although declining). He characterized the ideals of the great European countries as follows: in England one should be „a perfect gentleman,“ in France, „*un homme d'esprit*“ (a man of spirit), but in Germany the ideal was still that of a „cultured, *gebildet* (having accomplished or received *Bildung*), person,“ which of course is related to the English and French notions, but yet also different. The characteristic aspect of *Bildung*, in the words of Brandes in *Berlin som tysk Rigshovedstad* (Berlin as the Capital of the German Reich), was its insistence on the combination of „individuality“ and „universality“: the universal aspect was the constant attempt to get further than purely professional-scientific knowledge, the individual aspect was the very high position of personal acquisition and shaping of knowledge.

Without always having been formulated so outright, such perceptions have also stamped thoughts about upbringing and education in Denmark. These days -- so I gather -- the lack of sufficiently good middle-range training is much discussed in France, for example, and the big gap between the very well-educated people and those with only very little education is deplored as a threat to the dynamic and competitive power of France. In this discussion the French often refer to Germany and its highly developed system of professional education below the academic level, but yet with more than just functional ambitions. I don't want to make myself out to be wise enough to know if the French self-criticism and the occasional admiration for the German system is justified or not; I shall only point out that something very similar to the German system also exists in Denmark, and that it might be owing to the common roots in neo-humanism about 1800 which was able to conceive a picture of man in which the objective-professional and the personal-mature, in which society and individual were seen as one item. At the end of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* Wilhelm is part of, and he himself embodies, such a „human center,“ as expressed by Goethe's colleague Schiller; at the end of Honoré de Balzac's novel *Le père Goriot*, the protagonist Rastignac stands in front of the capital Paris, raising his fist and saying, „*À nous deux, maintenant!*“ This is the individual at war with his conditions, not in harmony with them.

This, I believe, is not only a difference in time (it is *also* that: between the 1790s and the 1830s), but also a difference in space. Not between Germany and France as nations or ethnic groups, but between a small and

a large space, between the German small states and what Walter Benjamin called „the capital of the 19th century“: Paris. Goethe's conception belongs to a manageable form of society, and Goethe himself was not attracted by Berlin or Vienna, the great German-speaking courts of his time. Denmark, too, was such a manageable form of society, indeed more and more so during the course of the 19th century. The state grew smaller and smaller whereas the big European states grew bigger all the time -- England and France through extensive colonizations in other continents, Germany and Italy through an interior unification. After 1864 when Denmark lost her German-speaking regions, Holstein and Schleswig, Denmark became a homogenous national state just as Goethe's Saxony-Weimar (but not Prussia and far less Austria) had been. The struggle for unity from the top (the formation of the state) and from the bottom (ethnicism) went together and reduced the importance of the social tensions which naturally existed in this country also: social tensions could neither be intensified nor be explained with ethnic contrasts. This situation had consequences also for thoughts about upbringing and education: the harmony between the exterior and the interior, high and low, as had been proclaimed by the idea about education harbored by neo-Humanism, seemed possible, indeed it appeared -- but that was surely often a misunderstanding -- to be already realized. Hardly any country has such a strong Folk High School movement as does Denmark. The interesting thing about that movement is perhaps not so much the idea of bringing education to „the people“ -- this idea is, of course, not specifically Danish, and actually it was not everybody who took part in the movement -- but the fact that it rated the idea of *Bildung* so highly that it rejected formally-qualifying tests, as it does even today! This can only be done where there is a basic coherence between the capabilities and expectations of the person in question and the requirements of society or state, a coherence so extensive that it becomes unnecessary for state or society to control its presence. „*Non scolae, sed vitae*“ is an old saying (actually the reverse of Seneca's „*Non vitae, sed scolae discimus*“, a statement deploring the actual educational conditions in Rome) but here it has been attempted to carry this out in *practical* life. The interesting thing, sociologically speaking, is the fact that such a project which might so easily have ended in sectarianism, turned out to contribute strongly to the reforming of a

whole nation. That, of course, is not due to the Danes being better people than other nations, but probably in particular to their homogeneity and manageability.

The manageable times are over, as are the times of quietly progressing education or development. Time accelerates, space widens, power is becoming concentrated, the claims on young people become stronger and stronger – and more and more of these youngsters react singly or in groups by shutting themselves off from this development, by turning their backs on society, opting out of it, or perhaps making violent attacks on it. The distance between an abstract knowledge reaching as far as outer space and concrete experience reaching the nearest McDonald's seems to be ever-growing. Thus, on one hand we demand a global moral system which is difficult to make one's own because the reference is without experience; on the other hand, unrestrained egotism prospers more openly than before. It is not news that it exists, but it is partly a new feature that it has such a good conscience. On one hand the demand to feed all the hungry of the world, on the other British Prime Minister John Major's call of May, 1994, for removing the beggars from the streets because they embarrass the aesthetic sense of the well-off people.

This is a problem in itself. It seems to me to be a still larger problem that the combination of rational and irrational which characterizes every human development, and thus every educational effort as well, is becoming more difficult to manage. People have not become and will never become grown-up mature persons simply by *learning* something, and no teacher ever found it a success just to grind some knowledge into the heads of his pupils. Adventures, experience, exultation are also necessary; the educator has always made an impression not through his capabilities alone, but also by means of his person, by charisma, and the material has always been acquired not only as knowledge, but also as adventure or mythology, whether it bore such a name or only seemed to do so. What began as an exciting story of the history of one's country, changed little by little to reflective knowledge about it, and what was un-questioned exultation might turn into criticism. One might ask if such changes still exist, or whether the scope between what is irrational and what is rational has become so large that communication is no longer possible. Either you stick unreflectingly to the irrational sphere and shut yourself away from actual

processes in the world, or you sell your soul to rational knowledge and ignore all that stands against it. The first may lead to barbarity, the second to cynicism. Or in other words: will it still be possible to keep the many „identities“ we all have -- birth, sex, family, school/education, political, national, etc. -- together in a kind of system, or will they disintegrate, maybe even combat one another?

What Goethe and other far-seeing people among his contemporaries saw appear on the horizon is everyday reality for us now. Our world becomes larger and larger, we are informed about events -- preferably catastrophes -- in the remotest parts of the world and are expected to form a well-founded opinion about them, but at the same time our feeling of being mere extras on the stage grows, because the quantity of information as well as the problems they illustrate is far beyond our imagination, let alone our possibilities for action. We can choose -- and we do so out of sheer need -- to throw our powers into the nearest demands, but this is followed by the feeling of its being completely futile, because superior processes at the same time remove the very basis for our thoughts and actions. Of course there will always be, in all societies, persons and groups who, owing to their predispositions or favored by their social conditions can relate rationally to everything that comes their way, and who will lead and form the elite of society. My concern, here expressed in accordance with a long tradition in my society, is not whether the future will provide us with a sufficient elite, but whether we shall be able to hold the elite to something common, bind it to values recognizable to others than the elite. The great project whose beginning in our historic framework can be dated to the European Enlightenment is idealistically seen as a project for everybody. What threatens us today is a new radical barrier between elite and common people that would mean the failure of education and democracy.

A comparatively peaceful example which it will be apt to bring up among European points of view is the discussion about the future of Europe. On the one hand, we must all be Europeans now (and so we shall, inasmuch as the actual integration has proceeded quite far and therefore demands a different way of thinking from before, and above all with many more people than before at that!); on the other hand, we cling more and more to what we understand as our roots, our native soil, our culture, in a common and quite empty word, our „identity.“ The optimists, then, say it

is quite all right. The more we are challenged by the increasingly international world, the more do we become conscious of our peculiarity and its qualities, and with a stronger consciousness we can thereafter contribute to the community. It is the old *Bildung* idea in today's clothing, and it's handsome enough, but is it supported by experience? Aren't there far more indications that communication between different levels fails? History has been vastly used as an identity-creating factor for collectives. The history about the European wars could be an excellent starting point for an understanding of the necessity of cooperation -- but the ethnic groups who now fight each other in various parts of Europe *also* plead history as their reference and teacher. And what is, after all, European history? In recent years some attempts have been made to create common European works or works about common European subjects, even as historical textbooks. But as far as I have seen they have all been met with the predictable and probably also correct criticism that they express a certain major country's ideas about Europe, but not a European idea.

The contradictions today are manifold. On one hand, it seems as if the freedom of the individual is a thousand times greater than before: in our European society we can practically behave „as we like it.“ On the other hand, we have enormous concentrations of power which reduce freedom to a question of choice among possibilities created by others. We have a civilization which modernizes everything incessantly and mercilessly and then from time to time looks back with longing for the old and true world, because the acceleration of the world often also leaves a feeling of uneasiness with some of the people who administer it. Thus society claims that the course of education, the upbringing, the process of bringing about culture, is supposed to provide a rising generation not only with the latest knowledge, but also with the old ethics -- an impossible task that society itself cannot live up to. New knowledge and old virtues, that's the way we want it. The faster and more confused our lives, the shriller sound the moral notes, the higher the flood of information rises, the more hysterically we cling to what we inherited. It is not merely a joke that the abbreviation PC can mean both „personal computer“ and „political correctness.“

Finally, we see in these years after the fall of communism a discrediting not only of this particular Utopia, but of Utopias in general. We see it, I believe, not only *after* the failure of communism, but maybe we had better see this failure as part of a general de-utopianizing which is based on the

fact that it has not been possible to formulate values to succeed those that in practice have dominated our societies: control of nature, work, technical initiative, the pursuit of happiness and wealth. For quite some time it might seem as if our proclaimed values -- charity, justice, liberty -- were not contrary to what we practiced, and maybe they were not. Scientific progress did serve to fight diseases, increased the use of natural resources, did put an end to some poverty. Now it is evident for all of us that Europeans have made their estimation of values a global one, but at the same time it is unthinkable that the whole world will ever be able to exist on the material level that has stretched out a safety net under our proclaimed values. How much exertion and privation, how much personal and social energy has not been evoked by the wish that „my children must have a better life than I had!“ And how difficult has it become today -- in our part of the world! -- to believe that this will be possible.

In postmodern times, when „anything goes,“ upbringing and education are either completely outdated or they are more important than ever before. I believe the latter statement to be true, and it is for this reason that present these unfinished considerations. To be sure, I don't feel capable of putting into words the guidelines along which upbringing and education should take place on the above described conditions. I cannot say that it is impossible to define, but only that I am convinced that those with greater expertise in the field of education will do it much better than I -- and that I hope they will succeed, if not right here and now, then in common, continued work.

L'EUROPE ET L'EDUCATION: ÉLÉMENTS D'ANALYSE SOCIO-HISTORIQUE DES POLITIQUES ÉDUCATIVES EUROPEENNES

António Nóvoa

Ce texte porte sur l'éducation dans la Petite Europe, celle qui se nomme Union Européenne et qui a son siège à Bruxelles¹. Une Europe «royale» qu'on ne saurait raconter de par elle-même, sans une référence aux autres Europes, au-delà, mais aussi au-deçà, du mur de Maastricht: l'Europe des immigrés, des nouvelles formes de discrimination, des groupes sans voix dans notre société de communication.

À la distance de trois quarts de siècle, l'interrogation provocante de Paul Valéry me frappe toujours:

L'Europe deviendra-t-elle *ce qu'elle est en réalité*, c'est-à-dire: un petit cap du continent asiatique?

Ou bien l'Europe restera-t-elle *ce qu'elle paraît*, c'est-à-dire: la partie précieuse de l'univers terrestre, la perle de la sphère, le cerveau d'un vaste corps?²

¹ Ce texte a été préparé aux États-Unis, en 1993/1994. Il doit beaucoup à la collaboration et aux critiques des collègues de l'Université de Wisconsin-Madison, tout spécialement de Thomas Popkewitz et Andreas Kazamias. La version finale fut rédigée à Paris, pendant un séjour très stimulant au *Service d'Histoire de l'Éducation*, dirigé par Pierre Caspard. Je tiens aussi à remercier l'appui et les suggestions de Jürgen Schriewer, Marc Depaepe et Evanthis Milingou.

² Cf. J. Derrida, *L'autre cap* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991).

Et pourtant les temps ne sont plus ni à l'eurocentrisme, ni à l'anti-eurocentrisme. «Ne pas déplorer, ne pas rire, ne pas détester, mais comprendre»: on s'étonne quelque peu de voir Pierre Bourdieu³ reprendre à son compte ce vieux précepte spinoziste. Mais, avouons-le: c'est peut-être le seul moyen d'éviter la démesure totalisatrice d'un rationalisme dogmatique ou la démission esthète d'un irrationalisme nihiliste: pour ma part, je me contenterai de quelques vérités partielles, cherchant à rendre raison d'un projet européen auquel nous sommes tous engagés, par la parole ou par le silence.

Je dis nous et, par là même, je m'identifie à ce projet, et je prends la parole pour essayer de le saisir. Moi, portugais, né dans un pays de la périphérie européenne, un pays tourné depuis toujours vers l'Amérique, vers l'Asie, vers l'Afrique. Je me souviens d'avoir échappé à la guerre coloniale à cause de la Révolution des Oeillets, en 1974. Aujourd'hui, je retrouve l'Afrique dans les rues de Lisbonne, de Madrid, de Paris... Et je pense au bel essai de Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*,⁴ où elle montre la façon dont la *négritude* a joué un rôle décisif dans la construction de la *blancheur*. De mon village du Nord du Portugal je retiens les longues murailles, signe fort d'une territorialisation accomplie, mais je retiens aussi le pont menant à l'Espagne, signe de liaison et de transgression.

Qu'on me pardonne ce détour dans la mémoire de mon pays. Mais je voulais commencer par un plaidoyer en faveur d'une Europe qui ne succombe pas sous l'excès du même, qui ne se construit pas sur l'absence de l'autre; en faveur d'une Europe qui bâtit son identité à partir d'une compréhension profonde de son altérité. Ainsi, elle sera en mesure de regarder ses frontières, internes et externes, comme des ponts, et non plus comme des murailles.

Dans la première partie, j'interroge le processus historique d'édification des systèmes scolaires, en liaison directe avec la consolidation des «nouveaux» États-nations, de façon à bien cerner le rôle de l'école dans la formation d'une citoyenneté nationale à l'intérieur des frontières d'un État souverain.

Dans la deuxième partie, j'analyse les politiques éducatives de l'Union Européenne (contextes, définitions, discours), pour soutenir que l'idée d'une

³ P. Bourdieu, ed., *La misère du monde* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1993).

⁴ T. Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

école s'exprimant au-delà de l'État-nation implique des changements majeurs dans la structure même des systèmes d'enseignement.

Finalement, dans la troisième partie, je souligne l'importance de la participation des communautés scientifiques, notamment des comparatistes en éducation, aux débats sur la problématique éducative européenne, à travers la production d'une pensée critique et théorique.

L'état-nation et la construction des systèmes d'enseignement: approches historiques

Les réformes scolaires dans l'Europe du XVIII^e siècle

Les théoriciens du *politique* ont montré que l'émergence du nationalisme en tant qu'idéologie est un phénomène du XVIII^e siècle, même si des sentiments «nationaux» peuvent être identifiés bien avant. Des auteurs comme Ernest Gellner,⁵ Benedict Anderson,⁶ Anthony Smith⁷ ou Charles Tilly⁸ ont mis en évidence les liens entre la *modernité* comme structure de pensée et la *nation* comme système idéologique: «ce n'est que pendant la période moderne que le principe de la division des populations grâce à son caractère national et à la possession d'une identité commune s'est imposé parmi les classes européennes éduquées».⁹ Cette thèse va à l'encontre des idées reçues sur la pérennité des nations, envisagées comme des formes «naturelles» d'organisation des peuples.

Dans un ouvrage de référence sur l'origine et la diffusion du nationalisme, Benedict Anderson soutient que les nations sont des communautés politiques *imaginées*: «En réalité, toutes les communautés plus larges que les petits villages (et encore!) sont imaginées. Les communautés se différencient non pas par leur fausseté/authenticité, mais par la façon à travers

⁵ E. Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

⁶ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1983).

⁷ A.D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

⁸ C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).

⁹ A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986), p. 11.

laquelle elles sont imaginées». ¹⁰ Par ailleurs, cette *imagination* se produit à l'intérieur de certaines limites (frontières), car le nationalisme a une finitude que les religions ne connaissent pas, et construit un principe de souveraineté, puisque le concept de nation est né dans un temps de Lumières et de Révolution où il fallait détruire l'ordre ancien. Il y a deux siècles, confirme Charles Tilly, une autre forme de nationalisme, plus stricte et plus forte, est devenue prédominante dans la politique européenne: «l'idée que les peuples qui parlent par des nations cohérentes et rien qu'eux ont le droit de diriger des États souverains». ¹¹

La reconstruction au XVIII^e siècle du principe de citoyenneté doit être mis en rapport avec l'affirmation des États-nations dans le contexte européen. Jusqu'alors la citoyenneté n'était pas conceptuellement liée à l'identité nationale; bien au contraire, comme le montre Elizabeth Meehan, ¹² elle avait été définie et redéfinie dans différents espaces et systèmes de croyances, tels que la cité de la Renaissance ou l'idéal stoïcien de la *cosmopolis*. Dorénavant, la citoyenneté s'exprime à l'intérieur d'une *nation souveraine*, ce qui change le statut des affiliations et des fidélités, tout en entraînant de nouveaux systèmes d'identification et d'appartenance. ¹³ Ainsi conçue, la citoyenneté est le fruit d'une *modernité* qui cherche à redéfinir les liens entre les populations et l'État sur la base d'une normativité qui se dit rationnelle et scientifique. ¹⁴

Nationalité, Souveraineté, Citoyenneté: voilà la triade de référence d'un projet sociopolitique qui accorde à l'État le monopole de la violence symbolique, dite *légitime*. L'école joue un rôle central dans la transformation des populations en nations, à travers l'attribution à un arbitraire culturel de toutes les apparences du naturel. ¹⁵ Le mouvement des réformes scolaires de la fin du XVIII^e siècle doit être interprété à cette lumière, c'est-à-

¹⁰ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.

¹¹ C. Tilly, „States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992,“ in *Theory and Society* 23 (1) (1994), p. 133.

¹² E. Meehan, „Citizenship and the European Community,“ in *The Political Quarterly* 64 (2) (1993), pp. 172-186.

¹³ J. Habermas, „Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,“ in *Praxis International* 12 (1) (1992), pp. 1-19.

¹⁴ R. Dahrendorf, „Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of an Idea,“ in *Social Research* 41 (4) (1974), pp. 673-701.

¹⁵ Habermas, „Citizenship and National Identity.“

dire comme un des lieux porteurs d'une nouvelle façon de gouverner, modulant les sujets en citoyens tout en entérinant de nouveaux liens entre les individus et l'État. Le concept de *gouvernementalité* c'est-à-dire la manière dont la conduite d'un ensemble d'individus s'est trouvée impliquée, de façon plus ou moins marquée, dans l'exercice du pouvoir souverain¹⁶ est très utile pour expliquer un projet historique qui inscrit la préoccupation éducative au sein du processus de modernisation de l'État. L'école sera, dorénavant, l'un des instruments principaux pour forger une solidarité nationale, dans le cadre de l'invention d'une citoyenneté qui se pense au niveau de l'État-nation et qui sert de justification à une politique d'homogénéisation culturelle.¹⁷

La cartographie des réformes scolaires dans l'Europe du XVIII^e siècle a déjà été établie, notamment par Roger Chartier et Dominique Julia.¹⁸ réforme amédéenne en Piémont (1729), réformes pombalines au Portugal (1759 et 1772), établissement de la Commission des études et réforme des gymnases en Autriche (1760 et 1775), réforme des collèges en France (1763), édit scolaire de Frédéric II de Prusse (1763), Commission d'Éducation Nationale en Pologne (1774), réforme d'Alexandre Ipsilanti en Valachie (1775), Commission royale des études aux Pays-Bas autrichiens (1775), *Ratio educationis* en Hongrie (1779), réforme scolaire dans le royaume de Naples (1777), Commission pour la fondation d'écoles publiques en Russie (1782), etc. La liste peut également englober les initiatives de réforme qui ont eu lieu en Angleterre, au Danemark, en Espagne, en Suède ou en Suisse.¹⁹

¹⁶ M. Foucault, *Dits et Écrits* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1994).

¹⁷ H. Röhrs, „A United Europe as a Challenge to Education,“ in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 3 (1) (1992), pp. 59-70.

¹⁸ R. Chartier & D. Julia, „L'école: traditions et modernisation,“ in *Transactions of the Seventh International Congress on the Enlightenment* (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1989).

¹⁹ Étant donné la quantité de références bibliographiques sur ce thème, je me contente d'avancer quelques suggestions de lecture: M. Archer, *The Social Origins of Educational Systems* (London: Sage, 1979); *Education and Enlightenment*, Actes de la Conférence de l'Association Internationale d'Histoire de l'Éducation (ISCHE) (Wolfenbüttel, 1984); A. Green, *Education and State Formation* (London: Macmillan, 1990); J. Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the 18th-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. Morange & J. F. Chassaing,

D'un site à l'autre, les efforts réformateurs sont, certes, marqués par les histoires et les conjonctures nationales, mais ils sont aussi menés par un projet commun, transnational. S'ouvre alors un cycle historique, pendant lequel la prise en charge étatique de l'éducation est associée à l'émergence de l'État moderne qui institue progressivement son double monopole sur la violence légitime et le prélèvement fiscal.²⁰ Ernest Gellner²¹ soutient même que la centralisation étatique est d'abord la conséquence de la nécessaire centralisation de l'éducation; il estime que le système d'enseignement est la condition nécessaire du développement économique spécifique de la modernité.

La question de l'origine des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement a attiré l'attention de la «nouvelle» Histoire de l'Éducation, écrite depuis les années soixante. Réagissant aux perspectives idéalistes qui regardaient l'école comme un progrès civilisationnel, les «révisionnistes» ont bâti des liens entre le développement scolaire et les phénomènes d'industrialisation et d'urbanisation. Mais ces interprétations avaient tendance à négliger le passé antérieur de l'école, tout en s'avérant incapables d'expliquer quelques paradoxes: comment se fait-il que les premiers systèmes nationaux d'enseignement aient été créés dans des sociétés largement rurales et pré-industrielles (Prusse, Portugal, Autriche, France, etc.), tandis que dans d'autres pays, comme par exemple l'Angleterre, leur développement est postérieur aux processus d'industrialisation et d'urbanisation?

Vers la fin des années soixante-dix les historiens de l'éducation essaient de saisir les processus de changement institutionnel qui ont lieu au XVIII^e siècle, en accordant une toute nouvelle importance aux explications fondées sur la dimension *État*.²² Bientôt, les théories centrées sur la nature

Le mouvement de réforme de l'enseignement en France, 1760-1798 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974); António Nóvoa, *Le temps des professeurs - Analyse sociohistorique de la profession enseignante au Portugal (XVIII^e-XX^e siècle)* (Lisboa: INIC, 1987); Marina Roggero, *Scuola e Riforme nello Stato Sabauda* (Torino: Diputazione Subalpina di Storia Patria, 1981); Antonio Viñao Frago, *Política y educación en los orígenes de la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982).

²⁰ Chartier & Julia, «L'école: traditions et modernisation.»

²¹ E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

²² Archer, *The Social Origins of Educational Systems*.

et le processus de formation de l'État suggèrent des interprétations plus sophistiquées, mettant en rapport la création des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement avec le besoin de former du personnel pour remplir des fonctions étatiques, de diffuser les cultures nationales dominantes et de construire une unité politique et culturelle au sein des nouveaux États-nations.²³

L'école de masses dans la transition du XIX^e vers le XX^e siècle

Les systèmes nationaux d'enseignement se consolident tout le long du XIX^e siècle, dans le cadre de l'affirmation des États-nations. Yves Déloye place l'école au cœur du processus de formation de l'identité civique et nationale; il explique que si le nationalisme crée la nation, c'est d'abord pour résoudre une question politique: comment homogénéiser la culture des citoyens d'un État-nation et, de la sorte, délimiter l'espace de l'identité civique et nationale, tout en circonscrivant le territoire sur lequel l'État exerce son autorité? C'est pourquoi, d'après cet auteur, «le contrôle de l'appareil scolaire national ne vise pas seulement à répondre aux besoins de formation de l'économie moderne mais aussi et peut-être principalement à développer une conscience nationale qui garantit une séparation entre les citoyens nationaux et les étrangers».²⁴

Pierre Bourdieu développe une argumentation semblable quand il se rapporte à l'*unification théorique* opérée par l'État, qui façonne les *structures mentales* et impose des principes de vision et de division communs, des formes de pensée qui contribuent à construire ce que l'on désigne par l'identité nationale:

C'est surtout à travers l'École que, avec la généralisation de l'éducation élémentaire au cours du XIX^e siècle, s'exerce l'action unificatrice de l'État en matière de culture, élément fondamental de la construction de l'État-nation. [...] En imposant et en inculquant universellement (dans les limites de son ressort) une culture dominante ainsi constituée en culture *nationale légitime*, le système scolaire, à travers notamment l'enseignement de l'histoire et, particulièrement, de l'histoire de la litté-

²³ A. Green, „Education and State Formation Revisited,“ in *Historical Studies in Education* 6 (3) (1994).

²⁴ Y. Déloye, *École et Citoyenneté* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1994), p. 23.

rature, inculque les fondements d'une véritable *religion civique* et, plus précisément, les présupposés fondamentaux de l'image (nationale) de soi.²⁵

Le système scolaire devient le lieu de production d'une nouvelle citoyenneté, qui se dégage de ses attachements traditionnels pour joindre le principe d'identité nationale. Qui plus est: une identité qui tend à confondre le nationalisme avec le droit à gouverner des États souverains. Il s'agit, au fond, de replacer la question de l'État au centre de la problématique de la *gouvernementalité*, en insistant sur le rôle décisif accompli par l'école dans le processus historique d'édification des États-nations. Les territoires nationaux sont quadrillés par des réseaux scolaires qui cherchent à encadrer l'ensemble de la population; l'imposition de la scolarité obligatoire même si dans beaucoup de pays, notamment de l'Europe du Sud, elle est plus symbolique que réelle est une date à retenir car elle marque un tournant dans la façon d'envisager les politiques de scolarisation: Danemark (1814), Grèce (1834), Espagne (1838), Suède (1842), Portugal (1844), Norvège (1848), Autriche (1864), Suisse (1874), Italie (1877), Royaume-Uni (1880), France (1882), etc.²⁶

Au XIX^e siècle, le système éducatif assume la responsabilité majeure de la formation de citoyens intégrés dans le projet d'une nation qui se définit, le plus souvent, dans les frontières d'un État souverain. Certains historiens parlent de l'*État enseignant*, pour bien marquer la liaison intime entre le «nouvel» État et le «nouvel» enseignement: il n'est pas possible de rendre raison de l'un sans faire référence à l'autre (et vice-versa). Andy Green a bien caractérisé cette complicité:

²⁵ P. Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), p. 115.

²⁶ Ces informations sont retirées d'un article de Yasemin Soysal et David Strang, „Construction of the First Mass Education Systems in 19th-Century Europe,” in *Sociology of Education* 62 (4) (1989), pp. 277-288 (il y a quelques inexactitudes qui ne mettent pas en cause l'argument principal). Les auteurs fournissent aussi les taux de scolarisation au niveau de l'enseignement primaire, en 1870, de façon à mettre en relief l'accomplissement inégal de la scolarité obligatoire: Danemark (58%), Grèce (20%), Espagne (42%), Suède (71%), Portugal (13%), Norvège (61%), Autriche (40%), Suisse (74%), Italie (29%), Royaume-Uni (49%), France (75%), etc.

[Le système national d'enseignement] a été utilisé pour assimiler les cultures immigrantes, pour promouvoir les doctrines religieuses établies, pour diffuser la norme standardisée de la langue nationale, pour forger une identité nationale et une culture nationale, pour généraliser de nouvelles habitudes et des formes rationnelles de pensée, pour encourager les valeurs patriotiques, pour inculquer les disciplines morales et, surtout, pour endoctriner selon les credos politiques et économiques des classes dominantes. Il a aidé à construire les subjectivités de la citoyenneté, en justifiant les mesures prises par l'État à l'égard du peuple et les devoirs du peuple à l'égard de l'État. Il a cru qu'il était possible de construire chaque personne comme un sujet universel, mais il l'a fait de façon différente selon la classe et le sexe. Il a formé le citoyen responsable, le travailleur diligent, le contribuable complaisant, le juré fiable, le parent consciencieux, l'épouse fidèle, le soldat patriote, et le votant scrupuleux ou soumis.²⁷

Le développement de l'école de masses,²⁸ à partir de la deuxième moitié du XIX^e siècle, constitue un autre moment de ce même processus de prise en charge par l'État des affaires scolaires. On assiste, alors, à un changement d'échelle, mais aussi à la confirmation d'un modèle d'organisation scolaire et d'action pédagogique déployé en Europe tout le long de la modernité. Au tournant du siècle, se consolide en définitive une sorte de *grammaire de l'école*²⁹ qui marque étant donné qu'elle construit et qu'elle organise notre manière de concevoir l'enseignement: des élèves groupés dans des classes graduées, de composition relativement homogène; des enseignants agissant à titre individuel, avec un profil de généralistes (enseignement primaire) ou de spécialistes (enseignement secondaire); des espaces structurés d'action scolaire, appelant à une pédagogie essentiellement centrée sur la salle de classe; des horaires scolaires rigides, qui

²⁷ Green, „Education and State Formation Revisited,” p. 10.

²⁸ J'utilise le concept *école de masses* dans le sens anglophone de *mass schooling*. Il essaye de saisir le processus historique d'expansion de l'enseignement à l'ensemble de la population et, de ce fait, il ne doit pas être confondu avec le concept de *massification de l'enseignement*.

²⁹ D. Tyack & W. Tobin, „The 'Grammar' of Schooling: Why has it been so hard to change?” in *American Educational Research Journal* 31 (3) (1994), pp. 453-479.

mettent en oeuvre un contrôle social du temps; des savoirs organisés en disciplines scolaires, qui fonctionnent en tant qu'axes de référence de l'enseignement et du travail pédagogique. Dorénavant, ce modèle s'impose comme la voie unique pour faire l'école et, du coup, il exclut toutes les autres alternatives. Sa force se mesure non pas par sa capacité de se définir comme le meilleur système, mais par le fait qu'il devient le seul possible, ou même imaginable.

L'étatisation de l'enseignement est intimement lié à deux autres processus: la professionnalisation des enseignants et la construction de la pédagogie scientifique. La professionnalisation s'accompagne d'une politique de normalisation et de contrôle de l'État; les écoles *normales* constituent l'enceinte adéquate à discipliner les enseignants, transformés en agents du projet social et politique de la modernité: les discours qui y sont produits édifient un nouveau modèle d'enseignant qui mélange les «anciennes» références religieuses avec le «nouveau» rôle de serviteurs de l'État. En outre, la tentative d'édification d'une pédagogie scientifique doit être regardée à la lumière d'un projet plus vaste d'organisation des sciences sociales modernes: la spécialisation de la connaissance octroie aux nouveaux professionnels une fonction d'autorité à l'intérieur de leur champ disciplinaire tout en les légitimant dans un discours de normalisation sociale. Les efforts de professionnalisation des enseignants et de construction de la pédagogie scientifique font partie intégrante d'un discours de *régulation sociale* qui tend à redéfinir la question de l'enseignement dans le cadre d'une nouvelle forme d'intervention de l'État dans la vie sociale.

Si les théories de la formation de l'État (*state formation theories*) fournissent les encadrements conceptuels les plus pertinents pour expliquer le mouvement des réformes scolaires du XVIII^e siècle, l'approche du système mondial (*world-system approach*) est la plus stimulante pour analyser l'école de masses et son développement à partir de la fin du XIX^e siècle. John Meyer, Francisco Ramirez et Yasemin Soysal³⁰ ont très bien montré que l'émergence et l'expansion de l'école de masses ont suivi des trajectoires identiques au niveau mondial, ce qui met en cause les interprétations basées sur les caractéristiques économiques, politiques ou sociales de chaque pays. Ils soutiennent la thèse selon laquelle l'État-nation est lui-

³⁰ J.W. Meyer, F.O. Ramirez & Y.N. Soysal, „World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980,“ in *Sociology of Education* 65 (2) (1992), pp. 128-149.

même un modèle culturel transnational au sein duquel la scolarisation des masses est l'un des principaux dispositifs en vue de la création de liaisons symboliques entre les individus et l'État:

L'école de masses est un composant central du modèle de l'État-nation. Sa standardisation collective célèbre la souveraineté unifiée et l'intentionnalité de la collectivité (l'État), sa focalisation individuelle et son universalité mobilisent le caractère intégré et universel de la société (la nation de citoyens), et sa culture sécularisée définit le caractère de l'État-nation comme une entreprise qui est conçue pour atteindre le progrès. [...] Par conséquent, nous soutenons que l'expansion de l'école de masses au niveau mondial est dépendante de la formation de projets souverains unifiés qui sont liés et qui sont reconnus par la société mondiale d'États-nations et de la mise sur pied de principes d'appartenance nationale à l'intérieur de chaque pays³¹.

Il faut bien souligner que le *modèle scolaire* et son prolongement à travers l'école de masses sont des phénomènes qui ont leur origine en Europe: leur diffusion au niveau mondial se produit à partir de cet espace culturel et politique. Ainsi, la question coloniale est au cœur de la compréhension de l'État-nation et du rôle qui y joue l'école en tant que dispositif d'articulation de la nationalité, de la citoyenneté et de la souveraineté. L'Europe construit les colonies, de la même façon que les colonies sont essentielles au façonnement de la pensée «occidentale» et de ses modèles de culture et d'éducation.³² Dans un monde où l'idéologie de progrès est synonyme d'*occidentalisation*, le discours philosophique de la modernité est par définition «eurocentrique».³³ La culture européenne et le colonialisme sont profondément liés, puisque l'Europe fonctionne comme le *réfèrent silencieux*, au niveau mondial, du travail intellectuel et de la connais-

³¹ Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, „World Expansion of Mass Education“, pp. 131-132.

³² C. Adick, „Education in the Modern World System: An Attempt to End the Mythology of the Concept of Education as a Colonial Heritage,“ in *Education* 40 (1989), pp. 30-48.

³³ H. Jung, Editor's introduction to a special issue about „Postmodernity and the question of the other,“ in *Human Studies* 16 (1-2) (1993), pp. 1-17.

sance historique.³⁴ C'est pourquoi il faut bien saisir le rôle de l'Europe dans la production et diffusion d'une rationalité scolaire qui sert à relocaliser les subjectivités individuelles en fonction de leur intégration dans le projet historique de l'État-nation. Nul ne doute de l'importance de la dimension «éducation» pour entériner une vision du monde d'après laquelle «seulement l'Europe est *théoriquement* connaissable, toutes les autres histoires étant considérées comme des questions empiriques qui se limitent à remplir le squelette théorique qui est l'Europe».³⁵

En somme, il faut retenir la relation entre le modèle de l'école de masses et le modèle de l'État-nation. L'ontologie de la modernité construit une école qui réalise un travail laborieux d'unification culturelle et nationale. Soutenu par une idéologie de progrès et par une rationalité scientifique, ce travail mène à bien le projet d'intégration des populations mieux dit, des citoyens dans les nouveaux États-nations. Plus que son rôle, ceci fut sa raison d'être.

À beaucoup d'égards, c'est cette raison d'être qui est remise en cause quand on parle, aujourd'hui, d'une Europe de l'après-État-nation ou d'une identité post-nationale. Peut-être sommes-nous en train d'assister à la fin de l'âge d'or de l'État-nation en tant que système social souverain et autonome: «le statut de citoyens des individus est en train d'être redéfini à la lumière des droits humains dans un système plus large; il y a une discussion mondiale autour des limites de la souveraineté nationale; et les sociétés nationales sont en train d'être envisagées en tant que partie intégrante d'un environnement naturel et social aux dimensions planétaires».³⁶ C'est tout un nouveau débat, plein de conséquences pour les questions éducatives, qui est en train d'être engagé: au coeur de ce débat, on trouve le concept de *globalisation*.

³⁴ R. Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990).

³⁵ D. Chakrabarty, „Provincializing Europe: Postcoloniality and the Critique of History,“ in *Cultural Studies* 6 (3) (1992), p. 338.

³⁶ J.W. Meyer, D.H. Kamens & A. Benavot, eds., *School Knowledge for the Masses* (London: The Falmer Press, 1992), p. 174.

L'éducation et le processus de globalisation à la fin du XX^e siècle

J'ai évoqué la fin du XVIII^e siècle et les réformes de l'enseignement qui ont contribué à la fixation du *modèle scolaire* et à l'émergence d'une nouvelle façon de gouverner sous l'emprise de l'État-nation. J'ai parlé de la fin du XIX^e siècle et de la consolidation de l'*école de masses* en tant que technologie rationalisée de progrès qui légitime l'État-nation dans son rôle d'intégration et de régulation sociale. Je m'arrête maintenant à la fin du XX^e siècle pour réfléchir au processus de globalisation et à ses conséquences sur l'arène de l'éducation, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne la formulation des *politiques éducatives*. L'interrogation sous-jacente à cette réflexion concerne la pertinence de l'État-nation comme espace de décision en matière d'éducation, étant donné la multiplication des niveaux de pouvoir entre le local et le global.

La littérature sur le thème de la globalisation est très abondante et je ne retiendrai que quelques idées majeures afin de mieux maîtriser les débats éducationnels contemporains. L'approche d'Anthony Giddens me semble utile, dans la mesure où il envisage la globalisation comme une intensification mondiale des relations sociales, de telle manière que les faits locaux sont influencés par des événements qui ont lieu à une grande distance, et vice-versa. Il s'agit d'un processus dialectique car une partie des événements locaux peut aller dans un sens inverse des relations lointaines qui les configurent: «la *transformation locale* fait partie de la globalisation autant que l'extension latérale des connexions sociales à travers le temps et l'espace». ³⁷ Autrement dit, la globalisation signifie la formation de rapports sociaux à travers des marges indéfinies d'espace-temps, dont les potentialités de transformation s'exercent aussi bien au niveau intensif qu'extensif: «une des caractéristiques centrales de la période actuelle est la complexité des liens entre le global et le local, un *local* qui n'inclut pas seulement les dimensions régionales, mais aussi des aspects intimes de nos vies personnelles». ³⁸

³⁷ A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 64.

³⁸ A. Giddens, „Foreword,“ in R. Friedland & D. Boden, eds., *NowHere: Space, Time and Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 12.

Cette perspective écarte une vision linéaire du processus de globalisation, trop souvent envisagé sous le prisme de l'uniformisation et/ou de l'homogénéisation. En effet, l'idée d'une culture globale comme une sorte d'évolutionnisme téléologique entraînant inévitablement la fragilisation de l'État-nation nous semble inadéquate: la référence à la globalisation est utile dans la mesure où elle suggère un autre degré de conceptualisation, mais la diversité des réponses locales, régionales et nationales invite à parler plutôt de cultures globales au pluriel.³⁹ Il faut abandonner une vision du monde comme l'addition d'une multitude de sociétés régionales ou nationales, séparées et autonomes, tout en la remplaçant par un regard centré sur les phénomènes d'interdépendance et de diffusion culturelle au niveau global. Je retiens un jeu de mots, avancé par Martin Carnoy,⁴⁰ qui exprime bien une nouvelle attitude: au lieu de penser *global* et d'agir *local*, il faut maintenant penser *local* c'est-à-dire en relation proche et directe avec les personnes et les communautés et agir *global*.

Le processus de globalisation concerne l'école pour toute une série de différentes raisons: économiques, étant donné la redéfinition des liens entre l'éducation et l'emploi; culturelles, car il faut tenir compte d'un ensemble plus vaste et diversifié d'histoires et de systèmes de croyance; politiques, puisqu'il y a une reconfiguration des pouvoirs et du concept traditionnel de souveraineté; etc. Un peu partout, on assiste à des mouvements de délocalisation/re-localisation des appartenances et des identités nationales et culturelles: le local devient global, le global devient local. On peut soutenir, à l'image de Jürgen Schriewer,⁴¹ qu'on est aujourd'hui face à un *système mondial d'enseignement*, qui trouve ses assises dans l'expansion éducationnelle de l'après-guerre, dans la standardisation de modèles institutionnalisés d'école, dans la diffusion mondiale d'une idéologie éducationnelle basée sur des principes de développement et de progrès et dans un système international de communication et de publication. Grâce à la triade *nationalité-souveraineté-citoyenneté* il est possible de signaler des

³⁹ M. Featherstone, „Global Culture: An Introduction,“ in *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (2-3) (1990), pp. 1-14.

⁴⁰ M. Carnoy et al., *The New Global Economy in the Information Age: Reflections on our Changing World* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

⁴¹ J. Schriewer, *World-System and Interrelationship-Networks: The Internationalization of Education and the Role of Comparative Inquiry* [in press].

changements qui ont des retombées directes dans le domaine de l'éducation.

Aujourd'hui, la mission d'homogénéisation culturelle de la Nation, qui était la vocation et l'apanage de l'école d'État, est en cours de redéfinition⁴² et ceci est vrai même si les réalités sont souvent contradictoires, comme le prouve le fait que beaucoup de pays, notamment de l'Est de l'Europe, sont en train d'utiliser les systèmes d'enseignement pour renforcer leur propre sens national. On attend de l'école qu'elle soit capable d'ouvrir à d'autres pratiques sociales, de raconter des histoires qui ne sont pas uniquement des histoires nationales, d'intégrer dans des cultures locales et globales. Les discours sur le multiculturalisme, sur le développement local du curriculum ou sur les thèmes communautaires, qui dominent les réformes éducatives depuis quelques années, cherchent à redéfinir le projet historique de l'école. Ils traduisent un changement de mission de l'école, qui passe d'un attachement au *national* à un va-et-vient entre le *plus petit* et le *plus grand*.

L'analyse des questions qui touchent à la souveraineté est encore plus complexe, puisque l'on touche directement à la problématique du pouvoir. Une des références centrales des réformes des années quatre-vingts concerne la modification des rapports entre l'État, la société civile et les communautés professionnelles et scientifiques. La réorganisation de l'État, et de ses stratégies d'intervention dans le champ de l'éducation, a conduit à l'émergence de nouvelles formes de gouvernement. Les pratiques discursives autour de la décentralisation en constituent le meilleur exemple, dans la mesure où elles créent des mécanismes de régulation sociale et professionnelle articulés sur plusieurs niveaux de décision. Mais il faut aussi être attentif aux phénomènes de transnationalisation, qui mettent en cause les limites de l'exercice d'une souveraineté qui s'imaginait autonome: «des bornages territoriaux traditionnels ne dessinent plus les contours de la souveraineté, ne permettent plus de distinguer entre l'interne et l'externe, ne font plus la part de ce qui est constitutif d'obligation pour le citoyen et de ce qui ne l'est pas».⁴³

⁴² W. Huttmacher, *L'école dans tous ses états* (Genève: Service de la Recherche Sociologique, 1990).

⁴³ B. Badie, *La fin des territoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1995), p. 219.

J'approche enfin la réflexion la plus difficile, celle qui a trait aux nouvelles citoyennetés (j'insiste sur le pluriel). La formation des citoyens a été l'un des objectifs traditionnels accomplis par l'école: les enseignants ont été les *instituteurs* des dispositifs d'adhésion à une idée «citoyenne» d'État-nation. Aujourd'hui, on est confronté à une véritable explosion des identités traditionnelles et à un effort de redécouverte, ou plutôt de réinvention, de nouvelles identités.⁴⁴ Ce ne sont pas nécessairement des identités territorialisées, car les communautés de sens prennent de plus en plus le relais des communautés localisées dans la consolidation des liens d'attachement et de solidarité. Yasemin Soysal explique très bien cette question, en estimant que les principes actuels de la citoyenneté tendent à être basés sur le statut universel de la personne plutôt que sur l'appartenance nationale: «la citoyenneté nationale est en train de perdre du terrain vis-à-vis d'un modèle plus universel, ancré dans des notions déterritorialisées des droits de la personne».⁴⁵ La conclusion de son ouvrage sur les limites de la citoyenneté est en elle-même un défi lancé aux systèmes éducatifs tels qu'ils se sont développés tout le long des deux derniers siècles:

La citoyenneté nationale, la *tradition inventée* du XIX^e siècle, et les sentiments habituels dont elle est porteuse resteront avec nous pendant un certain temps. Néanmoins, il faut reconnaître que la citoyenneté nationale n'est plus un concept adéquat pour soutenir une narrative raisonnée du statut d'adhésion dans la période de l'après-guerre. Les formations post-nationales nous invitent à repenser nos définitions et conceptions théoriques sur la citoyenneté et l'État-nation.⁴⁶

Voilà quelques éléments de réflexion sur l'influence du processus de globalisation dans le domaine de l'éducation. Les réformes éducatives doivent être lues comme des *discours autorisés* (et des discours d'autorité) qui introduisent de nouvelles formes de régulation sociale dans le cadre d'une réorganisation de l'État et d'une reconfiguration des pouvoirs entre

⁴⁴ S. Aronowitz, *The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992).

⁴⁵ Y.N. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago, 1994), p. 3.

⁴⁶ Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*, p. 167.

les différents niveaux de décision. L'argument développé par Boaventura de Sousa Santos,⁴⁷ quand il constate la perte de l'équilibre originellement inscrit dans le paradigme de la modernité entre la *régulation sociale* et l'*émancipation sociale*, est assez important pour penser l'éducation. Le débat doit tenir compte des stratégies d'inclusion/exclusion des différents groupes sociaux dans une société dite de la communication, mais qui produit plus que jamais des zones de silence, dans une société qui s' imagine homogène, mais qui offre les conditions favorables à un développement sans précédent de toutes les formes de la petite misère.⁴⁸

Les tendances antérieurement signalées sont très nettement majorées au sein de l'Union Européenne. D'une part, on ne doit pas oublier le rôle colonial de l'Europe et le travail de diffusion mondiale d'un certain modèle d'école; ce rôle fut progressivement mis en cause après 1945 et beaucoup d'auteurs associent les efforts pour repenser l'Europe, notamment à travers la mise en oeuvre d'arrangements supra-nationaux, à sa perte d'influence dans le contexte international.⁴⁹ Aujourd'hui, l'éducation constitue l'un des lieux centraux où l'idée *Europe* est en train d'être redéfinie, pour ce qui est de ses références internes mais aussi de ses rapports externes.

D'autre part, le processus de globalisation se double, dans l'espace européen, d'un projet d'intégration économique et politique tout à fait original. Ici, plus qu'ailleurs, on sent que l'État-nation est devenu trop petit pour les grands problèmes de la vie et trop grand pour les petits problèmes de la vie.⁵⁰ D'où la nécessité de prendre acte aussi, et peut-être surtout, dans le domaine de l'éducation de l'avertissement d'Edgar Morin: «L'Europe doit se métamorphoser à la fois en Province et en Métanation».⁵¹ Il n'y a pas d'explications simples: on peut soutenir que le projet de l'Union Européenne est porteur d'une logique de renforcement continuuel au détriment des États, des États-administrations mais aussi des États-

⁴⁷ B. de Sousa Santos, *Toward a New Common Sense* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

⁴⁸ Bourdieu, *La misère du monde*.

⁴⁹ A.S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); H. Wasser, „The European Mind and EC 1992,“ in *History of European Ideas* 17 (1) (1993), pp. 11-17.

⁵⁰ Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*.

⁵¹ E. Morin, *Penser l'Europe* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p. 199.

politiques;⁵² mais on peut également défendre que le processus de construction européenne a racheté l'État-nation en tant que concept organisationnel, en réaffirmant son rôle politique à travers la mise sur pied d'une structure supra-nationale de décision.⁵³

Une chose est sûre: l'Union Européenne constitue la forme légale la plus élaborée de définition d'une *citoyenneté post-nationale*.⁵⁴ Le principe désormais consacré d'une *citoyenneté européenne*, reconnue institutionnellement par le traité de Maastricht, inscrit les solidarités dans plusieurs espaces publics, «ce qui brise à tout jamais l'idée d'allégeance prioritaire sur laquelle était construite l'idée de territoire national».⁵⁵ C'est une réalité conflictuelle dans laquelle s'expriment des identités locales, des appartenances régionales, des sentiments nationaux et des idéologies européistes. Enserrés entre les pressions d'en bas vers la diversité ethnique et culturelle et les pressions d'en haut vers l'intégration économique et politique, les européens réagissent parfois avec crainte et se renferment dans les enceintes nationales.⁵⁶

C'est un débat fort complexe, qui a des conséquences radicales au plan de l'éducation. Au fond, c'est la raison d'être et la mission historique des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement, tels qu'il ont été conçus et développés pendant les deux derniers siècles, qui sont remises en cause. L'éducation se trouve, aujourd'hui, à la croisée de plusieurs chemins: les décisions prises dans cette arène auront des retombées très significatives sur l'organisation politique et sociale de l'Europe de demain. C'est pourquoi l'étude des politiques éducatives est un excellent *analyseur* des limites et des potentialités du projet de l'Union Européenne.

⁵² E. Pisani, „Où va l'Europe?“ in *L'événement européen 14-15* (1991), pp. 181-183; D. Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens: Sur l'idée moderne de nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).

⁵³ Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*; Smith, *National Identity*.

⁵⁴ Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*.

⁵⁵ Badie, *La fin des territoires*, p. 222.

⁵⁶ Carnoy et al., *The New Global Economy in the Information Age*.

L'Europe, la citoyenneté et les politiques éducatives: approches sociologiques

L'analyse des politiques éducatives de l'Union Européenne n'est pas facile. Il y a, d'une part, un discours *officiel*, à Bruxelles et dans les différents États membres, d'après lequel l'éducation a été dans le passé, et continuera à être dans l'avenir, un domaine de la compétence de chaque État membre, ce qui exclut d'emblée tout effort d'harmonisation des lois ou de mise en place d'une politique commune. Néanmoins, on assiste, de façon régulière, à l'adoption de toute une série d'actes communautaires (décisions, recommandations, résolutions, etc.⁵⁷) qui, bien que sans valeur juridique contraignante, ont une prise directe ou indirecte sur les affaires éducatives. Finalement, il faut tenir compte de toute une rhétorique pro-européenne, produite dans les cercles de décision politique mais aussi dans les milieux scientifiques, qui constitue un référentiel obligatoire de l'action communautaire en éducation.

Je défendrai que les systèmes éducatifs européens subissent, aujourd'hui, une série d'influences qui les poussent vers des évolutions semblables, tout au moins en ce qui concerne leurs configurations institutionnelles, leurs modalités organisationnelles et leurs stratégies de développement. Ceci n'est pas contradictoire avec le maintien, à l'intérieur des frontières de chaque État membre, de marges relativement importantes d'autonomie, beaucoup plus évidentes en ce qui concerne la production d'un discours de légitimation nationale que dans la formulation de politiques alternatives. Je soutiendrai aussi que l'introduction dans le traité de Maastricht du concept de *citoyenneté européenne* a des conséquences inévitables, à moyen terme, sur la mission des systèmes éducatifs et sur la définition de quelques politiques «communes» entre les différents États membres.

⁵⁷ La nature juridique des actes communautaires est définie dans le traité de Rome (article 189). En ce qui concerne leur application au domaine de l'éducation, il est utile de consulter A. Gretler, „Europe and Education: Let's Accept the Challenge," in *European Education* 23 (4) (1991-1992), pp. 15-31; F. Van Craeynest, „La nature juridique des résolutions sur la coopération en matière d'éducation" in B. De Witte, ed., *European Community Law of Education* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp. 127-133; et F. Vaniscotte, *70 millions d'élèves - L'Europe de l'Éducation* (Paris: Hatier, 1989).

Pour ce faire, j'essayerai, d'abord, d'évoquer le contexte sociohistorique des politiques éducatives au sein de l'Union Européenne, de façon à bien identifier les contradictions et les paradoxes qui les caractérisent. Ensuite, je présenterai une synthèse des principales mesures prises en matière d'éducation, notamment entre les premières résolutions des années soixante-dix et les initiatives déclenchées après la signature du traité de Maastricht. Je terminerai cette partie avec une référence à l'importance des discours sur l'éducation européenne dans la définition d'un *idéal régulateur* pour l'ensemble des actions nationales et communautaires dans le domaine de l'éducation.

Le contexte sociohistorique des politiques éducatives au sein de l'Union Européenne

En novembre 1994, la Commission Européenne a publié un bilan intitulé *Cooperation in Education in the European Union (1976-1994)*. Après une phase initiale marquée par quelques hésitations, on assiste à l'adoption d'une série d'actions concertées, qui culminent avec les articles du traité de Maastricht consacrés, respectivement, à l'éducation et à la formation:

La Communauté contribue au développement d'une éducation de qualité en encourageant la coopération entre États membres et, si nécessaire, en appuyant et en complétant leur action tout en respectant pleinement la responsabilité des États membres pour le contenu de l'enseignement et l'organisation du système éducatif ainsi que leur diversité culturelle et linguistique. (Article 126)

La Communauté met en oeuvre une politique de formation professionnelle, qui appuie et complète les actions des États membres, tout en respectant pleinement la responsabilité des États membres pour le contenu et l'organisation de la formation professionnelle. (Article 127)

La liste présentée par la Commission mentionne quelques centaines de documents qui esquissent une *politique européenne de l'éducation*, bien qu'à chaque passage soit rappelée la compétence exclusive des États membres dans ce domaine. C'est une précaution justifiée par la conviction,

largement partagée dans les différents pays, que l'éducation est, par définition, l'espace de construction de l'identité nationale: l'opinion publique place l'éducation en premier lieu dans les secteurs dont le pouvoir de décision doit rester au niveau national.⁵⁸ Et pourtant les instances communautaires interviennent fréquemment en matière d'éducation, à travers une stratégie politique «indirecte». Il s'agit, d'une part, de construire des catégories de pensée, d'organiser des langages, de montrer des solutions qui deviendront des schémas dominants pour approcher les problèmes éducatifs; et, d'autre part, d'agir sur un ensemble de champs (l'emploi, la formation, les qualifications, etc.) qui entraînent des reconfigurations du système éducatif.

La science politique, et notamment les spécialistes de la politique comparée, ont étudié les perversions possibles de ce genre de stratégie.⁵⁹ On a souligné, souvent, que l'Union Européenne était d'abord une construction juridique; Martin Shapiro,⁶⁰ par exemple, explique que la Cour de Justice n'a pas seulement joué un rôle central dans la configuration de la Communauté Européenne, elle l'a même constituée. En outre, l'articulation entre les différents niveaux de décision à l'intérieur de l'Union Européenne a toujours attiré l'attention des sciences sociales et politiques; Anthony Smith,⁶¹ par exemple, s'interroge sur les caractéristiques *sui generis* de cette nouvelle forme d'association politique transnationale, qu'il définit comme un condominium de pouvoirs. C'est justement autour des questions de la nature juridique des décisions communautaires et de l'architecture des pouvoirs au sein de l'Union Européenne que j'identifie deux perversions provoquées par les formes d'intervention politique en éducation adoptées à Bruxelles.

⁵⁸ Cf. *Eurobaromètre*.

⁵⁹ D. Miller, „The Nation-State: A Modest Defence“ in C. Brown, ed., *Political Restructuring in Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); S. Hix, „The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics,“ in *West European Politics* 17 (1) (1994), pp. 1-30.

⁶⁰ M. Shapiro, „The European Court of Justice“ in A.M. Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992), pp. 123-156.

⁶¹ Smith, *National Identity*.

La définition de l'éducation par le biais de l'élargissement du concept de formation professionnelle

La première perversion tient à une définition de l'éducation par le biais de l'élargissement du concept de formation professionnelle. Pendant longtemps, on a répété que l'absence de mention explicite à l'éducation dans le traité de Rome traduisait une restriction des pouvoirs de la Communauté à cet égard. Néanmoins, les juristes, et très spécialement les juges de la Cour de Justice du Luxembourg, ont estimé que le silence en matière d'éducation signifiait, au contraire, que les pouvoirs de la Communauté dans ce domaine n'étaient pas limités par la loi.⁶²

À travers une fine argumentation juridique, Koen Lenaerts, juge de la Cour de Justice, justifie cette position, qui est présente dans la plupart des arrêts émis au Luxembourg. Il retient, d'abord, la légitimité d'une intervention communautaire afin d'assurer la réalisation de certains aspects des traités, notamment le marché unique: «l'exercice raisonnable de ce pouvoir doit être toléré par les États membres, même si cela affecte des aspects des politiques éducatives nationales».⁶³ Ensuite, il tient compte de la compétence communautaire en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance des diplômes professionnels, laquelle est, à beaucoup d'égards, dépendante d'une harmonisation des politiques de formation (et d'éducation). Finalement et c'est peut-être le plus important, le juge Lenaerts explique que la Cour de Justice a été obligée d'adopter un concept très large de formation professionnelle, de façon à y inclure virtuellement toutes les formes d'éducation au-delà de l'instruction obligatoire.

Curieusement, et dans une interprétation contraire à la plupart des opinions, Koen Lenaerts⁶⁴ affirme que l'introduction de l'article 126 dans le traité de Maastricht n'élargit pas les pouvoirs de la Communauté dans le domaine de l'éducation. Bien au contraire, avertit-il: dorénavant, l'existence d'un cadre légal empêche une interprétation tous azimuts des

⁶² J. Shaw, „Education and the Law in the European Community,” in *Journal of Law & Education* 21 (3) (1992), pp. 415-442.

⁶³ K. Lenaerts, „Education in European Community Law after 'Maastricht',” in *Common Market Law Review* 31 (1994), p. 12.

⁶⁴ K. Lenaerts, *Subsidiarity and Community Competence in the Field of Education* [in press].

affaires éducatives, notamment une interprétation par le biais de l'élargissement du concept de formation professionnelle.

À la fin des années quatre-vingts, Bruno De Witte n'avait pas hésité à affirmer: «S'il y a des lois communautaires sur l'éducation, alors il y a aussi une politique éducative communautaire».⁶⁵ Mais il faut reconnaître que cette politique était légitimée, dans la plupart des cas, par une sorte de prolongement des actions prises dans le champ de la formation professionnelle, ce qui renfermait l'éducation à l'intérieur d'une définition trop restreinte. Voilà ce qui a amené à une première perversion: la surdétermination de l'éducation par le contexte économique et par le monde du travail. En regardant l'éducation par le seul prisme de la formation professionnelle, la Communauté a pris un détour qui l'a empêché de mettre en œuvre une action éducative engagée par des logiques autres que les lois du marché.

Aujourd'hui, rien ne justifie qu'on ne tienne pas compte de toutes les formes et modalités d'éducation, indépendamment de leur importance pour l'accès au marché de travail. Même si le traité de Maastricht restreint les pouvoirs de l'Union Européenne en matière d'éducation, on est face à une nouvelle situation, qui permet une formulation plus ouverte (et plus participée) des actions et des politiques éducatives.

La mise sur pied d'une politique éducative semi-clandestine

La deuxième perversion tient à la mise sur pied par l'Union Européenne, dans les faits, d'une politique éducative *sauvage*, qui cherche à se rendre invisible, qui ne se donne pas les moyens d'une régulation et d'un contrôle démocratiques. C'est une politique gênée, qui ne peut pas se dire sur la place publique, et qui, par conséquent, ne peut pas être participée, discutée et jugée par tous ceux qui en sont concernés. En effet, la situation de «semi-clandestinité légale»⁶⁶ vécue par la Communauté dans le domaine de l'éducation a empêché l'instauration d'un véritable débat. Fortement basées sur une logique des experts, et partant d'une rationalité technique, les actions entreprises par Bruxelles ont valorisé des stratégies adaptatives et normatives au détriment d'une attitude proprement *politique*.

⁶⁵ B. De Witte, ed., *European Community Law of Education* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p. 9.

⁶⁶ C. M. Frediani, „La politique de la Communauté européenne en matière d'éducation et de culture,“ in *L'Europe en Formation* 284 (1992), pp. 51-64.

La question passe par l'architecture des pouvoirs à l'intérieur de l'Union Européenne, ce qui renvoie directement au principe de *subsidiarité* et à l'échelonnement des décisions au niveau national, supranational et subnational. Souvent, ce débat fut engagé de façon simpliste, comme si le pouvoir était une *chose*, une *chose* qu'on pouvait diviser, additionner ou soustraire, céder ou conserver. Mais l'arithmétique simple ne fonctionne pas dans le champ du pouvoir, comme le processus d'intégration européenne le prouve à l'évidence.

Il faut comprendre comment se produit l'alchimie des pouvoirs au sein de l'arène politique européenne. C'est ainsi qu'au moment même où il y a la perte de quelques compétences traditionnellement liées à l'exercice de la souveraineté, certains États sont en train d'utiliser le projet européen pour développer leur propre identité voir, par exemple, le cas de la Grèce ou de la «nouvelle» Allemagne.⁶⁷ En outre, le fait de transférer une partie de leurs prérogatives à l'Union Européenne n'empêche pas certains exécutifs nationaux d'acquérir une légitimité accrue qui leur advient du fait d'être assis à la «table des décisions» à Bruxelles (voir, par exemple, le cas du Portugal ou de l'Espagne).⁶⁸ Signalons, enfin, que, s'il est vrai qu'il y a une consolidation des routines de décision supranationale, il y a aussi un renforcement des pouvoirs au niveau subnational, c'est-à-dire local et régional (voir, par exemple, le cas de la Belgique, de la France ou de l'Italie).⁶⁹

Ces tensions et contradictions apparaissent dans le champ de l'éducation.⁷⁰ Dans les pays périphériques, la référence à l'Europe joue un rôle central dans la légitimation des politiques éducatives nationales et dans l'imposition de certaines lois qui, autrement, auraient été inacceptables; pour ces États, le fait de participer à l'Union Européenne leur

⁶⁷ D. Marquand, „Reinventing Federalism: Europe and the Left,“ in *New Left Review* 203 (1994), pp. 17-26.

⁶⁸ Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*; A.M. Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992).

⁶⁹ M. Cornu, *Compétences culturelles en Europe et principe de subsidiarité* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1993); Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens*.

⁷⁰ D. Coulby, „Cultural and Epistemological Relativism and European Curricula,“ in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 3 (2-3) (1993), pp. 7-18.

stimule une *imagination du centre*, c'est-à-dire l'idée qu'ils appartiennent au centre politique d'une des grandes régions du monde.⁷¹ Mais, en se constituant en modèle vers l'extérieur, les pays centraux ont pu acquérir, eux-aussi, une source additionnelle de légitimité interne. Ce double jeu est bien illustré, dans le premier cas, par les réformes éducatives portugaise et espagnole des années quatre-vingts et, dans le second cas, par la tentative d'exportation des systèmes de formation professionnelle allemand ou danois.

Il est impossible de parler des pouvoirs, sans poser la question de la participation. À ce propos, Jürgen Habermas⁷² montre bien comment les décisions de Bruxelles sont prises par une nouvelle bureaucratie européenne qui est assez éloignée du processus démocratique, tout en rappelant qu'il y a une grande différence entre le fait d'être affecté par une chose ou de participer à son changement. Il s'interroge sur le caractère «provisoire» de ce décalage entre le nombre croissant de décisions prises au niveau supranational et le degré relativement faible de participation des populations: ce qui l'intéresse c'est de savoir s'il est possible d'inverser cette situation ou si l'on est face à une orientation «permanente» de prédominance d'une bureaucratie supra-étatique qui met en oeuvre une stratégie basée sur des critères de rationalité économique, qui tend à transformer la politique en un problème d'administration et de management.⁷³

La question se revêt d'une pertinence accrue dans le domaine de l'éducation, étant donné l'absence d'une politique «assumée» sur le plan européen, ce qui entraîne un déficit de participation. C'est une perversion qu'il faut combattre, faisant en sorte que l'Europe de l'Éducation ne soit pas une nouvelle stratégie d'exclusion, mais, bien au contraire, une forme d'inclusion, d'investissement positif de *tous* les pouvoirs, du *local* à l'*international*.

⁷¹ de Sousa Santos, *Toward a New Common Sense*.

⁷² Habermas, „Citizenship and National Identity,“ pp. 1-19.

⁷³ D. Dinan, „The European Community, 1978-1993,“ in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 531 (1994), pp. 10-24; C. Imbert, „Identité européenne: le complexe de Prométhée“ in *Les nouvelles frontières de l'Europe* (Paris: Economica, 1993), pp. 33-41.

La définition des politiques éducatives au sein de l'Union Européenne

Bruxelles a pris des mesures en matière d'éducation, dès le début des années soixante-dix, à travers une panoplie diversifiée d'instruments: actes communautaires (décisions, recommandations, résolutions, etc.), programmes communautaires (Erasmus, Petra, Lingua, etc.), subventions et appuis économiques, etc. C'est une longue liste de documents, qui définissent des *orientations* au moment même où ils construisent un *langage* pour parler de l'éducation en Europe. Il est impossible de faire le détail de cet inventaire, lequel, d'ailleurs, a déjà été dressé dans deux documents de consultation obligatoire: European Commission, *Cooperation in Education in the European Union (1976-1994)*,⁷⁴ Conseil des Communautés Européennes, *Textes relatifs à la politique européenne de l'éducation (1971-1992)*.⁷⁵

Cette littérature est traversée par certaines permanences, mais aussi par quelques changements, notamment en ce qui concerne les politiques de formation professionnelle et d'insertion des jeunes à la vie active, la dimension européenne dans l'éducation, le lancement de plusieurs programmes de coopération, l'enseignement supérieur ou la mobilité des enseignants et des élèves. Rien que pendant les dernières années, il faut signaler l'importance de documents tels que: les Conclusions du Conseil et des ministres de l'Éducation sur la coopération et la politique communautaire en matière d'éducation dans la perspective de 1993 (6 octobre 1989); les Lignes directrices de l'action communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation (5 mai 1993);⁷⁶ le Rapport de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement Européen et au Comité Économique et Social sur les programmes communautaires en matière d'éducation et de

⁷⁴ European Commission, ed., *Cooperation in Education in the European Union, 1976-1994* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community, 1994).

⁷⁵ Conseil des Communautés Européennes, ed., *Textes relatifs à la politique européenne de l'éducation, 1971-1992* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community, 3 volumes, 1990-1993).

⁷⁶ Commission des Communautés Européennes, ed., *Lignes directrices de l'action communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation* (Bruxelles: COM/93, 183 final, 5 mai 1993).

formation, 1986-1992 (5 mai 1993);⁷⁷ le Livre vert sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation (29 septembre 1993);⁷⁸ le Livre blanc sur la croissance, la compétitivité et l'emploi (5 décembre 1993);⁷⁹ et les définitions concernant la nouvelle «génération» de Programmes communautaires (Socrates, Leonardo, Recherche socio-économique finalisée, etc.). Il va sans dire que Maastricht représente un tournant dans la formulation d'une politique éducative, même si les conséquences du traité ont été moins significatives qu'on aurait cru au premier abord, ce qui tient, sans doute, aux difficultés actuelles du processus de construction européenne.

À travers une présentation nécessairement simplificatrice, il est possible de regrouper en cinq grands domaines les décisions prises au niveau européen:

a) *Formation Professionnelle*: Les mesures prises à l'égard de la formation professionnelle, avec tout ce qui touche, par exemple, à la préparation des jeunes à l'activité professionnelle, au passage de l'éducation à la vie active, à la correspondance des qualifications et à la scolarisation des enfants des travailleurs migrants et des populations nomades.

Le champ de la formation professionnelle a fait l'objet d'une action systématique des instances communautaires, basée sur la nécessité de préparer et/ou d'accompagner les changements dans le monde économique et dans le marché du travail. L'analyse de documents tels que les *Lignes directrices de l'action communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation* ou le livre blanc *Croissance, compétitivité, emploi*, approuvés en 1993, montre bien l'influence des arguments «économiques» dans la formulation des politiques européennes. C'est une option critiquée

⁷⁷ Commission des Communautés Européennes, ed., *Rapport de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement Européen et au Comité Économique et Social sur les programmes communautaires en matière d'éducation et de formation, 1986-1992* (Bruxelles: COM/93, 151 final, 5 mai 1993).

⁷⁸ Commission des Communautés Européennes, ed., *Livre Vert sur La dimension européenne de l'éducation* (Bruxelles: COM/93, 457 final, 29 septembre 1993).

⁷⁹ Commission des Communautés Européennes, ed., *Croissance, Compétitivité, Emploi - Livre Blanc* (Bruxelles: COM/93, 700 final, 5 décembre 1993).

par plusieurs auteurs, soit par ses effets pervers,⁸⁰ soit par ses fondements théoriques «post-fordistes»,⁸¹ soit encore par sa vision étroite des phénomènes éducatifs. Mais c'est incontestablement à partir de cet espace qu'ont été prises les initiatives communautaires les plus significatives, notamment dans le but d'obtenir de «meilleures performances économiques» et de favoriser le «progrès social et culturel»:

En raison des graves pressions économique et sociale, il est plus nécessaire que jamais de trouver de meilleures méthodes pour arriver à une plus grande compétitivité sur les marchés mondiaux [...]. Cette logique économique inexorable impose aux individus, aux entreprises et à la société d'investir dans le capital humain.⁸²

b) Enseignement Supérieur: Les décisions concernant l'enseignement supérieur, notamment en vue d'assurer la mobilité des étudiants, la liaison entre l'Université et les entreprises et la reconnaissance des diplômes; dans l'articulation entre la «formation professionnelle» et l'«enseignement supérieur» il faut aussi tenir compte des initiatives dans le cadre de la formation initiale et continue des enseignants.

Dans ce secteur, la politique européenne a été fortement influencée par un arrêt de la Cour de Justice (procès Gravier, 13 février 1985) reconnaissant que l'enseignement supérieur peut être considéré comme une modalité de formation professionnelle. Or, étant donné que le traité de Rome prévoyait l'existence d'une politique commune de formation professionnelle, cela a permis une plus grande marge de manoeuvre aux institutions communautaires. L'idée d'un «marché unique de travail pour un

⁸⁰ M. Cole, „Education in the Marketplace: A Case of Contradiction,” in *Educational Review* 44 (3) (1992), pp. 335-343; J. Lowe, „Education and European Integration,” in *International Review of Education* 38 (6) (1992), pp. 579-590.

⁸¹ S. Ball, *Politics and Policy Making in Education* (London: Routledge, 1990); G. Whitty, *New Schools for New Times? Education Reform in a Global Context*. Communication présentée lors du Symposium «Educational Reform: Changing Relationships between the State, Civil Society, and the Educational Community» (Madison, Wisconsin, 1993).

⁸² *Lignes directrices de l'action communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation*, 5 mai 1993, pp. 4-5.

personnel hautement qualifié» a dominé les initiatives dans ce secteur, lesquelles, néanmoins, ont été obligées de prendre en considération l'autonomie traditionnelle des universités. Simultanément, il faut relever la portée des mesures concernant la formation initiale et continue des enseignants, dont l'importance fut bien soulignée dans le *Mémoire sur l'enseignement supérieur* publié en 1991: on y mentionne le besoin d'un traitement exceptionnel de la profession enseignante, notamment à travers des programmes spécifiques de formation, étant donné le rôle qu'elle peut jouer dans la promotion de la dimension européenne de l'éducation.

c) *Coopération et Échanges*: Un ensemble d'initiatives en vue de stimuler la coopération et les échanges, telles que l'introduction des nouvelles technologies dans l'éducation, le développement de l'éducation à distance, la mise en place des écoles européennes et des partenariats scolaires multilatéraux ou l'organisation de programmes d'échanges de jeunes, ainsi que des mesures diverses concernant, par exemple, la lutte contre l'analphabétisme et l'égalité des chances des filles et des garçons en matière d'éducation.

Les programmes de coopération et échanges ont reçu une attention spéciale de la part de la Commission, étant donné qu'ils permettaient d'intervenir dans le domaine de l'éducation sans porter atteinte à la compétence exclusive de chaque État membre. Il s'agit d'utiliser les instruments d'échange comme une stratégie pour modifier les mentalités.⁸³ Certains de ces programmes ont contribué à l'élargissement des clivages sociaux: par exemple, les jeunes issus des milieux favorisés se sont appropriés du Programme Erasmus, acquérant à travers leur séjour à l'étranger une augmen-

⁸³ G. Neave, „On the Casting of Bread upon the Waters: Higher Education and Western European Integration,“ in *Compare* 22 (1) (1992), pp. 5-15. Ce but avait déjà été formulé en 1921, au sein de la Société des Nations: «On peut immédiatement supputer le gain que représenteraient pour notre Société toutes mesures nouvelles qui, grâce à une équivalence mieux définie des diplômes des divers pays, un échange plus fréquent des chaires entre professeurs de diverses nationalités, entretiendraient entre les nations une circulation plus active de maîtres et d'élèves» cf. R. Girault & G. Bossuat, eds., *Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée* (Paris: Publications de La Sorbonne, 1994), pp. 84-85.

tation de leur capital culturel et symbolique.⁸⁴ Par ailleurs, la gestion de ces programmes a souvent promu une logique bureaucratique au détriment d'un processus d'interaction culturelle et scientifique. Et pourtant on peut comprendre que la Commission soit assez satisfaite des résultats obtenus, étant donné les «sommes relativement modiques qui ont été investies dans les programmes»: «la réaction très positive de la base⁸⁵ aux programmes communautaires montre combien la Commission est parvenue à susciter un grand intérêt et un immense élan de bonne volonté en faveur de la collaboration transeuropéenne parmi les nombreuses institutions oeuvrant dans le secteur de l'éducation et de la formation».⁸⁶

d) *Information et Contrôle*: La mise en place de dispositifs d'information et de contrôle, tels que l'organisation de bases de données, la diffusion de statistiques et d'informations sur les différents systèmes éducatifs, l'évaluation des programmes communautaires ou le contrôle de la qualité de l'enseignement (notamment de l'enseignement supérieur).

L'action communautaire dans ce champ s'est caractérisée par l'effort de production d'un langage commun, au sens large du terme, c'est-à-dire une harmonisation des concepts, des instruments de mesure, des méthodes statistiques, des grilles d'évaluation, etc. Il est intéressant de vérifier l'importance accordée par le *Programme de recherche socio-économique finalisée*, lancé en 1995, à toute action de travail conceptuel et méthodologique de construction et d'intégration de données et de systèmes d'indicateurs, dans le but non seulement d'harmoniser des statistiques, mais surtout de créer un «système scientifique de description sociale» qui pourra contribuer à la compréhension du développement économique et social. Hans Vonk a montré les tendances d'uniformisation qui opèrent

⁸⁴ H. Van Daele, „Comparative Education in a Changing Europe,“ in *Comparative Education* 28 (1) (1992), pp. 91-99. Cette réalité a même été reconnue par le Parlement Européen, pour lequel les étudiants issus des milieux moins favorisés ont beaucoup de difficultés à participer dans les programmes communautaires d'échange et de mobilité (cf. *Education & Training*, 5, 1992).

⁸⁵ On remarquera, au passage, l'utilisation de ce concept, la base, pour identifier «les enseignants, les étudiants, les employeurs, les syndicats et les responsables politiques des divers États membres».

⁸⁶ *Rapport de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement Européen et au Comité Économique et Social*, 5 mai 1993, p. 5.

derrière ce langage, qui est porteur d'une logique de rationalisation et de bureaucratisation: il affirme que, malgré toutes les différences culturelles, les systèmes éducatifs européens sont en train d'évoluer dans la même direction, notamment en ce qui concerne la formation des enseignants. Des arguments semblables ont été exposés par Hans Weiler⁸⁷ et John Lowe⁸⁸ qui ont mis en relief les tensions contradictoires qui existent entre les politiques de décentralisation et de privatisation et la mise en oeuvre de procédures centralisées de contrôle des systèmes éducatifs.

e) *Curriculum Européen*: L'organisation d'aspects qui touchent au développement d'un curriculum européen, dont les plus importants se rapportent à la dimension européenne dans l'éducation, notamment à la promotion de l'enseignement des langues, sans oublier, néanmoins, des initiatives sur l'éducation du consommateur, l'éducation en matière d'environnement et de santé, ainsi que des propositions sur la lutte contre l'échec scolaire ou sur l'intégration des handicapés.

Le livre vert de 1993 présente une liste des principales étapes du développement de la dimension européenne de l'éducation au plan communautaire: on voit se mettre sur place, petit à petit, une approche qui essaie de bâtir, d'abord, l'idée de *conscience* (ou de solidarité) et, ensuite, de *citoyenneté européenne*. Le discours officiel se double d'une rhétorique engagée qui vise à articuler des concepts aseptisés de participation, d'identité, de compréhension, de tolérance et de citoyenneté avec l'idée d'Europe: «Nous pouvons espérer que dans la nouvelle, éventuellement intégrée, Europe les objectifs et les contenus de l'enseignement seront progressivement remplacés par un concept européen».⁸⁹ Le résultat en est un certain «folklore», à la fois politique et intellectuel, légitimé souvent par l'étiquette *expert*, qui tend à créer l'illusion que lutter contre l'«idéologie

⁸⁷ H.N. Weiler, „Comparative Perspectives on Educational Decentralization: An Exercise in Contradiction?“ in *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 12 (4) (1990), pp. 433-448.

⁸⁸ Lowe, „Education and European Integration.“

⁸⁹ T. Husén, A. Tuijnman & W.D. Halls, eds., *Schooling in Modern European Society* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992), p. 331.

nationaliste», en lui opposant la «dimension européenne», est la meilleure façon d'assurer la paix et le développement.⁹⁰

Cette systématisation en cinq grands domaines ne fait qu'effleurer l'action communautaire en matière d'éducation. D'une manière générale, la Commission a justifié son intervention par le besoin de *catalyser* l'action dans les différents États membres. Simultanément, les objectifs de cohésion économique et sociale ont été omniprésents dans la définition et le contenu de la politique européenne de l'éducation. La rhétorique de la «compétence exclusive» des États membres a été successivement démentie par les faits. À l'image, par exemple, du document issu de la réunion des ministres de l'Éducation, le 6 octobre 1989, qui réfère le besoin de «respecter la compétence fondamentale des États membres en matière de politique générale de l'éducation», mais souligne aussi les «conséquences de la mise en place du marché intérieur qui affectera les politiques éducatives des États membres». Essayer de saisir la politique éducative au sein de l'Union Européenne c'est, avant tout, chercher à rendre raison de cet équilibre, parfois contradictoire, souvent inexpliqué. Pour cela il faut non seulement décrire les *contextes* et identifier les *contenus*, mais aussi interpréter les *rationalités* organisatrices des pratiques discursives qui soutiennent les politiques.

Les rationalités des discours éducatifs de Bruxelles

Il y a plusieurs façons d'évoquer les rationalités qui organisent les pratiques discursives de Bruxelles relatives à l'éducation. D'une part, elles insistent sur des thèmes présents dans différentes arènes éducatives nationales, qui ont été résumés par des auteurs tels que Geoff Whitty⁹¹ ou

⁹⁰ G. Bell, „European Citizenship: 1992 and Beyond,” in *Westminster Studies in Education* 14 (1991), pp. 15-26; L. Edwards, P. Munn & K. Fogelman, eds., *Education for Democratic Citizenship in Europe: New Challenges for Secondary Education* (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994); D. Heater, „Education for European Citizenship,” in *Westminster Studies in Education* 15 (1992), pp. 53-67.

⁹¹ Whitty, *New Schools for New Times?*

Sigurjón Myrdal:⁹² le premier présente les cinq thèmes du mouvement réformateur des années quatre-vingts (qualité, diversité, choix des parents, autonomie de l'école et responsabilité); le second se rapporte aux idées de référence dans le contexte européen (égalité, privatisation, contrôle de qualité, retour à l'économie, centralisation-décentralisation et professionnalisation). D'autre part, ces rationalités peuvent être éclairées à travers le concept de *régulation sociale*, dans la mesure où les réformes éducatives sont le fruit d'un changement des dispositifs de régulation entre l'État, la société civile et l'économie: au niveau *macro*, il faut signaler les nouvelles modalités d'organisation de l'État et d'articulation des politiques dans le cadre de l'Union Européenne; au niveau *micro*, besoin est de relever l'utilisation de pratiques et de discours qui induisent de nouvelles formes de «gouvernement» en éducation.⁹³

La Commission insiste souvent sur trois grands principes qui sont à l'oeuvre dans l'organisation des programmes communautaires en matière d'éducation et de formation: compétitivité, qualité, citoyenneté. C'est une trilogie qu'on trouve, sous différentes formes, dans plusieurs documents adoptés par les institutions européennes. Elle me permet d'organiser ma propre lecture des raisons qui soutiennent les politiques éducatives de Bruxelles autour de trois grands axes: la logique économique, le discours de la qualité, la rhétorique de la citoyenneté.

La logique économique

Les politiques de l'éducation et de la formation se sont fondées, d'abord, sur une *logique économique*. Les documents communautaires n'ont cessé de répéter la nécessité de préparer des «ressources humaines qualifiées» pour répondre aux «défis économiques» et aux «mutations technologiques». Les réflexions éducatives qui ont lieu dans les aréopages européens «s'inscrivent dans un contexte plus large marqué par l'achèvement du Marché unique et son impact dans le domaine de

⁹² S. Myrdal, *Centralization, Decentralization and the Reprofessionalization of European Teachers*. Communication présentée lors du Symposium «Educational Systems and the Restructuring of the State» (Granada, 1993).

⁹³ T.S. Popkewitz, *Decentralization, Centralization and Discourses in Changing Power Relationships: The State, Civil Society, and the Educational Arena* [in press].

l'éducation et de la formation et par l'évolution des besoins en ressources humaines face aux changements technologiques et sociaux». ⁹⁴ Au moment de justifier l'importance de l'éducation et de la formation au plan européen, Hywel Jones, directeur de la «Task Force Ressources Humaines, Éducation, Formation et Jeunesse», ⁹⁵ fait appel au langage des théories du capital humain: «C'est surtout à travers l'exploitation totale de ces ressources humaines que l'Europe peut être compétitive dans l'économie mondiale et préparer le terrain pour une transition vers la citoyenneté européenne». ⁹⁶

Cette logique a restreint l'ampleur des mesures éducatives, tout en cherchant à mettre les États membres devant un fait accompli: les exigences économiques européennes et le marché unique du travail, en aval, entraîneraient inévitablement des accords et des harmonisations, en amont, c'est-à-dire au plan de l'organisation des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement (durée des études, niveau des qualifications, curriculum, etc.). Martin McLean prétend même qu'un «curriculum pan-européen naîtra des demandes des consommateurs locaux, dirigés par la logique de l'union économique européenne à laquelle tous les gouvernements se sont engagés». ⁹⁷ Dans un essai récent, Michel Crozier ⁹⁸ a justement mis en garde contre une politique éducative basée sur l'insertion dans le monde du travail, qu'il tient pour responsable d'une grande partie des difficultés actuelles des systèmes d'enseignement.

La rationalité économique s'accompagne d'une orientation néo-libérale, qui sert d'encadrement aux discours de la privatisation, de la liberté de choix et même de la participation. Dans le livre blanc *Croissance, compétitivité, emploi* on souligne «la convergence entre les États membres sur la nécessité d'une implication plus grande du secteur privé dans les

⁹⁴ *Livre vert sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation* (1993), p. 2.

⁹⁵ Task Force Ressources Humaines, Éducation, Formation et Jeunesse. *Rapport sur la mise en oeuvre de la résolution du Conseil et des ministres de l'Éducation réunis au sein du Conseil du 24 mai 1988 sur la dimension européenne dans l'éducation* (Bruxelles, 1993).

⁹⁶ H.C. Jones, „Education & Training,” in *Education & Training 1* (1991).

⁹⁷ M. McLean, *Britain and a Single Market Europe: Prospects for a Common School Curriculum* (London: Kogan Page, 1990), p. 1.

⁹⁸ M. Crozier, *La crise de l'intelligence: Essai sur l'impuissance des élites à se réformer* (Paris: InterEditions, 1995).

systèmes d'éducation et/ou de formation professionnelle et dans la formulation des politiques d'éducation et de formation pour tenir compte des besoins du marché et des circonstances locales». ⁹⁹ C'est une rhétorique qui essaie de reconstruire l'éducation comme «espace privé», mais qui est souvent incompatible avec l'Union Européenne en tant que structure d'articulation des pouvoirs des différents États membres. À travers des approches différentes, Martin Cole ¹⁰⁰ et Stephen Stoer ¹⁰¹ ont montré les contradictions qui existent actuellement entre les perspectives néo-libérales et les orientations autoritaires d'une grande partie des politiques étatiques dans le secteur de l'éducation.

C'est pourquoi il faut regarder la métaphore du «marché» comme une rhétorique politique, qui est porteuse d'un langage binaire (État-société civile, libertés-contraintes, public-privé) qui n'est pas en mesure de fournir les instruments intellectuels nécessaires à la compréhension de la problématique de la *gouvernementalité* dans l'arène de l'éducation.

Le discours de la qualité

Le discours de la qualité constitue un autre principe structurant de l'action communautaire en éducation. L'objectif premier de l'article 126 du traité de Maastricht est ainsi formulé: «La Communauté contribue au développement d'une éducation de qualité». D'autres matériaux, tels que le *Livre vert sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation* (1993), essaient de cerner le concept en identifiant la valeur ajoutée d'une action au niveau communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation: on s'y réfère, successivement, à des expériences auprès des établissements scolaires, à la mise en oeuvre de pratiques innovatrices, à la production de nouveaux instruments didactiques, à des modèles alternatifs de formation des enseignants, etc.

Et pourtant c'est ailleurs, dans un rapprochement avec l'idéologie de l'efficience et de l'efficacité, qu'il faut chercher la portée du concept de qualité. En effet, son utilisation s'intègre dans un processus plus vaste de redéfinition des politiques éducatives, dans le sens d'une valorisation des retombées économiques et des standards académiques au détriment des

⁹⁹ *Croissance, compétitivité, emploi* (1993), p. 144.

¹⁰⁰ Cole, „Education in the Marketplace.”

¹⁰¹ S. Stoer, „O Estado e as Políticas Educativas,” in *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* 41 (1994), pp. 3-33.

dimensions culturelles et des aspects sociaux. Michael Apple, dans son ouvrage *Official Knowledge*, suggère une caractérisation expressive de ce discours:

Des modernisateurs économiques, des experts de l'efficacité éducationnelle, des néo-conservateurs, des segments de la Nouvelle Droite, des parents des classes ouvrière et moyenne-inférieure qui croient que l'avenir de leurs enfants est menacé par un système scolaire qui ne garantit pas un emploi et des membres de la nouvelle classe moyenne dont la mobilité est dépendante d'un savoir technique et administratif ont formé une alliance tendue et contradictoire qui soutient le retour aux apprentissages de base, à l'imposition de normes et de valeurs, à l'efficacité et à la responsabilité, enfin à une articulation étroite entre les écoles et une économie en crise.¹⁰²

Le discours sur la qualité doit être décodé en fonction de ce projet diffus, qui cherche à remplacer les objectifs d'équité sociale par un renforcement des dispositifs académiques de sélection scolaire.¹⁰³ Et c'est pourquoi il faut maintenir une tension entre la qualité et l'équité, surtout dans une période où la situation économique tend à valoriser la «qualité totale» et à oublier la «qualité pour tous».

Un autre aspect de cette stratégie, très présent dans le contexte européen, concerne la mise sur pied des politiques éducatives, plutôt à partir de *critères* que d'objectifs et de propositions. Par *critères* j'entends tout un ensemble d'instruments d'évaluation et de contrôle (normes, standards, modèles, etc.) qui tendent à envisager l'éducation comme un problème de gestion et d'organisation et non comme une question sociale et politique. Hans Vonk a tout à fait raison de souligner qu'il s'agit d'une perspective essentiellement bureaucratique: «Dans les sociétés actuelles, les bureaucrates définissent plusieurs problèmes sociaux et éducationnels en termes de management et non plus en termes de contenu».¹⁰⁴ Cette tendance, qui

¹⁰² M. Apple, *Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age* (New York & London: Routledge, 1993), p. 119.

¹⁰³ Lowe, „Education and European Integration.“

¹⁰⁴ H. Vonk, „Some Trends in the Development of Curriculum for the Professional Preparation of Teachers in Europe,“ in *British Journal of Educational Studies* 34 (2) (1991), p. 134.

est à l'oeuvre au sein de l'Union Européenne, ne se limite pas à faire un contrôle *a posteriori*, mais contribue à la construction de solutions et à l'imposition d'une certaine manière d'approcher les problèmes éducatifs.

La rhétorique de la citoyenneté

Depuis Maastricht, la citoyenneté européenne fonctionne comme une référence utile des discours sur l'éducation. On connaît la fameuse réponse de Raymond Aron: «Il n'y a pas d'animaux tels que des *citoyens européens*. Il y a seulement des citoyens français, allemands ou italiens». ¹⁰⁵ On connaît surtout la formule de Jacques Delors, d'une *citoyenneté à géométrie variable*. C'est une formule qui donne à penser, dans la mesure où elle ne se borne pas à doubler la référence nationale d'une affiliation européenne; mais elle suggère, bien au contraire, une diversification des fidélités et des appartenances. ¹⁰⁶ Tant que la discussion reste sur le plan philosophique, les incidences sur l'éducation sont relativement limitées; mais si l'on investit le débat d'une dimension politique, alors le cas change de figure. À ce propos, l'approche de Jürgen Habermas ¹⁰⁷ est fort intéressante, quand il dénonce le *déficit de participation* des populations à la construction européenne, tout en montrant qu'à l'heure qui passe il y a un rapport évident entre les droits légaux et les droits civiques, politiques et sociaux.

La participation deviendrait, ainsi, la condition *sine qua non* de la citoyenneté européenne. ¹⁰⁸ Voilà ce qui nous permet de rompre avec le déterminisme d'une éducation renfermée à l'intérieur de l'État-nation et d'ouvrir l'imagination à des pratiques éducatives qui sont d'autant plus européennes qu'elles sont enracinées dans l'espace local. Alors, on peut mieux comprendre le cri du poète Alfonso Duarte: «Je veux être européen: je veux être européen. Dans un petit coin du Portugal». ¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ R. Aron, „Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?“ in *Social Research* 41 (4) (1974), p. 653.

¹⁰⁶ Badie, *La fin des territoires*.

¹⁰⁷ Habermas, „Citizenship and National Identity.“

¹⁰⁸ Imbert, „Identité européenne: le complexe de Prométhée“, Marquand, „Reinventing Federalism.“

¹⁰⁹ Cf. B. de Sousa Santos, „Onze teses por ocasião de mais uma descoberta de Portugal“, in *Luzo-Brazilian Review* 29 (1) (1992), pp. 97-113.

Les initiatives en vue de promouvoir la dimension européenne de l'éducation doivent être envisagées à la lumière de ce contexte de restructuration politique: «la référence à l'Europe est une dimension qui ne se substitue pas aux autres mais qui les enrichit»¹¹⁰ Les rationalités discursives reprennent des thèmes-clef des réformes éducatives de plusieurs pays européens, en les replaçant dans le cadre communautaire: le changement du curriculum, l'autonomie de l'école et la professionnalisation des enseignants.

En ce qui concerne le curriculum, il y a un discours des valeurs et de la socialisation des jeunes en tant que citoyens européens, qui est souvent accompagné d'une référence au multiculturalisme et au respect de la diversité. La démocratie, la tolérance ou la solidarité font partie d'un langage qui légitime les efforts politiques à travers la construction d'une histoire de l'Europe comme centre éclairé de la civilisation. Cette perspective «coloniale» conçoit le futur de l'Europe comme la continuation d'un passé que l'on imagine glorieux: «Je pense que s'il existe aujourd'hui un groupe ou une enclave culturelle capable de guider cette nouvelle civilisation planétaire, ce groupe est, précisément, le continent européen».¹¹¹

La «géométrie variable» se traduit aussi dans les pratiques organisationnelles. Les thèmes de la décentralisation et de l'autonomie de l'école font état d'une réorganisation des formes d'intervention politique: «Dans cette perspective, une action au niveau communautaire dans le domaine de l'éducation pourrait être naturellement centrée sur les établissements et autour de projets éducatifs transnationaux constituant autant de partenariats».¹¹² C'est ainsi que Jacques Delors, en 1991, considère que l'école joue d'autant mieux un rôle de renforcement de la cohésion sociale que son implantation est locale et territoriale. La traduction au niveau des systèmes d'enseignement du principe de *subsidiarité* introduit de nouvelles régulations (supra et infra-nationales) entre l'État, la société civile et les communautés éducationnelles.

¹¹⁰ *Livre vert sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation*, 1993, p. 6.

¹¹¹ J.L. García Garrido, *L'avenir de l'éducation dans une Europe unifiée*. Communication présentée au 16^{ème} Congrès de la CESE Copenhague (1994), p. 12.

¹¹² *Livre vert sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation* (1993), p. 9.

Finalement, il faut retenir l'importance du discours sur la professionnalisation des enseignants dans la reconfiguration des réalités éducatives européennes. Un peu partout, dans des documents officiels et dans des articles scientifiques, on souligne le rôle central des enseignants: «Sans enseignants européens il n'y a pas d'éducation européenne».¹¹³ Plus de professionnalisation, plus de responsabilisation, plus de formation: les discours se succèdent pour bien réitérer l'importance des nouveaux *instituteurs* de l'Europe.¹¹⁴ Francine Vaniscotte, à l'époque Présidente de l'ATEE (*Association for Teacher Education in Europe*), est l'une des personnes qui a le mieux exprimé ce sentiment:

Un désir d'Europe. Les enseignants ne peuvent plus être aujourd'hui regardés comme des serviteurs nationaux, ils doivent être regardés comme des ressources européennes. L'intégration européenne remet fondamentalement en cause les systèmes de formation et d'éducation.¹¹⁵

Les systèmes éducatifs européens sont confrontés, aujourd'hui, à des défis d'une telle ampleur qu'on ne peut pas leur répondre par des réformes ou des adaptations partielles. Tout le long de cette deuxième partie j'ai voulu attirer l'attention sur la complexité des débats actuels sur l'éducation européenne. J'ai insisté aussi sur la manière dont l'Europe fonctionne comme *idéal régulateur* des politiques éducatives des différents États membres. Mais, pour que l'éducation soit en mesure de préparer à une citoyenneté qui ne coïncide pas, exclusivement, avec les frontières nationales, pour que les politiques éducatives soient en mesure d'intégrer les références globales et locales (c'est-à-dire, de s'exprimer au-delà et en-deçà de l'État-Nation), il faut des changements majeurs qui remettent en cause la structure même des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement.

¹¹³ J.L. García Garrido, „European Education in a World Civilization,” *European Education* 23 (4) (1991-1992), p. 11.

¹¹⁴ Röhrs, „A United Europe as a Challenge to Education”; R. Ryba, „Common Trends in Teacher Education in European Community Countries,” in *Compare* 22 (1) (1992), pp. 25-39.

¹¹⁵ F. Vaniscotte, „Mot de la Présidente,” in *European Journal of Teacher Education* 14 (3) (1991), p. 188.

Il n'y a pas de réponses simples: l'Europe n'est pas obligatoirement une référence «progressiste» des politiques éducatives;¹¹⁶ en éducation, le nationalisme n'est pas nécessairement «conservateur» et «rétrograde»;¹¹⁷ l'espace local n'est pas automatiquement le lieu le plus «innovateur» du discours scolaire.¹¹⁸ À chaque instant, il faut être capable de *penser l'éducation* en fonction de la complexité croissante des processus qui définissent les multiples liens et identités de la société actuelle et de réinventer les mini-rationalités qui donnent du sens à notre action en tant qu'intellectuels et éducateurs.¹¹⁹ Et, pour cela, besoin est de redécouvrir une pensée de rupture, qui ne renferme pas le débat éducatif dans un consensus inerte, une pensée critique, engagée, capable de retrouver la fonction sociale de l'utopie. Que peut-on espérer d'une telle pensée dans l'Europe de cette nouvelle fin de siècle? Autrement dit: Quel est le rôle de la communauté scientifique, notamment des chercheurs en Éducation Comparée, dans le moment actuel de l'Europe de Éducation?

Le travail de penser l'éducation en europe

Penser l'éducation en Europe est une tâche difficile, et pourtant indispensable. Maastricht a ouvert une crise profonde dans le processus d'intégration européenne. Il faut en profiter pour encourager une discussion plus ouverte, plus participée, des problèmes éducatifs dans le contexte européen. C'est vrai que les instances communautaires reconnaissent souvent que «la dimension européenne est l'affaire de tous et non pas seulement celle des décideurs politiques européens»; mais cet appel est plutôt basé sur une logique d'expertise (la fameuse «synergie

¹¹⁶ R. Ryba, „Unity in Diversity: The Enigma of the European Dimension in Education,” in *Oxford Review of Education* 21 (1) (1995), pp. 25-36.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ M.A. Pereyra, „La construcción de la educación comparada como disciplina académica” in J. Schriewer & F. Pedró, eds., *Manual de Educación Comparada* (Barcelona: PPU, 1993), pp. 255-323.

¹¹⁹ B. de Sousa Santos, *Pela Mão de Alice. O social e o político na pós-modernidade* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1994).

d'experts»)¹²⁰ que sur la mobilisation et la participation des différents espaces scientifiques.

Cette exclusion se double d'une autre très insidieuse: l'idée que les évolutions éducatives seront le fruit de «contraintes extérieures» et en aucun cas de «volontés intérieures». Dans un ouvrage récent sur les scénarios de développement du Portugal et de l'Europe, on fait une anticipation du prochain siècle: «l'avenir de l'éducation ne sera pas moulé par les éducateurs, mais plutôt par les changements qui auront cours au niveau de la démographie, de la technologie et de la famille».¹²¹ Sans méconnaître que l'éducation est un univers plus *totalisé* que *totalisateur*, il faut valoriser l'explicitation d'une pensée et d'une volonté proprement éducatives.

L'intervention des chercheurs en éducation, et très spécialement des comparatistes, doit éviter l'arrogance d'une vision rationalisée du changement, fondée sur le concept de science comme progrès. L'idée que le travail scientifique peut «redresser» le monde fait partie d'une idéologie qui transforme les intellectuels en tenants de l'amélioration sociale.¹²² Mais elle doit éviter tout autant la permanente lamentation quant à l'inutilité de la recherche en éducation. Au regard du présent, je comprends la déception; mais l'éclairage historique nous permet de tempérer quelque peu ces propos. Je ne tiens pour preuve que l'ouvrage de John Meyer, David Kamens et Aaron Benavot sur l'homogénéisation du curriculum au XX^e siècle:

Les changements principaux que nous observons dans l'évolution du curriculum au niveau mondial ont été structurés par les conceptions des scientifiques et des professionnels de l'éducation. Ce sont des changements

¹²⁰ La formule est utilisée dans plusieurs documents, notamment dans le *Rapport sur la mise en oeuvre de la Résolution du Conseil et des ministres de l'Éducation réunis au sein du Conseil, du 24 mai 1988, sur la dimension européenne de l'éducation*. Document élaboré en octobre 1993 par les services de la Task Force Ressources Humaines, Éducation, Formation et Jeunesse.

¹²¹ A. Mateus, J.M.B. de Brito & V. Martins, *Portugal XXI: Cenários de Desenvolvimento* (Lisboa: Bertrand, 1995), p. 87.

¹²² T.S. Popkewitz, *A Political Sociology of Educational Reform* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1991).

théorisés, plutôt que des changements qui se limiteraient à refléter des pouvoirs naturels.¹²³

Finalement, je souhaite lier ce plaidoyer en faveur d'une plus grande participation des milieux scientifiques à la défense d'une *militance pédagogique*, condition essentielle de tout processus d'innovation. L'histoire nous montre que les moments forts de coopération et échange ont eu lieu autour de projets éducatifs et d'idéaux pédagogiques qui ont circulé en Europe et dont les différentes communautés locales et nationales se sont approprié en leur donnant un sens propre. Je prends un seul exemple: la façon dont, aux années vingt, les thèses de l'Éducation Nouvelle ont été relocalisées dans des contextes fort distincts, ayant été prises en charge par des groupes qui ont partagé ce projet de transformation de l'école.

J'en viens à mon propos: faire ressortir l'importance des chercheurs en éducation, surtout en Éducation Comparée, dans l'Europe post-Maastricht. À cela deux conditions: que les différentes communautés (locales, régionales, nationales) se mobilisent autour du débat européen, en le transformant en chose propre; que la recherche en éducation, notamment en Éducation Comparée, soit capable de produire une pensée critique et théorique, une pensée qui ne soit pas purement instrumentale.

La participation des communautés scientifiques au débat éducatif européen

Il y a plusieurs manières de tester la participation des communautés scientifiques au débat européen. Étant donné que les chercheurs s'expriment, en grande partie, à travers des revues scientifiques, il m'a semblé pertinent d'identifier la présence/absence de la problématique européenne dans deux corpus de documents: le premier est constitué par des revues «nationales», une pour chaque pays de l'Union Européenne;¹²⁴ le second est composé d'un ensemble de revues «internationales» publiées en Europe. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, l'analyse s'étend entre le

¹²³ Meyer, Kamens & Benavot, *School Knowledge for the Masses*, p. 175.

¹²⁴ Je n'ai pas pu identifier une revue «nationale» pour le Luxembourg. Étant donné la période considérée, je n'ai pas examiné des revues publiées dans les trois pays qui ont adhéré à l'Union en 1995: Autriche, Finlande et Suède.

début de l'année 1986 (date de l'adhésion du Portugal et de l'Espagne) et la fin de l'année 1993 (date de l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Maastricht). Dans le choix des revues j'ai essayé de tenir compte de leur représentativité, dans les contextes nationaux et européen; il s'agit, à beaucoup d'égards, d'une option arbitraire, aggravée d'ailleurs par l'hétérogénéité des revues consultées, mais qui, étant donné le niveau assez global d'analyse, ne met pas en cause les interprétations avancées.

Liste des revues «nationales»

Zeitschrift für Pädagogik (Allemagne)
Pedagogisch Tijdschrift (Belgique)
Dansk Paedagogisk Tidsskrift (Danemark)
Revista Española de Pedagogía (Espagne)
Revue Française de Pédagogie (France)
«Pedagogical Review» (Grèce)
*The Irish Journal of Education*¹²⁵ (Irlande)
Scuola e Città (Italie)
Pedagogische Studiën (Pays-Bas)
Revista Portuguesa de Pedagogia (Portugal)
British Educational Research Journal (Royaume-Uni)

Liste des revues «internationales»

Bildung und Erziehung
Comparative Education
Compare
Éducation Comparée
European Journal of Education
European Journal of Teacher Education
International Review of Education
Prospects
*Ricerca Educativa*¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Le volume de 1993 n'était pas encore disponible au moment de la rédaction finale de ce texte.

¹²⁶ Les volumes de 1992 et 1993 n'étaient pas encore entrés dans aucune des Bibliothèques consultées lors de cette recherche.

J'ai procédé à une analyse en trois temps: d'abord, l'identification, à travers le titre et éventuellement le résumé et les mots-clefs, des articles concernant des réalités «étrangères» (dans le cas des revues «nationales») ou rédigés d'après une «logique comparative» (dans le cas des revues «internationales»); ensuite, une lecture générique de ces articles, afin de repérer ceux qui intègrent, même de façon superficielle, une réflexion sur les questions européennes; finalement, une analyse fine des articles où la problématique éducative européenne est présente.

Du point de vue quantitatif, je suis arrivé aux résultats suivants:

ANNÉES 1986 - 1993	Nombre total d'articles publiés	Pourcentage d'articles concernant des réalités «étrangères»	Pourcentage d'articles concernant la problématique «européenne»
REVUES 'NATIONALES'	2703	6,3%	0,6%

ANNÉES 1986 - 1993	Nombre total d'articles publiés	Pourcentage d'articles rédigés d'après une «logique comparative»	Pourcentage d'articles concernant la problématique «européenne»
REVUES 'INTER- NATIONALES'	1653	47,9%	6,2%

Je ne vais pas entrer dans une analyse détaillée de l'enquête. Mais il me semble utile de faire deux commentaires.

Le premier concerne l'importance réduite accordée dans les revues «nationales» aux réalités «étrangères» (6,3% des articles), mais surtout

l'absence quasi-totale de réflexions sur les questions européennes, ou même sur la façon dont ces questions influencent les contextes de chaque pays. Sur un total de 2703 articles il n'y a qu'une quinzaine de textes (0,6%) qui approchent cette problématique, la plupart d'entre-eux regroupés en deux dossiers thématiques. Il ne faut pas être très perspicace pour vérifier l'indifférence des communautés scientifiques nationales face au débat sur l'éducation en Europe, lequel traduit un grand déficit de participation.

Le deuxième porte sur les revues «internationales», où l'on peut constater la présence relativement significative d'une approche comparative au sens large du terme (47,9% des articles), bien que seulement une centaine de textes (6,2%) tiennent compte de la problématique européenne. C'est une présence faible, laquelle, d'ailleurs, est assurée par un noyau dur d'une dizaine d'auteurs, chacun d'entre-eux responsable de plusieurs articles et souvent coordinateur de certains numéros ou dossiers thématiques. En tant qu'espace symbolique, on peut dire que la communauté scientifique n'a pas encore «découvert» la problématique européenne comme source de réflexion et de travail collectif.

L'engagement des chercheurs n'est donc pas très visible. Néanmoins, il se peut que le nouveau programme communautaire, *Recherche socio-économique finalisée*, qui inclut pour la première fois un domaine consacrée à la recherche sur l'éducation et la formation, soit susceptible d'aider au changement de cet état des choses. Il se propose de faire progresser les connaissances et de contribuer à la prise de décisions (décentralisées, nationales ou communautaires) qui devraient rendre possibles les bases d'un développement durable des économies européennes. Son objectif est de renforcer les réseaux de recherche, de façon à créer une base commune de connaissances sur les défis auxquels l'Europe est confrontée.

Il me paraît opportun d'évoquer trois aspects du programme qui permettent de mieux situer la question du travail scientifique en éducation: d'abord, le projet d'établir une communauté de recherche en éducation et en formation en Europe; ensuite, l'intention d'accorder la plus haute priorité au travail conceptuel et méthodologique de mise en oeuvre de systèmes conceptuels et d'instruments méthodologiques favorisant la comparaison entre différents contextes locaux, régionaux et nationaux; finalement, l'importance reconnue à la recherche comparative étant donné la «valeur

ajoutée» dont elle est porteuse au niveau européen. Ces points de vue montrent bien l'influence de plus en plus forte des espaces internationaux dans le travail académique et scientifique, ainsi que la mobilisation par l'État (dans ce cas le quasi-État européen) des communautés de recherche.

Sans oublier que les distinctions, les visions et les catégories de pensée des intellectuels sont des *pratiques sociales* qui font partie des réalités qu'ils cherchent à décrire,¹²⁷ il faut reconnaître que les temps actuels sont propices à une consolidation des structures et des processus de recherche comparative en éducation. Stephen Heyneman confirme cette idée, en écrivant qu'en termes de visibilité politique «l'Éducation Comparée et Internationale vit aujourd'hui un *âge d'or*, un âge qui continuera dans le prochain siècle».¹²⁸ L'affirmation est tout à fait pertinente dans le contexte européen. Pourvu que le débat s'élargisse à l'ensemble des communautés scientifiques et des acteurs éducationnels.

Pour une Éducation Comparée critique et théorique

Une analyse plus qualitative des articles concernant la problématique européenne dévoile une approche assez descriptive, marquée par une adhésion acritique à la rhétorique pro-européiste. Elle est produite par un groupe relativement restreint d'auteurs assez connus, proches des cercles bruxellois, dont l'objectif principal est celui de s'ériger en experts de soutien à la décision politique plutôt qu'en chercheurs capables de rendre raison de la complexité des dilemmes éducationnels.

Face à cette production, je ne peux pas m'empêcher de penser au *caméralisme* qui transforme les chercheurs en «conseillers du prince»¹²⁹ ou à la *doxa intellectuelle* dénoncée par Pierre Bourdieu.¹³⁰ Qu'il me soit permis de joindre ma voix aux appels de tous ceux qui, à l'image de Jürgen Schriewer,¹³¹ essaient de bien marquer la différence entre le travail

¹²⁷ Popkewitz, *A Political Sociology of Educational Reform*.

¹²⁸ S. Heyneman, „International Educational Cooperation in the Next Century,” in *CIES Newsletter* 109 (1995), pp. 1 & 8.

¹²⁹ J. Baechler, „Sociologie Historique de l'Europe,” in *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 22 (90) (1991), pp. 5-17.

¹³⁰ Bourdieu, *La misère du monde*.

¹³¹ J. Schriewer, „The Method of Comparison and the Need for Externalization: Methodological Criteria and Sociological Concepts” in J. Schriewer & B.

scientifique dans le domaine de l'Éducation Comparée et la réflexion internationale centrée sur l'orientation des réformes et des politiques éducatives.

Aujourd'hui, il faut être conscient des *limites* de nos interprétations, des fragilités de nos encadrements théoriques et conceptuels. Le comparatisme est à la recherche de nouvelles questions, qui lui permettent de construire d'autres histoires. Nos épistémologies ne peuvent plus ignorer quelques-uns des défis de la science contemporaine, notamment la constatation que rien ne peut être connu de façon sûre et qu'il n'y a pas une téléologie de l'histoire. C'est pourquoi il faut interroger les relations entre la connaissance et le pouvoir sur la base de leur localisation dans un certain espace-temps.¹³² L'Éducation Comparée doit assumer la disruption de ses *espaces-temps* traditionnels, qui caractérise bien la phase actuelle de transition paradigmatique d'une rationalité moderne vers une science que, faute de mieux, l'on désigne de «postmoderne».¹³³

Il s'agit, d'une part, de doter le travail comparatif d'une plus grande épaisseur historique et, d'autre part, d'interroger les présupposés épistémologiques de la modernité: la réalité n'est plus conçue comme une «chose» objective, concrète, palpable, d'où le besoin de comprendre sa nature subjective et le sens qui lui est attribué par les différents acteurs (individuels et collectifs). On est devant une nouvelle épistémologie de la connaissance, qui définit des perspectives de recherche centrées non seulement sur la *matérialité* des faits éducatifs, mais aussi sur les communautés discursives qui les décrivent, les interprètent et les localisent dans un espace-temps donné.¹³⁴ La dimension historique contribue à clarifier et à articuler conceptuellement la comparaison, mais non pas sur la base d'une vision historiciste de la connaissance.¹³⁵

Holmes, eds., *Theories and Methods in Comparative Education* (Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang, 3rd edition, 1992), pp. 25-83.

¹³² Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*.

¹³³ Popkewitz, *A Political Sociology of Educational Reform*; de Sousa Santos, *Pela Mão de Alice*.

¹³⁴ V.D. Rust, „Postmodernism and Its Comparative Education Implications,” in *Comparative Education Review* 35 (4) (1991), pp. 610-626.

¹³⁵ M.A. Pereyra, „La comparación, una empresa razonada de análisis. Por otros usos de la comparación,” in *Revista de Educación*, édition spéciale ‘Los

Il faut mettre sur pied de nouvelles intelligibilités, qui conduisent les comparatistes à consacrer plus d'attention à l'histoire et à la théorie au détriment d'une pure description et interprétation, aux contenus de l'éducation et pas seulement à ses résultats, aux méthodes qualitatives et ethnographiques au lieu d'un recours exclusif à la quantification et aux données statistiques.¹³⁶ L'Éducation Comparée doit regarder le monde comme un *texte*, cherchant à comprendre comment les discours font partie des pouvoirs qui partagent et divisent les hommes et les sociétés, qui entérinent des situations de dépendance et des logiques de discrimination, qui construisent des manières de penser et d'agir définissant nos rapports au savoir et à la recherche.¹³⁷

Les sociétés actuelles et l'Europe au premier chef constituent un terrain particulièrement stimulant pour la comparaison en éducation. Je tiens, d'abord, à insister sur le fait que l'éducation est un élément central aussi bien des processus de globalisation économique et culturelle que des tendances d'union politique qui ont cours dans certaines régions du monde, notamment en Europe.¹³⁸ Jürgen Schriewer souligne à juste titre que «de survol des différents champs de la recherche comparative montre que c'est bien dans le domaine des politiques éducatives et des orientations concernant la recherche éducationnelle, beaucoup plus que dans le domaine des politiques économiques, sociales ou de l'environnement, que le degré de standardisation des structures organisationnelles, des modèles d'intervention et des discours réformateurs a atteint son plus haut niveau».¹³⁹ Ceci crée de nouvelles opportunités à l'Éducation Comparée, même si c'est souvent la dimension *internationale* (échanges, coopération, appui à la décision, consultation, etc.) qui en occupe les espaces au détri-

usos de la comparación en Ciencias Sociales y en Educación' (Madrid, 1990), pp. 24-76.

¹³⁶ Pereyra, "La construcción de la educación comparada como disciplina académica."

¹³⁷ J. Der Derian & M. J. Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations & Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989).

¹³⁸ P. G. Altbach, "Trends in Comparative Education," in *Comparative Education Review* 35 (3) (1991), pp. 491-507.

¹³⁹ Schriewer, *World-System and Interrelationship-Networks*, p. 15.

ment de la dimension *comparative* (recherche scientifique, travail intellectuel, etc.).

Je reviens sur l'analyse qualitative des revues «nationales» et «internationales». Elle révèle bien la situation de crise de l'Éducation Comparée, née de notre incapacité à bâtir des modèles d'analyse théoriquement plus sophistiqués. N'ayons pas d'illusions: la sortie de cette crise ne passe pas par une Éducation Comparée plus utile, plus pragmatique, plus proche de la décision politique, mais, bien au contraire, par un investissement intellectuel, par un approfondissement conceptuel, par la construction de nouvelles théories.

On vit aujourd'hui une situation exceptionnelle au sein de l'Union Européenne, une situation dans laquelle le rôle des chercheurs se trouve renforcé: pensons à la crise de légitimité due à la vague actuelle d'euro-pessimisme, qui oblige les politiciens à recourir au prestige social des milieux scientifiques; mais pensons aussi au besoin de doter l'éducation d'une plus grande visibilité vis-à-vis de l'opinion publique, qui continue à considérer ce domaine comme relevant essentiellement de la compétence de chaque État membre.

Peut-on imaginer une conjoncture plus stimulante et plus dangereuse pour l'Éducation Comparée? À nous d'en développer les potentialités et éviter les écueils. Mais pour cela il faut produire: une Éducation Comparée critique et théorique, et non pas une espèce de réflexion molle du point de vue conceptuel; une Éducation Comparée qui ne renonce pas à un engagement dans les réalités quotidiennes, mais qui n'accepte pas la mission de simple relais des pouvoirs politiques; une Éducation Comparée qui ne se renferme pas dans des modèles descriptifs et prescriptifs, mais qui assume sa propre historicité et s'investit dans l'élaboration d'approches compréhensives. Il faut que les différentes communautés scientifiques s'approprient de la problématique européenne, que les comparatistes construisent des analyses théoriquement plus élaborées, que l'Europe devienne une référence pour le travail intellectuel. Sans cela le débat restera renfermé entre la logique des experts et la rhétorique politique. Et les Européens et les Européennes continueront à subir, plutôt qu'à participer à la construction de cette Europe (parfois) introuvable.

Un mot final. Par le biais d'un raisonnement, sans doute circulaire et parfois redondant, j'ai voulu construire trois arguments:

- Le premier, *historique*, cherche à éclairer les liens entre le développement de l'État-nation et la consolidation des systèmes nationaux d'enseignement, en suggérant qu'on assiste à la fin d'un cycle de deux siècles marqué par la référence de l'école à la triade «nationalité-souveraineté-citoyenneté».
- Le deuxième, *sociologique*, rend compte de la façon dont les phénomènes de globalisation et de localisation s'expriment sur l'arène éducative européenne, notamment à travers un nouveau concept de citoyenneté, en défendant que la remise en cause de l'emprise exclusive des États-nations sur la chose éducative entraîne un tournant décisif dans la manière de concevoir et d'organiser l'école.
- Le troisième, *comparatif*, souligne le besoin de stimuler une pensée scientifique capable de réfléchir critique et théoriquement à ces changements, d'une Éducation Comparée basée sur des logiques de recherche scientifique et de travail intellectuel, et non pas uniquement sur des principes d'expertise technique et d'appui à la décision politique.

L'Europe doit être attentive à toutes les Europes (raciales, ethniques, culturelles, etc.) qui coexistent sur son territoire, doit être capable de se raconter aux multiples histoires et identités. Il y a, peut-être, une citoyenneté à géométrie variable. Mais il n'y aura jamais des droits de l'homme à géométrie variable. Il faut que «l'Europe(s) se pense comme le *continent de la diversité* et non comme une péninsule en voie d'uniformisation».¹⁴⁰ Et que les politiques éducatives prennent acte de cette réalité.

Nous ne devons pas transformer l'Europe dans un nouveau mythe et, dans le plus intime de notre manière d'être éducateurs, il faut garder le bon dosage de scepticisme et d'utopie. C'est pourquoi je suis aux côtés de Franco Ferrarotti quand il s'indigne du déficit d'imagination politique et d'idéaux courageux: «L'Europe unie de demain devra découvrir dans ses propres racines le respect pour l'altérité de l'autre, le droit à la diversité ethnique, mais aussi culturelle, l'ouverture à tout ce qui n'est pas et ne sera jamais *Europe*, non pas pour le convertir, l'absorber, l'intégrer dans

¹⁴⁰ J. Attali, *Europe(s)* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), p. 11.

un impossible rêve pan-européen, mais tout simplement pour l'accepter, même si c'est quelque chose de trop lointain et de trop différent». ¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ F. Ferrarotti, „Attualità dell'europeismo di Luigi Einaudi,“ in *La Critica Sociologica* 99 (1991), p. VII.

BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL: A COMPARISON OF EMERGING IMAGES OF MAN IN THE SCIENCES

A Critical Analysis of the Dominant 'Image of Man' in Western Culture and its Implications for Education in the 21st Century

Willy Wielemans

This article is a synthesis of research which has been published as a book, written in the Dutch language.¹ The thesis of this research is that in Western culture the human being is defined, socialized and educated in a very specific and limited way, i.e. as an individual, as an autonomous person. This thesis may be surprising because it casts doubt on pre-suppositions which are taken for granted.

Based on a comparison of new scientific insights (but not on ethical or philosophical principles) I will argue that human beings are much more than only individuals: they are **nodal points of relationships**. *To be is to be related.*

Starting from this thesis, I will deal with the following points:

- *First*, I would like to investigate historically when, why, and how the Western image of man changed from a „participating consciousness“ to a modern individualistic, objectifying consciousness.
- *Second*, I will try to penetrate into the paradigm debates in four sciences, i.e. quantum physics (beyond Newton?), psychology (beyond

¹ Willy Wielemans, *Voorbij het individu. Mensbeelden in wetenschappen* (Leuven: Garant, 1993), p. 230.

Freud?), sociology (beyond Parsons?), and theories on evolution (beyond Darwin?). Probably, from a comparison of these debates on shifting paradigms we will be able to learn more about emerging images of man.

- *Finally*, consistent with and inspired by both the changing paradigms and alternative image(s) of man, I will present an approach that reflects differently on issues relating to: education for freedom and responsibility, shifting norms, a contemporary coherent and religious meaning of life, the role of teachers and pupils, the content of education, and local as well as central educational policy.

An Historical Approach to the Western Concept of the Individual

In the first chapter of my book *Beyond the Individual* I tried to reconstruct the mental history of the human being in Western culture. I found that the image of the *human-as-an-individual* is only a recent historical construction. With the exception of the last centuries, the human being has experienced her/himself as an essential component of an organic world. The genesis of the experience of becoming an individual was accompanied by a process of objectifying the world. Concurrent to the development of the human as an autonomous and subjectified „individual,“ the world changed into an objectified and mechanized „thing.“ Both Greek tradition and Judaic Christianity, supporting each other, contributed to this development.

Judaism mainly originated from a reaction against an animistic life-style. The Old Testament is concurrently the story of the triumph of Jewish monotheism as well as the death of a godhead/goddess who was conceived as inherent in nature. The discontinuity between creator and creature, or between man and nature was emphasized. The earth became both inanimate matter and a field to be reclaimed, exploited, and manipulated for human gain.

The „Greek Enlightenment“ started in the 5th century BC. The school of sophists aimed to establish one of the first rational foundations of Western anthropocentrism. We all remember the famous saying of Protagoras, „Man is the yardstick of all existence.“ Socrates and Plato reacted strongly against an Homeric-mythical life-style as well as against an acquisition of

knowledge via a process of direct participation. No longer was a „sensual experience“ the basis of a valid process of learning. The philosophy of Aristotle was very successful in enlarging the gap between myth and reason. Nevertheless, the „Greek Enlightenment“ did not result in a complete disenchantment with nature nor in a self-conscious, autonomous human subject, characterized by the experience to master nature as an object.

Generally speaking, the animistic and mystical-magic world-view was able to survive until the take-off of the scientific revolution. The *medieval image of man* was mainly organic, and nature was seen as animated. As distinct from the modern island-like individual, the medieval human being was to be conceived much more as an embryonic component of all existence. In order to understand the medieval „mind,“ I would like to refer to the analysis of the alchemic tradition as well as to the psychoanalysis of one of its last great representatives, i.e. Isaac Newton. However, because this article has to be short, I can only invite you to read (among other sources) Berman's book entitled *The Re-enchantment of the World*² in which both the shift from a „participating consciousness“ to an individual, scientific self-image, and from an organic to a mechanic world-view are carefully described. In particular the personal life of Newton is like a mirror reflecting the radical changes of European civilization at the beginning of a new era.

This new epoch of the 16th and 17th century is called „the scientific revolution.“ Newton and Descartes are seen as its main architects. Bacon, Hobbes and Locke succeeded in providing this new world-view and its image of man with a scientific foundation. Ever since those times the civil-capitalist society has increasingly promoted both the autonomy of the *atomistic individual* and the manageability of the *fragmented earth*. From these days forward, the human individual is situated opposite to nature. The modern *ego* is a ruling, mastering, constructing, interpreting and (e)valuating entity, seeking its own emancipation, free from relatedness. Nature is only a composition of meaningless, neutral, manageable *things* and processes. Consequently, in modern sciences the concept of the

² M. Berman, *The Reenchantment of the World* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1981).

human-as-an-individual is a non-problematic presupposition supplying the foundations for the construction of theories and praxis.

It is not surprising that in education as well the image of the human being as an autonomous individual is of paramount importance. Self-affirmation and competition are valued as the most effective attitudes both in education and society. Meritocracy seems to serve as a consistent ideology.

Strangely enough, the development mentioned above is increasingly generating doubts in the very heart of the most remarkable and esteemed paradigms of contemporary sciences. Based on its manifold tested empirical methods, the instrumental rationality has discovered that „facts“ rebel against the founding axioms of the great architects of the scientific revolution. The presuppositions concerning matter, energy, psyche, socialization, evolution and objectivity have henceforth lost their traditional certainty. Consistency is no longer assured; alternative interpretations are needed.

Again, but this time on scientific grounds and in a post-industrial era, *an organic view on earth* is emerging as well as *an image of the human-beyond-the-individual*, i.e. *as a nodal point of relationships*.

In the following sections I will try to investigate whether this thesis could be proved or not. In order to do so, I analyse and interpret paradigms from contemporary science; that is as already mentioned, physics, psychology, sociology, and theories on evolution.

New Images of Man Emerging from Paradigm Shifts in Four Sciences

Physics

In modern physics the quantum theory shows the most fundamental pattern of all existence, i.e. the simultaneousness and intertwining of the particle/wave duality. This arch-pattern is the ultimate source of the dynamic and creative indefiniteness of existence. Instead of inevitable determinism, this dual pattern generates probability in the stream of events and establishes the ultimate condition for causality and determinism.

Such an interpretation goes critically beyond the Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, as well as beyond dualism and Hegelian-Marxist dialectics. Starting from these quantum-theoretical insights it is no longer consistent to put a total emphasis on the concept of the individual in trying to under-

stand and define the human being. The image of the human being strongly emerges as an individual/relation dynamic, simultaneously and indivisible interwoven. This alternative interpretation throws heavy doubts on the human ambition towards both autonomy and objectivity.

Because reality as a whole is characterized by this arch-pattern, the opposition between autonomy and dependency as well as between subjectivity and objectivity is really a false problem. In other words, these so-called dichotomies are to be interpreted as variants of the dual particle/wave pattern. Both are existing at the same time; they are never separated; they are always intertwined. Essentially characterized by the individual/relation duality, the human is also and always „holographically“ connected with a larger context which is ever energetic and influencing. The code and the properties of this context (or of the almost endless web of complex relations) are engraved on the daily, concrete human existence.

Initially unintended, but as the result of a retrospective view of my research as a whole, I have inevitably to conclude that this dual pattern discovered in quantum physics finds surprising analogies and exposes concrete forms in contemporary psychology, sociology and evolutionary theories. The many metaphors, used in different sciences, seem to be only other names pointing to the same discovery which manifests itself on the manifold layers of reality.

Psychology

As far as psychology is concerned, we cannot avoid observing the shift from the emphasis on the human-as-an-individual to the image of the human as a nodal point of relationships.

It is well known that Freud relativized the highly glorified autonomy of the human psyche by making us aware of the physiological and biochemical substratum of human behavior. However, this relativity did not imply at this stage a rejection of the image of the human-as-an-individual. The psyche remained single/singular, entangled in the specific energetic pattern of the individualized human being. The Freudian „individual“ -- or indivisible being -- is to be understood as a „multividual,“ or as a being who experiences in her/himself division and fragmentation. By means of rational ego-control this fragmentation could be neutralized, and the state of the individual as „indivized“ could be restored.

Freud comes much closer to the relational capacity of human beings in his essay on narcissism. In the post-Freudian psychoanalysis (e.g. of Nancy Chodorow³, among others) this interpretation is strongly developed. It has been discovered and increasingly emphasized that the human in her/his deepest psychical dynamics has to be seen as a „co-habitus,“ as a being always accompanied and inhabited by many others; in other words: as a nodal point of relationships. Human beings are anchored in one another. Each „me“ is always also a „we.“ Mental health, personal freedom and free will, responsibility, creativity and the capacity to interact, are characterized by the quality of the human-as-a-dynamic-co-habitus. The dual basic pattern manifests itself clearly recognizable at the psychical level: the human is a primordial individual/relation duality, simultaneously and unbreakable.

Sociology

From the decodification of contemporary sociological theories one has to conclude that the opposing dialectical *dualism* of the „individual versus society“ is exchanged for the conception of a *duality* which shows striking similarities with the basic pattern emerging both from quantum physics and alternative psychological theories.

In the sociology of education there are basically two diverging schools, which could be reduced to the so-called voluntarism-determinism debate. In traditional socialization theories the vulnerable individual is opposed to the determining society. In recent interpretation theories the position of the individual is based on strongly emphasized voluntarism. In the new interpretations, however, this dichotomy is transcended. In the well-known theories of Bourdieu⁴, Giddens⁵, Luhmann (among others) the traditional

³ N.J. Chodorow, „Toward a Relational Individualism: The Mediation of Self Through Psychoanalysis“ in T.C. Heller, N. Sosna, & D.E. Wellbery, *Reconstructing Individualism, Anatomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 197-207.

⁴ P. Bourdieu, *Opstellen over Smaak, habitus en het veldbegrip*. Gekozen door Dick Pels (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1989).

⁵ A. Giddens, *Studies in Social and Political Theory* (London: Hutchinson, 1977); *Nieuwe regels voor de sociologische methode* (Baarn: Ambo, 1979); *Een kennismaking met de structuratietheorie* (Wageningen: Landbouwhogeschool-Medelingen van de vakgroepen sociologie, 14, 1987).

polarity between individual and society is neutralized. The two main concepts of Bourdieu, „habitus“ and „field,“ and of Giddens, „structure“ and „system“ are the two faces of only one indivisible reality. In other words, „individual“ and „society“ co-exist inseparably and simultaneously in time and space. The reality individual/society is one concurrent and unbreakable duality, which is basically restless, self-energetic and unpredictably self-renewing. The voluntarism/determinism dichotomy deals with the same characteristics. Polarity is exchanged for dynamic integration.

Theories on Evolution

In contemporary theories on evolution as well as in some geo-physiological and socio-biological studies the human being is seen in a new relationship to the evolving planet and not so much that the human her/himself is at the focus of these studies. Furthermore the analysis of the evolutionary „behavior“ of the Earth is at stake. One of the main results is the construction of a coherent theory in which the Earth is represented as a living entity that creates and maintains itself. Our common planet and birthplace, named „Gaia“ by the ancient Greeks, seems to be one big organ, that cannot longer be understood and treated as an inanimate machine. The well-known and recognized „Gaia-theory“ of Lovelock and Margulis contributes to the exchange of the Newtonian „mechanomorphic“ thinking for an anthropomorphic interpretation.

One can expect that this new insight has far-reaching consequences for the self-image of man. The whole human being, including her/his critical faculties, is rooted in, and is constantly emerging from a billions-of-years-old gigantic process of evolution. We are life-within-life; we are behaving within a larger web of behavior. Once again, but not in a different way, we become aware that the earth is the „womb“ of humanity. The obsession of the „ego“ in our consciousness is tempered. In a special way, we are reminded of who we are, where we come from, and how close we are taking part in the history of the planet as a whole. The Gaia-theory sets the images of matter, man and God in accelerated motion. The critical quest for ethical standards finds inspiration in the tested behavioral patterns of the evolving planet.

However, the interpretation of Gaian behavior is not an easy undertaking. Recent studies show that most of the (neo-) Darwinist theories provided a legitimization for the principle of natural aggression and hard

competitive struggle between individuals, for the superiority of both the masculine human beings and the white race, especially (but not only) in the world of politics and economics. It becomes increasingly clear that (neo-) Darwinism is wrong⁶ and that the definition of the „unit of survival“ in the process of evolution is not correct at all. Darwinists are used to looking at organisms as isolated competitive entities. Organism and environment are interpreted as being polar and even more antagonistic. Consequently, Darwinists have not paid attention to the fact that organisms are multi-layered systems, connected to one another as components of one enclosing, layered regulation, wherein the part/whole duality is one of the many manifestations of the dual basic pattern of all existence. The „unit of survival“ in the new interpretation is „the organism-in-its-environment.“ In other words, the evolution of eco-systems in the even larger whole of the living planet is at the focus of the attention. On closer investigation, the laws of heredity are also inclined to cooperation and co-evolution, because ultimately competition and cooperation are components of one and the same dual basic pattern, just as self-affirmation/integration, or as individual/relation, or as particle/wave in quantum physics. The fundamental code of the living planet seems not to be „competition,“ but „co-operative reciprocal dependency.“ This type of behavior is „naturally selected“ because it guarantees reproductive success as well as the optimization of evolving life.

The juxtaposed images of the human, emerging from the foregoing four sciences, point to a very distinct convergence (a meta-paradigm?) of both the metaphors and their underlying meaning, i.e. polarized and dialectical *dualism* is exchanged for simultaneous and interwoven *duality* of particle/wave, individuality/relatedness, individual/society, and competition/ cooperation or organism/environment.

Anyway, it is clear that this convergence points „beyond the individual“ and translates itself most adequately in *the image of the human as a nodal point of relationships*. (This representation of the human is suggested in Figure 1.)

⁶ See, among others, C. Badcock, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).




Figure 1: The Image of the Human as a Nodal Point of Relationships

Consequences for Education

As promised in the introduction of this article, I will now search for some essential consequences for education, inspired by the shifting paradigms and images of man referred to above. I would like to reflect on issues relating to individual autonomy and self-development, to education for freedom and responsibility, shifting norms, a contemporary coherent and religious meaning of life, the content of education.⁷

The contemporary uncertainty concerning the image of man, values, the (ultimate) meaning of life, goals and objectives of education, could be

⁷ The role of teachers and pupils, and local as well as central educational policy are not included in this paper.

interpreted as the inevitable participation of educationists in the difficult search for new paradigms. The thesis of my book and this article is that we could be inspired in this search by a comparison of the emerging paradigms in contemporary sciences. I think that the striving for *consistency* of education with these new insights will finally be rewarded. Since this article is only a synthesis of a more comprehensive research, I have to confine myself to only a few results.

Autonomy/Self-Development

Consistent thinking reveals that the human is a „being-in-relation“: to be is to be related! On these grounds the image of an independent individual becomes increasingly wrong. The person has to be seen as embedded in an environment. The human is a network, or a complex reality with two faces, an individual one and a relational one. These two faces are always intertwined. The most glorified statute of the Western image of a unique and independent individual has thus been strongly criticized. Man's experience of being a skin-locked ego is ever-decreasing. The notable ego-emphasis as the most dominant characteristic of Western culture is no longer consistent with the emerging paradigms.

This relational thinking contains the idea that the human person has no intrinsic properties which are independent from his/her environment. Autonomous individuals are abstractions because their properties can be observed and defined only by means of their interactions with other individuals, who in their turn also exist in interrelations. Thus, human beings can never be conceived of as complete autonomous individuals, or as the ultimate building-stones of the society. They cannot be described in terms of what they are on themselves, but in terms of their relatedness to nature, to other people, to socio-economic events and institutions, and to the socialized sediment of all this in their own psyche.

As a consequence, autonomy and independency, emphasized in education and schooling, are very open to question. Another image of autonomy is emerging from the mentioned sources of inspiration. Autonomy is increasingly interpreted as an obsessional concept which is characteristic to Western culture. In the new interpretation autonomy is only one of the necessary conditions for interrelatedness. Instead of emphasizing self-development, education should focus more on co-development or the optimization of the-human-in-and-together-with-his-relations. Inspired by

Koestler⁸, I would like to say that a human being is like a „holon“ integrated in multi-layered and ever larger „holons.“

Ethics and Responsibility

The image of the human as a nodal point of relationships also includes questions concerning the traditional concept of „individual“ free will. In the new conception free will and responsibility have to be attached to the whole dual reality of the human. The intertwined duality of individual/relation is the only reality to which we can adjudge faculties such as free will and responsibility. It is not the autonomous individual that is virtuous or culpable, but the human as a nodal point of relationships. Free will and responsibility are embedded in the dynamic tissue of our existence, which ramifies itself in time and space, in a permanent dialogue with our own past, our experience, our environment and with other persons and their relationships.

Consequently, if in education we would like to improve the ethical quality and responsibility of the society as a whole, we then have to optimize the entire network of relationships in which the human co-exists.

Of course this implies also that self-development or ego-assertion and competitive assertivity will be relativized and even criticized, both in education and in all aspects of societal life. The development of the capacity to be related and to live critically creative with the many relationships in the web of our existence, will be valued as more important. Neither the ethics of the autonomous ego, nor the ethics of the collectivity of human persons will be the norm in the near future. Beyond the individual, the emerging ethical norm is the all-embracing whole, which is the living planet to which we belong as critical co-governing and goal- and norm-seeking nodal points of relationships.

Education and the (Ultimate) Meaning of Life

The paradigms mentioned reveal indeterminism, self-organization, creative doubt and searching uncertainty. If we try to discover or to invent the (ultimate) meaning of life on the basis of these new insights, then we are in trouble with the traditional characteristics of most religions. Dogmatic thinking, powerful institutionalization, legitimation by referring to a

⁸ A. Koestler, *Janus: A Summing Up* (London: Pan Books, 1978).

transcendental source of inspiration, the belief in an absolute truth, hierarchy and unquestionable authority are in contradiction with the essential properties of the new paradigms. If we allow the principle of consistency to be the guide in our quest for sense and meaning in life, then not only the image of man is shifting, but also the image of God, as well as the concept of the transcendental, of truth, even the concepts of life and death.

Religion will be interpreted as a fundamental-teleological striving, which is inherent in the cosmic evolution as a whole, to find and permanently redefine its own goals and future.

Education could contribute to develop the capacity to live with creative uncertainty, and with the knowledge that we have to discover and to invent the meaning of life in co-existence with an evolving and living planet, and thus as a nodal point of relationships.

The Content of Basic Education⁹

Beyond the individual, education and school-education aim to develop the human as a nodal point of relationships, to optimize the human-in-and-with-her/his-relations. This alternative goal description invites one to construct a taxonomy to develop school curricula which are consistent with the emerging paradigms as well as with the new image of man.

It is very promising to observe that man is developing a consciousness not only about himself, but also relating to the whole environment in which he is existing. In many cultures, this image of the human exists in the traditions and has to be re-interpreted through the stages of industrialization and modernization. In the West, this consciousness-enlarging awareness is emerging and focusing on the mutual connection and cooperation of all elements of life. Finally, the human is beginning to acquire this new insight that the acquisition of an individual consciousness is not the ultimate goal of human development. At the same time, it is crucial to look at all things and beings as interconnected and to adopt a new way of life. Individual behavior can then gear more to the interest of the whole which eventually provides the norm and yardstick for individual development. In

⁹ See also W. Wielemans & C.-P. Chan, *Education and Culture in Industrializing Asia: The Interaction between Industrialization, Cultural Identity and Education. A Comparison of Secondary Education in Nine Asian Countries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), p. 473.

a synthesis between cultures, it is very important to become aware of the fact that man is much more than only an individual. *The human being is a nodal point of relationships.*

In a study on nine Asian countries (see Wielemans-Chan), the relation-axes model is constructed to represent the essential dimensions of man's existence. This new interpretation of a related image of man in a dynamic interrelated living world will be the new challenge for countries in all continents in providing an adequate education for the future generations.

In the following I would like to explore more in detail the potentials of this new image of man as well as its significance for a core curriculum that would be able to cope with the problems of post-industrialization and cultures all over the world.

From research it appears that the concept of „the individual“ is underlying the (f)actual and desirable core curriculum of countries characterized by the „industrial mentality.“ However, it is still exceptional to find studies aiming at a deeper analysis of this fundamental concept. The image of man supporting and justifying the construction of a core curriculum is not given much attention. In many countries the discussion concerning ideal structures of the education system and concerning the realization of equality of educational opportunities has been enfeebled. In the contemporary agenda the content of (especially basic) education and the educational quality (especially of the output) seem to be much more important. Not only a predominantly pragmatic atmosphere is striking, but also a lack of sound theoretical concepts. As a result of this absence, questions on core curricula and basic education are, from the start, formulated in a very practical way and are urging for an analogous answer. At best one finds some very valuable critical reflections made by educational sociologists. However, in most cases the deeper philosophical-anthropological reflection is lacking. To pupils between the ages of 6 and 15-16 years, a concrete and detailed menu of subjects is offered, predominantly based on political choices. Ingredients of this menu are mostly pointing to knowledge, skills and attitudes which are estimated to be very essential to the modern society. In doing so, the requirements of our (f)actual and prospected society are functioning as incontestable norms. The content of the curriculum for basic education reflects what the present society is indicating as its common fundamentals.

Because of a lack of critical curriculum development, the content of basic education is concealing the value assumptions upon which it is based. A theory-based curriculum construction will be more effective if the analysis of dominant ideologies is taken as an explicit task for educationists in their attempt to bring about changes in education.

It is beyond doubt that the dominant image of man in Western societies comes very close to the extreme of the individual. Also in some Asian countries both this concept and its consistency with the promising industrial mentality are mostly uncritically promoted as the very crucial, new and desirable identification objectives of the core curriculum. However, concerning the consequences for education and schooling, the critical analysis of the exported „Western ego“ can provide a source of revolutionary ideas, in which education could search for a new image of the human and therefore provide contemporary societies with fundamental solutions for the problems resulting from shifts towards modernization and post-industrialization.

Cultural-critical research draws attention to the fact that the strong emphasis on ego-training, the separation between subject and object, and the fragmented view on reality facilitate the inclusion of presuppositions (which are mostly taken for granted, e.g. personal development, competition, meritocracy etc.) in documents on education, and in particular on core curricula and basic education. The role of the teacher is in danger of being reduced to just the specialist teaching of a subject and to a mere agent of transmission of subject-matter. Education could also risk being swallowed by overwhelming utilitarianism. Education is permanently assessed by the one-dimensional question: what is it useful for? Or, does it work? Curriculum construction is subordinated to means-end thinking. In this view, education is reduced to „strategy.“ Nowadays the educated man is to a large extent identified with the useful man, the strategically defensible man, the undaunted man who in his world has to be able to cope with reciprocal distrust and with the overall threatening manipulation. Another presupposition as to the formulation of today's education is found in the fragmentation of the curriculum. As society continues to be sustained by competing fragments, likewise this „law“ has an impact on curriculum development. It is not surprising at all to see this corresponding with the image of the specialized-fragmented teacher as well as with the strategic

utility of subject matters. If the core curriculum for basic education is going to be only an additional sum of juxtaposed subjects, we may well strengthen the pupil's reductionistic and fragmented view on reality. However, if true knowledge in the minds of educated and integrated personalities has to result in finally perceiving unity, then of course we do not see much point in a fragmented curriculum.

Constructive criticism entails the task of creating an alternative image of the human being that will be inspiring for a kind of basic education which is capable of continuously submitting the normative claims of society to a critical self-examination. Experience shows that criticism emerges when an alternative is awakening. The critical undertone in the foregoing requires acknowledgment of the sources from which this criticism grew and developed itself towards an alternative. The alternative *image of the human* derives from the four sources already mentioned, viz:

- philosophical reflections on the new paradigm in physics;
- a new interpretation of theories and research about „socialization“;
- a critical re-interpretation of the psycho-analytical (Freudian) image of man;
- and finally, re-interpretations of the theory of evolution.

The main question now is: what could be the implications for basic education when the human is defined as *a nodal point of relationships*? One particular question (among many others) that may arise is: What should basic education include concerning knowledge, skills and attitudes?

The concrete selection of knowledge, skills, and attitudes will, consequently, be determined both by the described conception of the human and an appropriate educational science. In terms of the foregoing, education is to be defined as a relational-intentional process aiming at full development of the person oriented towards as critical-constructive/creative integration in dynamic society and culture. Consequently, knowledge, skills and attitudes will be derived from a mainly psychological analysis of the changeable and changing personality, from the main dimensions of both society and culture, and from the requirements of a critical-constructive integration (which means much more than merely adaptation). This definition could be represented as follows:




Figure 2: Definition of Education Based on a „Relational Image of the Human“

The notion of „*relatedness*“ becomes more concrete if we know more about everyday human relations. The domain of human relations can be categorized in three main dimensions:

- the human „is relational“ towards nature;
- the human „is relational“ towards other humans (including social institutions);
- the human „is relational“ towards his own psycho-somatic reality.

These relation-axes are not static. The whole of this relational landscape is dynamic and permanently in evolution. It is continuously revitalizing itself by a changing creation of relative order and chaos. Crucial to this dynamism is the presence of man with his capacities such as: to perceive, to describe, to observe experimentally, to quantify, to interpret critically, to project and plan technically, to evaluate ethically, to design and shape esthetically, and to create (ultimate religious) meaning.

The three relation-axes are permanently crossed by these dimensions of the mind, as represented in the following figure.




Figure 3: A New Paradigm for Education Based on the Relation-Axes Model¹⁰

¹⁰ Source: Wielemans & Chan, *Education and Culture in Industrializing Asia*, p. 464.

The temptation to think immediately in terms of traditionally-known subjects is of course very strong. Indeed, it is obvious to think of physics and chemistry as far as the relationship with nature is concerned; or of languages, sociology, political sciences, economy, etc. concerning the relationship with the social world. These subject-clusters are put in a dotted line frame. The intersection of basic capacities of the human mind with the three relation-axes provides us, in our opinion, with a justified educational and philosophical foundation on which more concrete dimensions of basic education (eventually also subjects or clustered domains of knowledge, skills or attitudes) could be formulated.

The results of these intersections suggested in the figure are influenced by time-space (f)actors (such as social interest groups, requirements of the labour market, changing professional profiles, etc.). These time-space (f)actors are „proportionalizing“ and „hierarchizing“ the aspects of basic education. So, one could assign more value (utility, status) to mathematics than to art education. This is mostly expressed in the quantity of hours dedicated to a certain subject on the curriculum. There is mostly a high degree of correlation between the proportion of hours and the hierarchy of status and of importance. For this correlation, undoubtedly, the same time-space (f)actors are highly responsible.

The teacher is the guide of the pupils in their critical exploration of the relatedness they themselves are. He/she teaches them in this web of relatedness to act intelligently and skilfully, to interpret critically, to evaluate ethically, to project aesthetically, plan and shape, and to create a religious meaning of life. Obviously, the teacher also exists in a web of relationships, constructed by himself or herself, that will overlap more or less with the web of his pupils. Specializing himself or herself in certain clusters of relationships (either subjects or not), is not discharging him/her from cultivating as much as possible an overview of the whole field of relationships. It is equally expected that he/she will critically introduce his/her pupils into the complex web of (f)actors which keep basic education „proportionalizing“ and „hierarchizing.“ The relational image of man, thus, has far-reaching consequences as far as teacher training is concerned.

Further analysis and operationalization of this alternative paradigm is needed in order to prepare for the smooth transition to a more educationally-grounded basic education.

Final Recommendations for an Alternative Educational Policy

The definition of the human as *a nodal point of relationships* implies a new normative consciousness. No longer is the individual (and its development) the norm for economical, social, political, educational activities (*anthropocentrism*), nor is it one or another form of collectivity (the family, the group, the firm, the nation). The new insight which is to be derived from modern, scientific-technical „relatedness“ is that the whole (living) planet is the ultimate norm for whatever kind of development in the future (*ecocentrism*). The search for a more appropriate mentality in the near future (in the coming post-industrial era) has already started to include this new and essential norm. Post-industrialization, changing cultural identities, educational policies and their curriculum construction should become more in line with this new global concern. This growing awareness is not limited to a few cultures or countries only, but it involves all continents and political-economic-cultural-religious systems. The ultimate norm is: the development of the living planet. Consequently, industrial planning, economic competition, educational theories and practices, etc. are not to be seen as autonomous activities or principles, but are subordinated to the planetarian well-being; the planet being perceived more and more as a self-regulating system. The emphasis on this new normative principle does not exclude the importance given to both the individual and the different kinds of collectivities; on the contrary, their importance remains. However, the individual and its development are no longer the ultimate cornerstone of rights and duties; nor do groups, families, clans, firms, legal states, etc. acquire decisive and unquestionable legitimate power to restructure the ethical hierarchy of mankind. The value of both the individual (and his accompanying attitudes such as competition) and the collectivity (including the nation-state) becomes relative and is toned down by the ultimate rights and values of the living planet.

This growing awareness, of not only the survival but the harmonious development of the living planet, provides a new moral code for man as a nodal point of relationships, and consequently also for the essential objectives of his/her economies and industries, of his/her dynamic cultural identities, and his/her changing and searching educational systems, in the east and the west, as well as in the north and the south.

FROM VISION TO PRACTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN FOLK HIGH SCHOOLS FOR ADULT EDUCATION IN TODAY'S EUROPE

Steven Borish

It was in 1844, exactly 150 years ago, that the first folk high school was founded in the town of Rødding, Denmark. It did not take long for the idea of the folk high school to take root in neighboring countries. The first Norwegian folk high school opened its doors at Sagatun twenty years later, in 1864, and a mere four years after that the first three Swedish folk high schools appeared, at Hvilan, Önnestad and Herrestad.¹ There are also excellent and enduring folk high school traditions in Finland, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.

My talk today is focused on the Danish folk high school tradition. Yet I must emphasize at the outset my belief that the folk high school is a truly Scandinavian institution whose history and accomplishments transcend national borders. Particularly in Denmark and Norway, the folk high schools have since their inception been greatly influenced by the life and work of Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, a major contributor to Scandinavian intellectual and spiritual life. Grundtvig, born on September 8, 1783, lived to be nearly ninety; he was still preaching actively at Vartov Church in Copenhagen the day before his death in early September, 1872.

The sociologist C. Wright Mills once set out a stringent, but in my opinion very useful definition of social research. Mills wrote the following: „no social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of

¹ E. Simon, „Og solen står med bonden op,“ in *De nordiske folkehøjskoleers idehistorie* (Askov Højskoles Forlag, 1989).

history, and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey."² In the work most admired by Mills, whether contemporary or in the past, three sorts of questions were consistently asked: 1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? 2) Where does this society stand in human history? 3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of „human nature“ are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period?

Mills' third question is particularly relevant to the thesis I will set before you today, which deals with the Scandinavian folk high schools and their potential implications for adult education in today's Europe. In these remarks I will attempt to take up Mills' challenge, the challenge of what he called „the sociological imagination.“ It is perhaps a reflection of Mills' own time that his questions are oriented toward a single society. My remarks today are of necessity not oriented toward a single society, but toward the increasing critical problem of education for adults in an emerging transnational Europe. The thesis I wish to develop today is fourfold:

I begin with a truism that bears repeating. We live in a time of rapid, accelerating, unprecedented global change, and the implications of this process of change for adult education are of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered, at least for the moment, as a general topic in and of itself, apart from its specific local, regional, national and transnational manifestations. Traditionally in the academic disciplines one has spoken of „culture change,“ „economic change,“ „social change“ or „political change,“ and assumed that these separate categories were adequate to frame the discussion. The change processes occurring in today's world transcend these simplistic classifications: they are multiple, long-term, and synergistic in their complexity, and they are quickly redefining many of the fundamental conditions of human life on a planetary scale.

² C.W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), p. 6.

Secondly, in such a time of overarching crisis and change, many people all over the world face threatening instability or the actual breakdown and disappearance of their traditions. What happens to farmers who can no longer farm? To fishermen who can no longer fish? To teachers and iron-workers when schools and factories close their doors? To those between eighteen and thirty, whether dropouts or school graduates, who are unable to compete in the shifting job market and thus locked out of the workplace, perhaps for life?

We have long been aware of the high degree of helplessness of the human infant. At birth the average volume of the human brain is 350 cc; it more than doubles in size during the first year of development and takes a full three years to achieve a volume within the range of normal human adults.³ As long ago as 54 AD Lucretius wrote these lines:

Like a mariner cast ashore
By raging waves, the human infant lies
Naked upon the ground, speechless, in want
Of every help needful for life, when first
Nature by birth-throes from his mother's womb
Thrusts him into the borders of the light.

We have been much less willing to see and admit the extreme vulnerability of human *adults* to the „distress of nations and perplexity,“ to the oscillating instability of the world economy, to our uneasy world littered with the wreckage of disappearing traditions. In the times in which we live, it becomes more and more clear that the need for adequate nurturance, caretaking and „interpersonal sustenance“ is not limited to infancy and early childhood, but continues to be of paramount importance throughout the life cycle.

Thirdly, this dimension of life, the human need for nurturance and caretaking that continues throughout the life cycle, is greatly neglected in the theoretical discussions relevant to adult education in today's Europe. Indeed, I would go even further. We do not even have an adequate

³ Discussed in the classic paper by Ashley Montagu, „The Meaning of Neonatal and Infant Immaturity in Man,“ in *Journal of the American Medical Association* 178 (1961), p. 156ff.

language to deal with the overall crisis of meaning that has resulted from the widespread perception of failure in traditional institutions. Its manifestations range from a dangerous passivity and withdrawal to an equally dangerous rage and hatred of the outsider. We know that those affected by this crisis of meaning are all too easily victimized by demagogues who fill their loneliness and insecurity with false promises of salvation. Emotionally crippled human beings in search of security (to use terms drawn from the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan) are drawn to extremist movements both as leaders and followers; and for an audience of contemporary Europeans it will not be necessary to elaborate on the potential for catastrophe inherent in the psychosocial dynamics behind the growth of extremist mass movements.

Fourth, those who are looking for models of adult education to serve the needs of today's Europe -- politicians, educators and scholars from many disciplines, business executives, labor leaders, community activists -- could well draw theoretical and practical inspiration from the Scandinavian folk high school tradition. In the folk high schools of Scandinavia, we may be able to see the beginnings of a potentially constructive approach for European adult education, to the crisis of meaning in today's Europe. We must keep in mind Mills' admonition that „no social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history, and of their intersections within a society has completed its journey.“ A good place to begin this journey is in an examination of the roots of the Scandinavian folk high school tradition, to which I now turn.

Grundtvig and the Vision of the Folk High School

What is a folk high school? What strategy should one use in presenting the Scandinavian folk high school as a school form? To attempt to cover even the existing diversity in a single country, let alone the details of past history, would take us much too far afield. Thus in the following discussion, I have chosen to define the folk high school not by recounting the details of everyday practice, but by recalling the original vision which gave rise to the founding of these schools in Denmark.

Although the folk high school movement originated in practice as a school form to serve the single social grouping of the peasant farmers, the idea of the folk high school is much broader in scope. It is rooted in the

European romantic tradition, in the work of Herder, Fichte, Rousseau and Pestalozzi, and its first formulation was an immediate consequence of visits made to England in three consecutive summers, 1829-1831. Yet it is traceable to the teachings of a single remarkable man, and based on a vision that is quintessentially, undeniably Danish. Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783-1872) was a man of many talents – poet, scholar and lecturer, educator, philosopher and theologian, writer of universal histories, translator of ancient documents, prophet and visionary, myth-maker and student of ancient Nordic mythology, bishop, author and composer of nearly 1500 hymns, editor, member of parliament (always in the opposition), protester, crusader and social critic, an active and energetic contributor to Danish public life over the course of nearly seventy years.

Even this extensive list does not do full justice to his concerns and commitments, his passions and his accomplishments. The man was in truth a living whirlwind. One can only say of him (with little fear of contradiction) that both his own time and the future of Denmark would not have been the same had he not been there to bequeath to them the unique stamp of his thoughts, actions and feelings.

I have chosen to focus on the nature of Grundtvig's vision for several reasons. For the first, unlike his historical contemporaries Hans Christian Andersen and Søren Kierkegaard, he is a figure who has had great difficulty coming out of Denmark. He is neither widely translated nor widely read; indeed, there are few outside Scandinavia who have even heard of him. For the second, I will risk a bolder pronouncement: Grundtvig is a figure whose time has come. I stated earlier that one of our problems is that we do not even have an adequate language to describe the present crisis of meaning and its implications for adult education. Grundtvig's own vision was formulated not in a time of peace, but in response to a series of shattering historical crises that were experienced in 19th-century Denmark. Although he is virtually unknown outside Scandinavia, his writings, particularly on education, could make a very real contribution to our search for an adequate language to deal with the present day crisis of meaning in Europe.

Within Denmark, neither Kierkegaard nor Hans Christian Andersen has had anything remotely like the profound influence on Danish culture and

institutions exercised by Grundtvig both during and after his lifetime. As his biographer Kaj Thaning points out, his works are not widely read even in Denmark. Yet, somehow, his influence has been pervasive and enduring. It is reflected not only in the existence of the folk high schools but in the independent Danish free school tradition, and in the Danish school law which places on parents an obligation to have their children obtain instruction, but not necessarily within the formal framework of school attendance. As Thaning has written simply and eloquently of Grundtvig, „you meet him at the border.“ Who was this man, and why is his life so important for an understanding of Danish history? What accounts for the way in which he is remembered, and for the special place he holds in the hearts and minds of the Danish people? From where did his vision of the folk high school come? What was the nature of that vision?

Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig was the youngest son of the local minister in the small town of Udby in south Sjælland. He was born on September 8, 1783 into a family with a long history of religious involvement at a time when the philosophy of the Enlightenment permeated both the church and secular society. He learned from the adults around him, from the heated discussions of contemporary events that took place among the parish's guests, and from the songs, stories and legends recounted by an old crippled woman, Malene Jensdatter, who after the custom of the time had found refuge in the parish-house. The deep impression she gave him of the songs and myths of Sjælland may have had something to do with Grundtvig's later extraordinary sensitivity both to the beauty of the Danish language and to the spiritual quality that he saw lying latent in the common people of Denmark.⁴

Grundtvig was accepted to the Aarhus Latin School in 1798, and after passing his student examinations he began to study theology at the University of Copenhagen in 1800, passing his examinations in 1803. In the years that followed, Grundtvig began to construct for himself the prophetic role he would play, and it drew him inexorably toward a difficult mission. The mission that he had set for himself was one that we today would describe with the words cultural revitalization and renewal; in Grundtvig's language his mission was to awaken the Danish people to the

⁴ F. Slumstrup et al., eds., *Grundtvigs Oplysningstanker og Vor Tid* (Nordisk Folkehøjskoleråad, 1983).

fact that Life and Human History are an expression of the Spirit, to which one must add that for him the Spirit was not an abstract concept but a living, existential force. He would be Denmark's *skjald*, taking upon himself the role of the ancient singer whose improvised courtly song was a faintly disguised commentary, often political and polemical, on events taking place at the time. He had vowed to open his countrymen's eyes to the rich cultural heritage that lay in their neglected past, and to make this heritage live again so that new generations could draw from its strength. It is this mission to which all of his writing was dedicated, and it was a mission, obviously, not for the fainthearted. Yet even Grundtvig himself could not have known of the difficulties it would entail, of all the twists and turnings that were to follow: success and failure, knowledge and despair, the highest spiritual revelation alternating with fits of depression that would lead him near madness.

During his life Grundtvig was almost continuously engaged in a series of controversies with prominent figures ranging from Kierkegaard himself⁵ to the physicist H.C. Ørsted. „He spoke right from his heart, often harsh and bitter words, but he was almost never driven by personal dislike or enmity; on the contrary, it was precisely love and feelings of a deep mutual connection that forced him to remonstrate with those who he admired.“⁶ Those who were attacked by him were, however, understandably somewhat slower to see anything positive about Grundtvig's underlying motives.

Perhaps the final judgement to remember is that of history. His hymns, once banned, now fill the pages of the church hymnal and the folk high school songbook. Although few other than Grundtvig scholars and specialist historians of theology are familiar with the names of his theological opponents, everyone in Denmark knows about Grundtvig. He is admired and respected even by people who have never read a single word that he wrote.

Why, one must ask, is this the case? Why is Grundtvig remembered? I believe that he is remembered because over the course of his life the prophetic mission he set for himself crystallized in a remarkable inner

⁵ E. Skjoldager, *Hvorfor blev Søren Kierkegaard ikke Grundtvigianer* (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1977).

⁶ H. Koch, *Grundtvig* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1943).

transformation, and it is this transformation that enabled him, in an almost mystical way, to touch the inner core of his people. This has been beautifully put by his biographer Hal Koch who writes: „It was to this wandering in the grove of humanity, with its appreciation of everything touched by life, that Grundtvig dedicated the years from 1810 to 1820, and once begun, this wandering never ceased as long as he lived. And in the process he himself was changed from the thundering prophet of doom to life's true seer, and to the glowing lover of Denmark and all things Danish.“⁷

By 1832 his many years of searching back to the heroes of the old Norse myths, in order to find deeper meanings that could light up the darkness of the present, had led him to a concern with what he called „universal history.“ A famous passage provides insight into his views:

A human being is not a kind of monkey, condemned to imitate first the other animals and then itself until the world's end, but a matchless, miraculous creation, in whom divine forces shall proclaim, develop and survive through a thousand races and generations, a divine experiment that shows how spirit and dust can interpenetrate and be explained in a common divine consciousness.⁸

This frequently cited statement of Grundtvig's provides a key testimony. The language is original, the point of view universalistic and the insight both memorable and provocative. A frequent early mood, that of dark pessimism, has been transmuted by some subtle spiritual alchemy into a new kind of faith and optimism in human possibilities. Humanity is no longer seen as a ship of fools, but as „a magnificent, matchless creation,“ as „a divine experiment.“ The passage mirrors a fundamental transformation that took place in Grundtvig's „ground vision“ of human life. His Christianity became what Danes have called „the joyful Christianity“; his pedagogy an overriding concern with what he called „the school for life.“ His zeal for Christianity as the life-giving religion became tempered by a deep understanding that true enlightenment, whether in the

⁷ Koch, *Grundtvig*, p. 90.

⁸ R. Skovmand, *Danmarks Historie: Folkestyrets Fødsel, 1830-1870* (Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1978), p. 115.

church or the school, can never be force-fed, or crammed down an unwilling throat.

In the wake of this inner transformation, the angry young man became the people's acknowledged champion and defender, or, to borrow a metaphor from one of his better known contemporaries, the tragic hero became a Knight of Faith. It is for this reason, I believe that so many of his ideas have lingered and that his thoughts on education have taken root. It is for this reason that his hymns are still sung, and his personality remembered with fondness. Many of his sayings have become a part of common Danish parlance. „As sunshine is to the black soil, so is true enlightenment to the soil's friends.“ „He has never lived who became clever and wise about something he first didn't come to love.“ „We will have gone far in achieving wealth, when few have too much and fewer too little.“

Let us turn now to his ideas on education, and to the achievement of the folk high school which was one of their fruits.

Grundtvig's Views on Education

With royal support Grundtvig was able to travel to England in the summer of 1829. This voyage was so successful that he made two additional voyages in 1830 and 1831, and spent the total of a year's time busy with his studies in the English libraries. Perhaps his most decisive experiences came as the result of a two-week visit to Trinity College, Cambridge, in the summer of 1831. He encountered there an educational system different from any he had ever known, one where conversation between student and teacher was a major theme. The teachers lived at the college, and it was the custom for students and teachers to take their meals together. Grundtvig saw that the dialogue between them was continuous, intense and open-ended. Shortly after returning to Denmark after his third voyage to England in 1831, he had some momentous personal insights and discoveries.⁹ In the following years his views on education crystallized into a personal vision that, being Grundtvig, he was not at all slow to communicate at every conceivable opportunity to his contemporaries.

⁹ K. Thaning, *N.F.S. Grundtvig* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Kulturinstitut, 1972), p. 69.

In those sections of Grundtvig's voluminous writings that deal with education, a number of themes recur. The first is *his belief that the real source for enlightenment is to be found lying latent in the common people and not in those he scathingly refers to as „the learned ones.“* Accordingly, he calls for a return to the language of the common people, to their mother tongue. He saved his special anger and contempt for the classical Latin Schools which, through the rote learning of texts written in Greek, Latin and German, dutifully prepared the children of elites to assume their parents' privileged positions in society.¹⁰

These schools, he charges, „have been at work for hundreds of years widening the gulf between life and learning.“ His scorn for them knew no bounds: „the black schools,“ he called them, and „the schools for death.“ They were „workplaces of dissolution and death, where the worms live high at the cost of life.“¹¹ When he wrote about the Danish language, however, his angry tone could give way to bliss.

The mother tongue is the word of power
That lives within the people's mouth.

The mother tongue is the band of roses
that embraces large and small
Only in it the spirit of the fathers lives
And only in this the heart is swinging.

The mother tongue is the language of the heart
Only loose is all foreign speech
It alone in mouth and book
Can wake a people from its slumber.

We must remember that in Grundtvig's day Danish was considered an ignorant, rude tongue, the proper language for peasants and farmers, perhaps, but not for an educated person. The classical Latin Schools of the

¹⁰ These schools were a form of *Gymnasium*, the closest European equivalent to the American high school; they prepared students for university entrance examinations.

¹¹ Cited in Slumstrup et al., *Grundtvigs Oplysningstanker og Vor Tid*, pp. 40-41.

time required that students become competent in the languages of European high culture: French, German, Greek and Latin. In the surviving manuscripts of some of the major Danish diplomats and statesmen of the period, not a single word of Danish can be found. These are some of the subtle threads in the tapestry of Grundtvig's thought. His views on the importance of the mother tongue are relevant for us today in an increasingly multicultural Europe, one in which national borders change, ethnic groups migrate, and daunting problems connected with linguistic diversity face us in schools, communities and the relations between nation states.

A second major theme in Grundtvig's educational writings is his thoughts on the need for a new type of school and a series of concrete proposals for its establishment. These thoughts culminated in the publication in 1838 of his *School For Life and the Academy in Søer*, and in the years that followed all of Denmark was to hear again and again his calls for the founding of a new school. He proposed originally to call it the *folkelig højskole* (meaning loosely a school that would be „of and for the people“). His special passion was that these schools would give dignity to the life of the farmer. They would awaken in rural men and women not only a pride in the national culture, but a love of learning that would continue long after a student had finished the formal course of study.

The new school he envisioned for Søer would not be just for the sons and daughters of farmers, but for those in all the different classes and occupations found among the Danish people. There would be neither entrance requirements nor leaving exams. It was to be a national or folk high school, an institution to be attended by „self-owners both large and small, handworkers of all kinds, seamen and tradesmen.“ This single school would serve the needs of „those behind the plow, in the workplace, at the top of the ship's mast and in the market stall,“ and its very existence would bring to an end the monopoly on education possessed by the university.

University students would be especially welcomed. When young, at a sensitive period in their life development, they would be able to gain actual knowledge from the life experience of a baker, a sailor, a merchant and a farmer, rather than mere theory from the dusty pages of a book. And insight would work in the other direction as well. The need for such a school, he believed, was now particularly acute. In 1831 the first

„consultative provincial assemblies“ (*stænderforsamlinger*) were allowed to meet, and these assemblies provided the first official forums in which elected representatives of the people could advise the king on the affairs of the country.¹² Only seventeen years later, and five years after the first folk high school had opened its doors in Rødding, Denmark would make a major transition from a nearly two hundred year-old absolute monarchy to its first parliamentary democracy.

A third recurrent theme in his work is *the idea of Enlightenment for Life* (*livsoplysning*). What he meant by this was that an understanding of the real and deepest truths which constitute Enlightenment never come from any rote study of classroom texts. One can learn the facts and theories of received tradition in the classroom, and these might prove useful, but they can be no substitute for the Life's Enlightenment, which can only be taught by life itself. Herein lies a paradox: it is and must be the deepest task of our lives to acquire this Enlightenment for Life, for only through its realization will we be able to distinguish light from darkness, truth from lies, and actions in the cause of death from actions in the cause of life. Yet this liberating insight is something that no schoolroom lesson will ever teach us. This is part of the central paradox of education: it is the school's role to act as a catalyst, to set the stage, to light the candle or prepare the bed of coals, but the sudden bursting into flame which constitutes enlightenment can neither be controlled for in a state curriculum nor institutionalized in a teacher's lesson plan. When he wrote about these issues, he often used breathtaking oppositions of Light and Darkness, Life and Death, Truth and Lies:

Is the light only in the planets found, that can neither see nor speak?
Is not the word from our mouth a light for all souls?
It gives the vision for our spirits, as the sun our body's light,
It blasts our souls alive, like lightning come down from the skies.

Is the light under certain conditions to be only halfway enlightening?
Doesn't it always, everywhere do us good?
Isn't the light the eye of life?

¹² Allowed to meet only every other year, they could give non-binding advice on such questions as personal rights, property questions and taxes.

Shall we for the sake of misuse rather see darkness and blackness
Than the sun's white light on the arching sphere of heaven?

A fourth recurrent theme is the concept of education as *the living word* (*det levende ord*). At the most superficial level of interpretation, he is distinguishing between the knowledge that comes from books and the knowledge that comes from our lips in the form of spoken words. Down through the ages of history, he tells us, it is the words spoken by living men which, in Eliot's words, „fructify in the minds of others.“ He, whose collected life work would fill nearly 130 thick volumes if published in its entirety, now came to believe that the printed word found in yellowing books is dead, and it is only the spoken word that can really teach us life's deepest lessons. As if in silent testament to the truth of his insight, his own theological and historical volumes are written in an archaic and convoluted prose difficult to understand and even more difficult to translate. Of course, if faced with this discrepancy, Grundtvig could well reply by citing the American poet Walt Whitman:

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)

Part of the problem, however, is that Grundtvig's vision of education as „the living word“ is more subtle than a simple distinction between the written and spoken word. The fact that words are spoken, that a speech is given, does not necessarily mean that „the living word“ is present. A television commercial for a politician, a soft drink or a pair of athletic shoes is not an example of what Grundtvig meant by „the living word.“

How can we recognize the presence of „the living word“? What are its signs? We know it because three things are happening, and here I must use words that have long been debated in the Danish folk high school tradition. The first is *oplive*, which means to fill with life, to make glad, to imbue with self-confidence, to encourage. The second is *oplyse*, which means to inform and to teach, but more than this, to enlighten, to teach to aspire to true enlightenment, to want to serve the cause of life. The third is *vække*, which means literally „to awaken,“ and in contrast to the two former terms it usually has a directly religious connotation.

Grundtvig wrote extensively on science as well as religion. In an 1839 article, he set forth an extensive proposal for a cooperative Scandinavian University of the North, to be established in Gothenberg, Sweden. This university would make a special contribution to world civilization by embracing the concept of man in its entirety, and by contesting every form of „spiritless and lifeless science.“¹³

According to Ove Korsgaard, one of a contemporary group of researchers refocusing on Grundtvig's scientific perspective, there is a red thread, a steady chorus that runs through his key writings on science. It is, according to Korsgaard, the prophetic and visionary understanding „that the laws of life shall be set over the laws of death.“ Much too frequently this point of view is reduced to a question of the living spoken word versus the dead letters of the written alphabet. This was certainly an important issue for Grundtvig, but much is lost if one narrows Grundtvig's point of view to turn on the use of the spoken word as an educational method. That the mouth precedes the pen is, so to speak, Grundtvig's standard example of a much more general principle: namely that the laws of life stand over the laws of death. The examples of what Grundtvig meant by „dead science“ are all around us, from deadly nuclear wastes that must be safely stored in total isolation from the environment for a quarter of a million years, to the uncountable number of land mines that lie buried in Kuwait, Mozambique and Afghanistan.

A fifth recurrent theme in Grundtvig's educational writing is that of the *People's Enlightenment* (*folkeoplysning*). Due to the depth of Grundtvig's commitment to all things Danish, it is easy to see why some foreign authors have mistakenly labeled his views as chauvinistic. Yet his lifelong work with what he called universal history, which culminated in an immense three-volume treatise on the total history of mankind, was not written from the point of view of any narrow nationalism.

Grundtvig had a high degree of respect and admiration for the other cultural traditions of the world. There is love for Denmark in his writings, but nothing at all about Danish superiority to the other peoples of the globe. Nor is there a belief that *all* grass roots movements from the people were necessarily good or right (a naive position which has been attributed to him by several foreign observers). His concept of People's Enlighten-

¹³ Thaning, *N.F.S. Grundtvig*, p. 111.

ment has a dual thrust. On the one hand, it argues that all humans everywhere are born into a particular historical context, and it is within this framework that their own personal drama of Enlightenment must be played out. On the other hand, it suggests that there is a collective as well as an individual aspect to the experience of Enlightenment, and that it must be the goal of a society to create, through wise and farsighted policies, the conditions that will facilitate *folkeoplysning*, the People's Enlightenment.

A final recurrent theme in Grundtvig's vision is the notion of *folkelighed* (a noun) [also: „*folkelig*,” an adjective, and „the *folkelig*,” an adjectival noun]. My anthropological interpretation of these virtually untranslatable terms is this: he uses them to construct a framework for approaching the difficult but unavoidable problem of how people of different cultures can view each other in a way that encourages mutual respect and understanding. Our universal common humanity manifests differently across the boundaries of culture, language, nationality, ethnic group and religion. These positive local manifestations Grundtvig refers to as the *folkelig*. Something that is *folkelig* has the connotations of „simple,” „unassuming,” „of the people,” „popular,” „enlightened,” „democratic,” „responsible,” „consistent with the idea of equality.”¹⁴ But it is at the same time more than this. Let us see how Grundtvig uses the term:

When I speak of the *folkelige* as the best, the most outstanding in every country, I do not mean it to be in contradiction to the human. I mean only to distinguish it from that which is only *folkelige* in other countries, and to distinguish it from what with power and cunning will make a people strangers to themselves . . .¹⁵

The *folkelig* then, according to Grundtvig consists of the local positive manifestations of what anthropologists have called „the psychic unity of human groups.” A people that has lost its *folkelighed*, i.e., a people that is no longer *folkelige*, will also have lost some or all of its humanity. *Folkelighed* is then in one sense the attitude of tolerance, openness and mutual

¹⁴ See discussion in S. Borish, *The Land of The Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark's Non-violent Path to Modernization* (Nevada City, Cal.: Blue Dolphin Pub., 1991), p. 306ff.

¹⁵ Cited in Koch, *Grundtvig*, p. 135.

respect that Grundtvig urges different peoples to have for each other's culture-specific, *folkelige* patterns of thought, feeling and behavior.¹⁶ But it is also an attitude that he believes should be cultivated between members of different social classes and divisions of the same people. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in these stanzas from his poem on *Folkelighed*, written for his fellow Danes:¹⁷

If one class regards itself as superior
to the spirit of the common people,
then the head, the hands and the feet
will part ridiculously on their own.
Then the nation is torn apart.
Then the history has come to an end.
Then the people have been put to sleep,
and you cannot wake them up again.

Folkeligt is here in this lush countryside
Still one more thing stemming from the depths of the heart....

If we get legislation or laws in the Danish spirit,
If we get these new Danish schools,
Danish thoughts, Danish plows,
Then we regain our old reputation.
The Danes, happy and clever,
Living with peace and joy on the sea.
Then we see the people's deeds and poetry,
Then is everything *folkeligt*.

What happened to Grundtvig's proposal for a *folkelig højskole*? It seems, on the face of it, an outlandish idea, one of many airy fantasies thrown out into the world by an impractical and idealistic dreamer. Certainly that is what many of his contemporaries must have thought. As we know, most proposals for a new type of school fall on deaf ears, or end

¹⁶ In Grundtvig's own mind the term had additional dimensions reflecting his transcendental philosophy of history. See Koch, *Grundtvig*, pp. 134-136.

¹⁷ This beautiful translation was made spontaneously by Erik Lindebjerg, who teaches at Silkeborg Højskole.

in short-lived experiments. But Grundtvig lived to see the schools whose existence he had envisioned begin to grow and take root. It was an idea that reached fulfilment in his own lifetime. One reason for this was that many of the „really enlightened people“ of his day and age came to devote their lives to the burgeoning folk high school movement, attempting to show young farmers „how human life appears when the sun shines upon it.“

The period between 1864 and 1876 saw an explosion of the new schools over the entire Danish countryside, as well as the opening of the first folk high schools in Norway and Sweden. In the four years between 1866 and 1869 alone, forty-four new folk high schools were established. By 1870 there were already more than fifty schools; by 1890, seventy-five.¹⁸ It was a development that Grundtvig could watch with a rich sense of fulfilment from his position at Vartov Church in Copenhagen during the final decades of his life.

The first folk high schools belonged to a decentralized grass roots social movement that gave the independent landed farmers a vehicle of social and personal self-transformation. The same school, however, would show itself capable of playing other and quite different roles in Danish society. This issue, perhaps implicit in Grundtvig's original vision, was addressed in an earthy comment made by Ludvig Schrøder, the principal of Askov Højskole, in 1872: „We have a saying in Denmark: stick your finger down into the soil and smell where you are! *There* is where the needs of the people are found, which can be different in different places and times. Where this meets the abilities of the teacher, there lies the *højskoles* 'calling.'“¹⁹

By the early decades of the 20th century the folk high school had become, in the words of a visiting German observer „one of the great cultural forces in Denmark -- a fact of great significance in the life of the country, since the country people are now among the leaders in political as

¹⁸ N. Højlund, *Folkehøjskolen i Danmark* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 1983), p. 33.

¹⁹ O. Christensen, P. Christensen, & P. Warrer, *Højskolebevægelse og Al-mendannelse* (Århus Universitet, Institut for Statskundskab, 1981), p. 141.

well as economic affairs."²⁰ It would serve primarily the children of Danish farmers until the postwar decades of the 1950s.

Conclusion

Few would question the proposition that the decades since the end of World War II have seen a process of social, political, economic and ecological change that is without parallel in human history. Frequently, the events of change are accompanied by human tragedies of unimaginable proportions, as well as terms, such as the by now all-too-familiar „ethnic cleansing,“ that in their very usage debase the language of political discourse.

But it is not necessary to look beyond the borders of the developed economies of Europe to perceive manifestations of this global change process. Everywhere one looks within Europe one sees new and more intense forms of local and regional economic competition, connected with the emergence of enormously powerful but dangerously unstable international markets, in which it is now possible, for instance, to instantaneously transfer capital funds vast beyond description across borders in order to deliberately destabilize a national currency. The word „change“ is not drastic enough to describe the impact of these developments; we ought instead to be speaking in terms of cultural stress and cultural distortion.²¹

The existence of a highly organized labor market is one of the preconditions for an industrial society; yet one of the fundamental changes presently taking place in the developed western economies is a transformation of the nature of the labor market itself. In the chronic instability of the workplace of the 1990s, with its wave after wave of firings, mass-layoffs, bankruptcies, takeovers and leveraged buyouts, its increasing automation and rationalization, its ease and fluidity of multinational capital transfer to cheaper, impoverished, unregulated third world societies

²⁰ A.H. Hollman, „The Folk High School,“ in S.F. Mittell, ed., *Democracy in Denmark* (Washington, D.C.: National Home Library, 1936), pp. 97-98. Initially published in German in 1909, Hollman's study is one of the best early foreign expositions of the developing folk high school.

²¹ The term „cultural distortion“ has been used by the American anthropologist Anthony F.C. Wallace in his discussion of revitalization movements.

and their economies, it is no longer enough for a European worker to be „competent“ or „qualified“ in the older meaning of these terms. As the very context of the labor market itself is transformed, such once clear and unambiguous terms as „competence,“ „work qualifications,“ „job training“ and „unemployment,“ undergo a wrenching shift in meaning.

Even the highest level of „formal competence“ in a skilled trade today is no guarantee of stable employment tomorrow. In light of these insecurities, no form of adult education which gives narrow, task-based competence can ensure that an individual will be able either to gain, or keep steady employment. The futurist Alvin Toffler has written of „the new meaning of joblessness“ in discussing this fundamental transformation of the labor market. In Toffler's words: „The old, Second Wave factories needed essentially interchangeable workers. By contrast, Third Wave operations require diverse and continually evolving skills . . . “²² Neither the traditional Keynesian nor monetarist measures work well in a highly fluid labor market where the skills required are varied and fast-changing. The problem of unemployment has thus acquired a new dimension in our period of history.

Let us recall the questions posed earlier by C. Wright Mills. What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of „human nature“ are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? The anthropologist Jules Henry once wrote that „the orientation of man toward survival, to the exclusion of other considerations, has made society a grim place to live in, and for the most part human society has been a place where, though man has survived physically he has died emotionally.“²³ Is this to be our fate?

Let us recall again Grundtvig's vision, with its faith in the wisdom of the ordinary people, in the possibilities of Life's Enlightenment, in the living word, and in the need for an alternative school form which would bring the people to life. And the words of Ludvig Schröder: „Stick your finger down into the soil and smell where you are! *There* is where the

²² A. Toffler, *Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam, 1991), pp. 71-74.

²³ J. Henry, *Culture Against Man* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 12.

needs of the people are found, which can be different in different places and times."

„The needs of the people," of course, is a phrase that can be interpreted quite differently across cultures. It is thus of great interest that the rhetoric of what Alfred Telhaug has called „the conservative restoration" has led to an unusual convergence of themes in places as culturally and historical diverse as Japan, China, Germany, England, the United States, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.²⁴ There is a tendency to change from „child-centered" to „economy-centered" motivations when school reforms are made or contemplated. Ideals of social justice and personal development are disparaged, and schools become increasingly the targets of metaphors drawn from the adult marketplace: competitiveness, standards, quality and effectiveness.

From this point of view, the folk high school may look like an out-moded dinosaur from the past, an impractical survivor from a past whose experience is no longer relevant to our world today. „The living word"? Indeed! From the point of view of the conservative restoration, what we need today is more knowledge, higher test scores, and better skills, which means tighter control over teachers, more years of formal education, and a return to basics. Only in this way, it is held, will our people achieve the necessary levels of competence, *real* competence, *formal* competence, that will enable them to compete in the changing markets of the world economy.

A possible answer to this line of thinking comes directly from the folk high school experience. In the last half of the 19th century, grain from the virgin fields of the United States and Argentina first appeared on the international market. Denmark, traditionally a major grain-producing country, simply could not compete. A disaster faced Danish agriculture. But the Danish farmers responded by forming a cooperative movement (*andelsbevægelse*) which radically transformed the face of Danish agriculture beginning in the 1880s. In 1882 the first cooperative dairy was established; in 1903, just twenty-one years later, the cooperative dairies were

²⁴ A. Telhaug, *Den Nye utdannings-politiske retorikken* (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1990).

handling milk from 80% of all the cows in Denmark.²⁵ Many who had once attended a folk high school were instrumental in the formation of the cooperatives.²⁶

The self-owning farmers, many of whom had earlier been students in one of the Grundtvig-inspired „schools for life,“ possessed the faith, the self-confidence and the clarity to make difficult transfers of competence in the technical field of agriculture. Specifically, these transfers were made between the formal „task competence“ requirements of grain-farming and those of livestock raising. In a revitalized and transformed rural culture, where the institution of the folk high school had come to play a significant role, it took less than two decades to make a highly successful transition from grain to livestock farming. Soon Danish eggs, butter and bacon were in demand as luxury items in the best European hotels.

What this example seems to indicate is that the type of „competence for life“ developed in the 19th-century Danish folk high school, precisely because it was not concentrated on narrow vocational expertise, created a framework that made possible the rapid attainment of vocational expertise *when that became necessary*. It is worth remembering that *when the need arose*, these Danish agriculturists, who belonged to a living folk high school tradition, successfully restructured a centuries-old tradition of agriculture along cooperative lines *in less than two decades*.²⁷

²⁵ U. Østergaard, „Hvad er det ‘danske’ ved Danmark? Tanker om den ‘danske vej’ til kapitalismen, grundtvigianismen og ‘dansk’ mentalitet,“ in *Den Jydske Historiker* 29-30 (1984), p. 111.

²⁶ This point is made in Christensen et al., *Højskolebevægelse og Almindelighed*. See also C. Bjørn, *Folkehøjskolen og Andelsbevægelse* (Årbog for Dansk Skolehistorie, 1971).

²⁷ The historical background is far more complex than this discussion would indicate. A genuine macrohistorical perspective on the origins of the new social class of self-owning Danish farmers as a new social class, and the folk high schools, would have to trace their roots back to the remarkable series of land reforms that took place in late 18th-century Denmark. These land reforms (together with the peaceful acquisition of parliamentary government) I have called „the primary agents of transformation.“ The complex of social movements which resulted I have called „the secondary agents of transformation,“ they include the rise of the folk high schools, the cooperative movement, the meeting houses, the free congregations, free schools, etc. For further discussion see Borish, *The Land of The Living*, especially Chapter 4.

Genius was once defined as 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration. This may be true, but without that very small 1% of inspiration, why would one bother in the first place to even work up a sweat? I believe that we must be wary of an unanalyzed competence concept, and of any simple dichotomies between so-called „formal competence“ and „competence for life.“ In societies and educational systems pervaded by fear, stress and examination hysteria, we need more than ever before a kind of school in which learning is not the result of force and compulsion. In societies and educational systems which focus on specialization, short-term results, and competitive ranking, we need a school where people are, at least for a time in their lives, free to be and to discover themselves. In societies and educational systems where school entrance is increasingly a restricted prerogative of the successful minority, we need a school to which members of every group in society can gain entrance. In societies and educational systems where everybody is incessantly in too much of a hurry, we need time for what Erik Erikson called „the psycho-social moratorium,“ a socially-sanctioned period of constructive delay granted to somebody who is not ready to meet an obligation.²⁸

The Scandinavian folk high school tradition has never been and is not now a static one. There is uncertainty, debate, and unresolved problems, as in any living tradition. The Swedish folk high schools, for instance, have from the very beginning focused on the use of books and the written word, and in contrast to the Danish and Norwegian schools, the students often do not live at the school while taking a course of study. Yet in spite of these and other differences, the existence of the folk high schools continues, in a subtle and often overlooked way, to contribute to the cultural wealth of the Scandinavian countries. It is interesting to speculate on the fact that the folk high school tradition began and is flourishing in that part of the world where nations which once waged war have long since made a lasting peace with each other. In all of the folk high schools I have visited, small helpful projects were contributing to peaceful, enlightened international relations. I am not at all disappointed by their smallness. In the words of a former American President, „it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness.“

²⁸ See E.H. Erikson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968).

What does it mean to have been, at some point in your life, at a school where there was no force, no compulsion, no grades or formal evaluation, and you were really responsible for yourself: as Grundtvig foresaw, it sows seeds deep in the personality, not apparent at the time. The folk high schools both of Grundtvig's time and today are radically different from what he conceived, but that is not the point. One could almost say that Grundtvig's idea was so enlightened, that there was so much life in it, that the school he envisioned could appear in many forms, and still serve the purposes of life. One garden, many paths. It is my hope that other educators will gain inspiration, as I have, from the Scandinavian folk high school tradition, and that we may someday, perhaps in our lifetime, see the emergence of a European folk high school tradition.

Section II

Education and Cultures: Multicultural and Intercultural

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Hartmut Kaelble

This article¹ is intended to show what contribution to the historical analysis of European integration can be made by social historians. I do not claim to present a fundamentally new interpretation of general history by a social historian. My idea of a social history of European integration is much more modest and more pragmatic. It is a plea for a broader and more comprehensive historical analysis of European integration.

I shall start with some brief remarks on what could be regarded as a social history of European integration. I shall then present a concept which consists of what I would see as the four essential aspects of social history of European integration. First, the interconnections and exchanges between European societies; secondly, the social differences between European societies and the convergence of European (mainly Western European) societies since World War II; thirdly, the social commonalities and at the same time the social peculiarities of 19th- and 20th-century Europe compared to non-European industrial societies; and finally, the awareness among Europeans of a common European society and civilization.

Let me first make some initial remarks on what could be understood by the social history of European integration which in theory could be written in three different ways from which I shall select one for this article.

The first way of writing the social history of European integration is the way which is expected normally by political historians and political scientists. *Social* factors and *social* preconditions for the emergence and for the further development of supranational or intergovernmental

¹ I am very grateful to Tony Nicholls for comments and suggestions.

European institutions are investigated as well as policies and political ideas. Historians and political scientists hope to learn from social history about new, neglected, but powerful factors affecting European integration. They seek social factors underlying the foundation of the European Coal and Steel community of 1950 or the social background to the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957, or even try to find social reasons for the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 or the reinforcement of European integration in the late 1980s. This sort of social history of European integration has not been written so far, mainly because it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that social factors played a role in the motivation of European decision-makers and they certainly cannot be detected in the European archives. I shall therefore not present this type of social history of European integration.

A second type of social history of European integration investigates the direct or indirect social results and consequences of the policies of European institutions. It describes the direct results of European policy in various fields, e.g. the mobility of labor, the mobility of students, the occupational chances for women, the social funds for the workers in the declining coal and steel regions, the social funds for European farmers, and the social history of the European bureaucracy. If the European social chapter will come into effect, this history will also include European regulations for working hours and perhaps eventually European regulations for industrial relations or a European social policy, which at the moment is only in an embryonic stage.² This type of social history of

² Cf. for the discussion on a major theme of this way of the social history of European integration E. Vogel-Polsky & J. Vogel, *L'Europe sociale 1993: illusion, alibi ou réalité?* (Brussels: Éd. de l'Université, 1991); P. Flora, „Unity and Diversity: A Comparison,“ in P. Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits. The Western-European Welfare State since World War II, Vol. 5* (in preparation); B. Schulte, „Die Entwicklung der europäischen Sozialpolitik,“ in H.A. Winkler & H. Kaelble, eds., *Nationalismus -- Nationalitäten -- Supranationalität* (Stuttgart: Verlag Klett-Cotta, 1993); S. Leibfried, „Sozialstaat Europa? Integrationsperspektiven europäischer Armutsregimes,“ in *Nachrichtendienst des Deutschen Vereins für öffentliche und private Fürsorge* 70 (1990); F.X. Kaufmann, „Nationale Traditionen der Sozialpolitik und europäische Integration,“ in L. Albertin, ed., *Probleme und Perspektiven europäischer Einigung* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1986); B. Henningsen, „Europäisierung

European integration could also include more indirect social consequences of European integration which are usually linked to specific policies only in a loose way, e.g. the rise of a European consumption pattern, the improvement of the European standard of living, changes in regional disparities, changes in national consciousness, new mental horizons among national administrative and political elites. This type of social history of European integration would be written in the activist spirit of the motto of Jean Monnet: „We do not only ally governments, we also unite peoples.“ In this sense, this social history describes not only the co-operation between European governments, but also the wider effects of European integration on the coexistence of European societies and on the way Europeans live together in everyday life. I also shall not present this social history of European integration mainly because the direct social results of European policies are usually not very impressive and because the more impressive indirect results are difficult to trace and to prove. So far I am not aware of any historical book which follows this way of the social history of European integration.

There is, however, a third type: it does not begin with the policies of European institutions. Rather it stands back from the history of European society and tries to find out whether European societies, or in particular West European societies, became more integrated in the sense that they became less dissimilar and less separate from each other during the second half of the 20th century. This type of approaching the social history of European integration does not presume any direct link between the foundation of supranational European institutions and a more intensive integration of European societies. Integration of European societies might start earlier or come later than political integration. It might include only a few societies of the European Community, but also it could include societies outside the European Community. The integration of European societies might be most intensive in fields which are not covered by European policy and might be least intensive in fields in which European institutions have intervened. Integration in European societies might be totally unintended or even unnoticed by European politicians. This social history of European integration starts from a wide idea of European integration which includes

not only the foundation of European institutions, but also the emergence of a European civilization, of common European characteristics under the precondition that cultural, economic, social and political integration might even develop independently from each other. The center of interest in this type of approaching the social history of European integration is what actually differs in society. A further general remark: historians who work on European social integration cannot build upon theoretical concepts and extensive theoretical debates for two reasons. Theories of supranational integration usually concentrate upon political integration in the narrow sense. They normally leave out any social aspects, factors or preconditions. In addition, concepts of supranational integration which regard European integration as a special case of nation building or as a special case of multinational empire building do not really fit into European reality. The stimulating theoretical concepts of European integration which were developed, especially in the 1950s, started with the assumption that Europe would become a sort of a nation-state. It is difficult to share this basic assumption after forty years of European political integration. Nor can concepts raised in historical analysis of multicultural empires be applied to the European Community, since it is a unique supranational institution. For this there are three reasons: first, it did not come into existence by military conquest, by immigration or by marriage as all other multinational empires have done; secondly the European Community is not based on the hegemonial leadership of one ethnic group such as the Russians in the Soviet Union or the Austrian Germans in the Habsburg Empire or the Serbs in Yugoslavia, but upon partnership which includes an important input from the small member states; and finally, the European Community is integrating rather than suppressing nation states and national identities. European integration is so unique that not only theories, but also precise terms do not exist for it. Hence, historical analysis of European integration so far has to be pragmatic rather than led by theoretical concepts which are normally helpful for the historian.

For lack of space I shall only briefly deal with the four main aspects of the concept mentioned above. I can give only an overview rather than a detailed analysis. For the same reason, I shall mainly concentrate upon the period after the World War II, though one might also wish to treat these aspects in a much longer perspective to show more clearly whether inte-

grative tendencies since the war in fact replaced disintegrative tendencies during the 19th and early 20th centuries. This article also cannot deal with individual European countries. This may be seen as a disadvantage, since individual European countries by no means always follow the main European trends. Presenting such a general concept has its dangers. Many of the special aspects which I touch upon are almost totally neglected by research and I would need the whole space of this article to present individual integrative tendencies in a convincing way. I am therefore fully aware that in many ways this article will lead to questions and reflections rather than to firm arguments based on detailed empirical proofs.³

Interconnections between European Societies

Social interconnections between European societies are an important aspect of European integration. In his theory of European integration Karl Deutsch saw communication between societies as the major social factor of political integration.⁴ Some studies of bilateral relationships between European countries put social interconnections in the center of their analysis. Nevertheless, the interconnections between European societies as the result of education in other countries, migration, travel, international communication, or the international transfer of goods, of ideas, of life styles and social values have rarely been investigated. If at all, they have been explored in bilateral relationships rather than on a European or even on a West European level. No doubt, European investigations do face serious difficulties for lack of general European sources, for lack of stan-

³ The paper is based on my book *A Social History of Western Europe, 1880-1980* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1989). The paper, however, goes beyond that book in including the first and fourth aspect and also in complementing in many ways the second and third aspect which is covered in the book until the 1970s.

⁴ K.W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, 1957); K.W. Deutsch, „Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Development. A Summary Report,“ in *Political Science Review* 69 (1966); K.W. Deutsch, „Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows: A Problem of Measurement in International Relations,“ in *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1 (1956).

dardization of national European statistics, and also for lack of methods by which Europe or groups of European countries can be isolated from international world-wide interconnections. Hence, the history of the weakening and the intensification of inner European social connections and exchanges has in many ways to start from the scratch.

Moreover, the development of interconnections within Europe did not go simply in the direction of intensification. On the contrary, disconnections also exist. I want to refer to four major weakenings of social connections between European societies during the 20th century. First, the kinship relations between European power holders in the form that they existed between the European monarchies and national aristocracies were seriously weakened with the decline of monarchies in many European countries, and lost their political importance as the royal power in 20th-century monarchies declined. Moreover, the migration of workers within Europe also lost its former importance. In the period in which Europe was clearly divided into an economically developed inner Europe and an economic periphery, the migration of wage-earners created a strong connection between European societies, although it often produced ethnic and national discrimination and even ghettos. Since Europe became fully industrialized during the 1960s and 1970s, labor migration between European societies ceased to grow. The number of Italian workers migrating to France, the number of German employees migrating to England, the number of Dutch workers migrating to Germany did not increase, and even declined. To take a third weakening of international communication: The international example of the scholar whose best known exemplar was Erasmus of Rotterdam, and who still existed in the 19th and early 20th century became more and more marginal because of the national separation of scientific cultures since World War I and also in a different way because of the rapid expansion of research personnel since the 1960s. It is not clear that the internationalization of research since the 1970s actually compensated for this decline in the internationalism of scholars. Finally, for about forty years, international communication and exchanges were also strongly reduced by the political division of Europe between Eastern Europe and Western Europe. No doubt, it will still take years until the interconnections across the former iron curtain will get back to a normal level of intensity.

Nevertheless, it seems in general that the interconnection between European societies intensified especially since World War II in a double sense: On the one hand, the quantity of exchanges between European societies increased distinctively, especially during the 1970s and 1980s.⁵ On the other hand, the experience of geographic space by Europeans expanded beyond the regional and national borders and at the same time concentrated more upon Europe.

The development of quantitative social exchanges between European societies is still to be investigated on the European level. Statistics vary strongly between countries. Standardized statistics do not exist even for the European Community. Hence, I have to illustrate the quantitative development by taking that example of Germany, which does not look to me to be an exceptional case. Social exchanges increased between European countries in all major fields, in education as well as in professional migration, in traveling as well as in marriages, in the consumption of foreign goods as well as in the knowledge of foreign languages.

Education of Europeans in foreign European countries has clearly expanded. In the German case, the number of German students at foreign European universities increased from some hundred university students around 1910 to 7,000 students during the 1960s and to more than 25,000 students in 1989. At the same time foreign European students in Germany increased from about 6,000 in 1910 to about 11,000 during the 1960s and to about 18,000 in the 1980s, though German universities (and the German language) lost much of their international attraction during the 20th century for political and scientific reasons. These numbers may seem small, but many of these students were later on to assume important and influential positions.

Short-term and long-term migration between European countries also increased, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Once again let us take the German example: Around 1980 more British and French than ever before lived in Germany. The number of Europeans in Germany coming from member states of the European Community was larger than one might expect; it is as large as the largest group of immigrants from outside the European Community, i.e. the Turks. It is highly probable that these

⁵ The following statistical data are collected from national statistical year-books and from publications of the European Community.

migrants between European countries were not just blue-collar workers, but came from all sorts of occupations including those demanding highly qualified employees; in Southern European countries they were also migrants after retirement. Since the stagnation of the inner-European migration of mostly unskilled workers from peripheral to industrial countries, a new stream of short-term and long-term socially diversified migration between industrialized European societies seems to have emerged.

Traveling between European societies also seems to have enlarged rapidly. Hotel bookings by European foreigners in Germany rose from about 800,000 in 1950 to almost 15 million in 1989. In other Western European countries as a whole hotel bookings by European foreigners increased even more rapidly. European statistics show that this increase of travel not only brought Northern Europeans to the South, but more recently also Southern Europeans to the North. Among the young Europeans, in 1990, only a small minority had not visited other -- mostly European -- countries.

Family connections between European countries also increased though on a lower level than one might expect. Again the German case: the number of male Germans who married European foreign women increased from somewhat more than a half percent in 1955 to almost two percent of all marriages in Germany in 1980. The share of female Germans who married a foreign European man increased from around one percent to more than two and a half percent. A final important interconnection between European societies: the increasing exchange of consumer goods, which created not only an economic momentum, but also led in many ways to changes of lifestyle. The separation of national consumption cultures became less distinct and gave way to the beginnings of a European consumer culture consisting of goods from all European countries.

One major precondition for exchanges between European societies, the knowledge of foreign languages, also changed dramatically. Once again, I take for lack of general European case studies the German example: among those who went to school before World War II only a small minority of about 15% spoke English. Among the West Germans who went to school after the war about the half spoke English. At the end of the 1980s the overwhelming majority of 90% of young West Germans spoke English. West Germany is no exceptional case. Among the young Europeans in the

European Community in 1990 about 90% had learned a foreign language, about two thirds could carry on a conversation in a foreign language.

All these interconnections (except of the knowledge of English language) opened up links mainly to European societies. Once again the German example: About 80% of the West German students who were at a foreign university in the 1980s studied at European universities. The three quarters of the foreigners who booked hotels in West Germany in 1990 were Europeans. Around 80% of West Germans who made their holidays in foreign countries went to European countries. Marriages by Germans with foreigners were predominantly (males) or increasingly (females) European marriages. Foreign consumer goods in Germany were overwhelmingly European consumer goods. Three quarters in terms of value came from European OECD-countries. Increasing international connections seem to have remained either predominantly European or to have become even more European.

Among the reasons for this rising international connections between European societies I would distinguish between two sorts of explanation. On the one hand, there are general explanations which apply to European as well as to non-European industrial societies: The unique rise of the standard of living especially since the 1950s and 1960s, the unique development of educational qualification and the rapid expansion of university graduates and secondary schooling, and finally the traffic revolution and the information revolution have led to a more intensive social exchange between all industrial societies. On top of these explanations, there are special European reasons for more intensive European interconnections: The long period of inner-European peace which is needed to tear down the economic, political and mental barriers between European societies; the negative experience of two wars felt by most Europeans and which gradually opened European minds to other European countries; finally also the European Community which in indirect ways also made social exchange easier or even encouraged them.

Interconnections between European societies became more intensive not only due to more quantitative exchanges, but also due to a new geographical experience. Before roughly the middle of the 20th century, most Europeans only knew their own country, often only their own region or locality from direct personal experience. Of other European countries they usually

knew only indirectly from journals, from books, from radio broadcasting, or from hearsay. Only for a very small group of business men, of higher civil service, mostly diplomats, of internationally active academics, artists and intellectuals, of special occupations such as railway employees or seamen, was direct experience of other European countries part of normal life.

Mass experience of other countries was made in two different and clearly exceptional ways. On the one hand, direct personal experience of foreign countries was made by many Europeans in countries *outside* Europe, either by emigration mainly to the Americas, where they usually stayed, but where quite a number of Europeans also came back after shorter or longer stays; or by immigration or temporary work or traveling in the European colonies. This experience of foreign countries did not render other parts of Europe more familiar. On the other hand, direct personal experience of foreign *European* countries was made by many Europeans under extreme, often traumatic conditions. Probably the most frequent situation was the war and the experience of other European countries as soldier, as prisoner of war, as displaced person, as deportee, as refugee, or as prisoner in a concentration camp. These experiences were not only traumatic in the sense that they created a total separation from normal life; they were also undergone in a fundamentally hostile situation. A still rather frequent experience of other European countries was the migration of usually unskilled workers and servants into other European countries, often leading into ghettos and deprivation and often also experienced as a major upheaval in life. More limited to the European middle-class was the experience of other European countries through work in foreign firms of relatives or friends as sons of business families, or through work as a governess or as an au pair in foreign middle class households. This experience again was exceptional in the sense that it was usually part of the middle class adolescence and in this way limited to a specific phase of male or female middle-class life. On the whole and with the exception of a few occupations, Europeans had either no direct personal experience of other European countries, or only in exceptional, peculiar and often traumatic situations.

From roughly the middle of the 20th century the direct personal experience of other European countries changed fundamentally in two direc-

tions. On the one hand, direct experience of foreign countries became more Europeanized. With the decline of the colonial empires of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy less Europeans from these countries lived in the European colonies outside Europe and knew them. In fact, many Europeans lived through a dramatic 'Europeanization' of their lives in being forced to leave the colonies and to go back to a Europe which they sometimes did not know at all. In addition, with the decline of emigration to the Americas after the end of the short-term postwar revival of emigration, less Europeans than before emigrated from this part of the world. This was not compensated by expanding tourism and business traveling in non-European countries. They were much more superficial experiences, not real continuity. On the other hand, from roughly the middle of the 20th century on, the mass of Europeans started to cross the borders into other European countries under normal conditions of peace by business traveling, by tourism, or for the purpose of education or work. They also experienced European countries by marrying, by contact with foreign visitors, by business relations, or by buying consumer goods from abroad. These rising interconnections not only became part of the normal life, but were also repetitive rather than exceptional. They were usually neither linked to extreme situations such as wars, nor to a radical break with the society of origin nor limited to a specific phase of life. Among the young Europeans in 1990 three out of four visited other countries, mostly European countries, at least once. One out of three Europeans in 1990 had stayed in foreign countries for longer than one month.⁶

It would be naïve to assume that these increasing exchanges and increasingly normal personal experiences of other European countries led to a disappearance of confrontations of different European cultures and to a full abolition of prejudices or to an automatic emergence of international minds or European identities. Some types of tourism in foreign European countries are undoubtedly caricatures of direct personal experience of foreign societies. The persistence of strong prejudices among citizens of the same national society with even more internal exchanges than between European countries is a definite warning. The precise consequences of

⁶ Commission of the European Communities, ed., *Young Europeans in 1990* (Brussels, 1991), p. 58 (opinion poll among Europeans in the European Community between the ages of 15 and 24).

these enlarging interconnections on the images formed by Europeans of other Europeans has in fact been little investigated. But one can expect for good reasons two major consequences. On the one hand, the image of the other European societies would have a fundamentally different base and would be much more influenced by personal direct experience than before. Moreover, purchasing consumer goods from other European countries and traveling to other European countries has become so much part of the normal life of the mass of Europeans, that the abolition of these exchanges would be seen as directed against their material interests. The German or Spaniard of the 1930s who was, prevented by the policy of autarchy of the Nazi regime or the Franco regime, from traveling abroad and from consuming foreign products did not renounce many important things in his life. The German or Spaniard of the 1990s faced with a similar policy of autarchy would face a substantial reduction in his standard of life.

The Convergence of European Societies: Fewer Dissimilarities

A second major aspect of the social history of European integration is the mitigation rather than a full convergence of the social differences between European societies. For lack of space it is impossible to go into details about the development of social differences between individual European countries. I can only touch upon the main trends.

No doubt, social differences between European countries have by no means disappeared. They were and are important. This is not only a matter of empirical evidence, but also a matter of wishes and hopes. Most Europeans appreciate intensive interconnections between European societies, but they do not necessarily wish to have less social differences between European countries. Quite the opposite, one of the major European peculiarities which makes Europe different from the United States is the way in which Europeans appreciate the peculiarities of national and regional societies. A rising number of European intellectuals also believe that the enormous inner social and cultural variety of Europe is its most outstand-

ing characteristic, and a major protection against overcentralization of power in Brussels and against economic overstandardization in Europe.⁷

In addition, especially during the immediate postwar era, some differences between European societies were reinforced. First of all, World War II did not affect all European countries to the same degree. Some countries were much more affected by hunger, by scarcity of housing and fuel, by epidemic diseases, by the break-down of the provision of basic needs, public administration and schooling. Contrasts in everyday life were very strong after the war, especially between the small part of Europe which did not take part, i.e. Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Ireland on the one hand and the regions most affected by the war, i.e. Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Northern Italy, Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Union. In addition, governments and societies drew varying lessons from the war. The continuity of elites, the political role of former resistance movements, but also social reforms in a wide sense varied enormously from one country to the other as a direct consequence of the war. In Britain for example, the war led to a fundamentally new concept of social policy, the Beveridge plan, which inspired the reforms of the British welfare state directly after the World War II; in Germany the war and the Nazi regime strengthened the position of the opponents of any reform of public social insurance. In France, the war led to an awareness of the backwardness of the French economy and to a forceful modernization policy by 'planification' after the Second World War; in Germany the reaction to the highly centralized Nazi war economy was an important precondition for the strictly liberal economic policy adopted in the Western part of Germany. Finally there was a much more persistent reason for social differences within Europe: the division between Eastern and Western Europe. The fundamental social differences caused by the political division of Europe can be observed in contemporary Germany, for example.

However, distinct convergences and reductions of the differences between European societies have also occurred, especially since the 1950s.

⁷ Cf. as examples: E. Morin, *Penser l'Europe* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); W. Lepenies, *Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1992), pp. 61ff.

Two major new momentums of convergences came into effect, an economic momentum and a political momentum.

The economic momentum for social convergence of European societies came from two directions. On the one hand, the period since World War II is the period of industrialization of the *whole* of Europe not only of inner Europe,⁸ but also of the former Southern, Northern, Eastern periphery. Whereas in inner Europe industrialization was a long-term process which started in the late 18th and in the 19th century, for large parts of Eastern, Southern and Northern Europe industrialization was a sudden economic upheaval during the 1950s and 1960s. Only from that time on can one say that Europe as a whole was industrialized, with the exception only of some isolated regions. On the other hand, the period since the Second World War was a period of a unique rise in the standard of living without any parallel in the European past. The timing and the intensity of the rise in the standard of living was not the same in all European countries, but the basic trend can be found everywhere, in the West as well as in the East, in the North as well as in the South. The industrialization, as well as the rise in the standard of living, was reinforced, though not fully explained, by the new international economic order established in the West by the United States, by European economic integration since the 1960s and by different but highly purposeful national economic policies.

This economic momentum led above all to three major social convergences since World War II, i.e. by no means to full similarities, but to a reduction of dissimilarities. First, the strong dissimilarity in the active population decreased distinctively. The sharp contrasts which existed still around 1950 between societies with marginal agrarian labor forces such as Britain or the Netherlands and societies with a predominant agrarian labor force such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and various Eastern European countries were clearly reduced. The agrarian labor force became a minority everywhere in Europe, except in some isolated regions and in Albania. The huge differences in the industrial labor force which also could still be found in 1950 between countries with strong industrial labor force such as

⁸ Inner Europe includes Britain, France, the Benelux countries, Germany, Switzerland, Northern Italy, Austria, Bohemia. I take this term from Sidney Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest. The Industrialization of Europe 1760-1970* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 45ff.

Britain, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and countries with a marginal industrial labor force such as Portugal, Italy and many Eastern European countries also clearly diminished. The labor force in the service sector was always less dissimilar than in other sectors, but it became still even more similar. No doubt, during the 1970s and the 1980s some new divergences emerged, especially between some Central European countries such as Czechoslovakia and the GDR with a continuously strong industrial labor force and Western Europe with an increasingly tertiary labor force. In a rapid, brutal deindustrialization, the Central European societies have become more similar to the European average since 1989.⁹

Secondly, the strong dissimilarities in urbanization were also mitigated. Directly after World War II, huge differences existed between the most urbanized European societies, Britain and the Netherlands on the one hand and predominantly rural European societies such as Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Finland, and various Eastern European countries. After the urbanization of the whole of Europe during the last decades almost all European countries became predominantly urban. Most Europeans live now in urban environments and have taken over urban values.

Thirdly, the perhaps most important convergence: at least in Western Europe the large differences in the standard of living have also been reduced. In the 1950s, impressive differences were found between the inner, industrialized Europe and Southern Europe especially. Private consumption expenditure in Portugal around 1960 was only a fifth of the Western European average, in Italy it was still just above two thirds of the Western European average. In 1990, the private consumption expenditure in Portugal has reached two thirds of the European average and in Italy it was equal to the European average. The huge differences which could also be found in the normal indicators of living standards (which in the meantime have become partly dubious) such as housing standards, telephones,

⁹ Cf. for the decline of industrial labor in Central Europe *Short-term Economic Statistics: Central and Eastern Europe* (Paris: OECD, 1992), Tables 5.3 and 5.4; for the post-war development of the labor force, cf. International Labor Office, ed., *Economically Active Population*, Vol. 5 (Geneva: ILO, 1986), pp. 87ff.

TVs, refrigerators, cars were also clearly reduced. No doubt, important differences in the standards of living between European countries persisted in Western Europe and demanded a more active regional policy on the part of the European Community. In addition, clear differences became more apparent between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe. But the Western European standard of living in 1990 was clearly more homogeneous than in 1960. This gives us some hope for a decline of the difference between Western and Eastern Europe.¹⁰

These trends of reduced dissimilarities are not simply global trends of all industrial societies. Though Europe did not divert from these global trends, she still kept distinct peculiarities. In the active population of Europe, industrial labor remained more important than elsewhere. The urbanization in Europe remained special: Huge metropolitan areas of several million inhabitants were less important among European cities than among American, Canadian, Australian or Japanese cities, and they did not grow as rapidly as in the Soviet Union. The process of de-urbanization during the 1980s also was much less distinct in Western Europe than in the United States. Undoubtedly, the indicators of the standard of living, i.e. the use of cars, of TVs, of telephones developed in a similar way everywhere. However, the clear reduction of international disparities in private consumption expenditure was a European peculiarity. Even among the OECD countries it cannot be demonstrated.¹¹

Was the rise of interconnections and the weakening of social dissimilarities between European, especially Western European countries not mainly a consequence of an Americanization of the European societies? I think one ought to be careful when evaluating arguments on this topic. 'Americanization' is not only a term which is loaded with ideologies and strong emotions, and, hence, difficult to define and to use as an efficient

¹⁰ Calculated from *Historical Statistics 1960-1980* (Paris: OECD, 1982), pp. 14ff.; *Historical Statistics 1960-1990* (Paris: OECD, 1992), pp. 18 ff; for the decline of international differences in the use of cars, telephones, TVs, cf. B.R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1989* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 714ff., 744ff., 754ff.

¹¹ Cf. sources given before. For the international comparison of the trends in private consumption expenditure Western Europe as a whole was compared to the non-European members of the OECD, i.e. the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and Turkey.

scientific term. We also do not know very much about the social impact of the USA on European societies. Few European historians worked on this topic in social history, though it is usually understood that Americanization was strong since World War II.¹² Moreover, in social history one ought to make a clear difference between two levels: The debate by contemporaries on Americanization and the actual social impact of the USA. In the debate by contemporaries since World War II, the term Americanization was often used by conservative as well as left-wing commentators of social trends to stigmatize widely varying social changes. It would be highly problematic to use these debates as sources for the factual social impact of the USA. No doubt, the factual impact of the USA was distinct in specific social areas such as in scientific and social scientific research, in business management, in the cinema, in the commercialization of consumption, e.g. in the introduction of supermarkets, of fast food and also in the introduction of specific American products such as Coca Cola, computers, jeans or burger restaurants. However, one should also not overlook some fundamental limits of the American social impact.

¹² A. Sywottek, „The Americanization of Daily Life? Early Trends in Leisure and Consumption,“ in M. Ermarth, ed., *America and the Shaping of German Society 1945-1955* (Providence: Berg, 1993); P. Duignan & L.H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West. The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958* (London, 1991); R. Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949* (London: Routledge, 1989); J. E. Miller, *The United States and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); R. Kroes, ed., *Image and Impact: American Influences in the Netherlands since 1945* (Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut, University of Amsterdam, 1981); on some aspects of Americanization, especially in West Germany: V. R. Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945-1973* (Oxford/Providence, R.I., 1986); H.-J. Rupieper, „Bringing Democracy to the Frauleins. Frauen als Zielgruppe der amerikanischen Demokratisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945-1952,“ in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 17 (1991); H. Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse: Die amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland 1945-49* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1972); B. Plé, *Wissenschaft und säkulare Mission. 'Amerikanische Sozialwissenschaft' im politischen Sendungsbewußtsein der USA und im geistigen Aufbau der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990); R. Kuisel, „L'américanisation de la France (1945-1970)“ in: *Cahiers du Centre de la recherche historique* 5 (1990), pp. 53-55.

One major limit which might look paradoxical at first glance is the long-term basic proximity of the societies of the USA and of inner Europe. Industrialization and subsequent social change have advanced in close mutual connection on a similar level in the USA and Europe since the 19th century. Basic technologies and basic social innovations were developed on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Because of the destruction created by two European wars, a wide gap emerged in the interwar period between the United States and inner Europe in economic and social development and continued to exist for about two decades after World War II, especially in the field of management techniques, in household techniques, the expansion of the automobile, in housing standards, in the quality and standard of life in general. Because of this gap, many Europeans during that period believed that the model of the American way of life was alien to European societies. But most of these techniques and principals of social life were also developed in Europe. The automobile, the motorway, the skyscrapers, the refrigerator, canned food, fast food, the radio, the TV, even the supermarket were also European traditions. 'Americanization' in many ways meant either re-importing or even just encouraging social trends already present in inner Europe. It was usually not an 'Americanization' which was imposing a foreign way of life on Europe. In this way, 'Americanization' in Europe -- provided one still wants to apply this term at all to the social history of inner Europe -- means something fundamentally different from social change brought about by the American model in Japan, in Southern America, in Southeast Asia or also in some peripheral European countries. No doubt for inner Europe, especially for West Germany, the American impact led to fundamental political upheavals, i.e. for certain aspects of constitutional history, for international relations, also for the change of the political and professional mentalities of the elites. But for social history, the notion carries with it the misleading image of an imposed alien hegemonial social culture.

Social Peculiarities of Europe

A third crucial element of a social history of European integration is the existence of commonalities of European societies which at the same time single out Europe from non-European industrial societies. Such social peculiarities of Europe as a whole compared to non-European industrial

societies did not only exist as common historical origins, as Judeo-Christian origins, as ancient origins and as medieval origins. Social peculiarities also did not only exist in the sense of an historical European civilization compared to China or to India or to the Muslim world as the classical sociologists and historians such as Max Weber or Emil Durkheim or Arnold Toynbee have demonstrated. There are also social peculiarities of Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries which were rarely discussed by social historians in a general sense. What we know comes from three sources: From the classical sociologists who also analysed the civilizations of their time; from the research by social historians on some specific themes such as family history or the history of the welfare states or the history of specific social milieux; and finally from the historical research on the American 'exceptionalism,' which usually compares the United States with Europe as a *whole*.

No doubt these social peculiarities do not include all European countries or even all Western European countries. They do, however, cover the situation of the majority of the Europeans. No doubt also, these social peculiarities did not last during the whole of the 19th and 20th centuries. Some of these social peculiarities emerged in the early modern period or became clear already in the 19th and early 20th centuries. But all of them are still important for the period since 1945. It is also clear that the social peculiarities which will be treated on the following pages are not known outside the community of specialists. In general, Europeans are not aware of these social commonalities of European societies. The common European historical roots, the ancient, the Judeo-Christian and the medieval roots are much more familiar than the social commonalities of the present. Still, the social peculiarities and commonalities in post-war European social history are a crucial aspect of the reality of social integration of Europe.

For lack of space I shall treat the European social peculiarities only briefly.¹³ I want to touch upon the five most important social peculiarities

¹³ Cf. H. Kaelble, *A Social History of Western Europe, 1880-1980* (Dublin: Gill & McMillan, 1989), pp. 12 ff; for more details see my article „The European Integration Since 1950 and Social History,“ in P. Lützeler, ed., *Europe After Maastricht: American and European Perspectives* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1994); there is also a French version, „L'Europe vécue et pensée au XXe siècle:

and at the same time the social commonalities of post-war Europe. For these five peculiarities evidence from social history research is available. Other social peculiarities of Europe could be added or should be more closely explored: the social history of religion, the social history of the city and of urban life, the social history of the intellectuals and their public, the social history of public bureaucracy and of attitudes towards law, the social history of business and management, the social history of industrial relations, the social history of migration and of minorities. However, the five major European social peculiarities and commonalities which I want to mention briefly are: the European family, European work, European social milieux, the European welfare state and the European consumption pattern.

First, British and Austrian social historians have demonstrated that a peculiar European family developed since the early Modern period. Its main momentum can be seen in an especially strong independence of young European couples from the household of their parents. Hence, marriage meant the establishment of a household independent from the parents of the young couple. As a consequence, three-generation households were much more rare in Europe than elsewhere; the age at first marriage of men as well as of women was distinctly higher because an independent household needed more professional independence and more savings; for the same reason, the rate of unmarried was more substantial in Europe than elsewhere; the late age of marriage also led to a lower birth rate than elsewhere. At the same time, specifically European family mentalities developed: an especially strong intimacy of the family and an especially strong separation of the nuclear family from the neighborhood and from the other relatives; strong emotional links between husbands and wives and between parents and children; and a more distinct crisis of the adolescence which prepared the separation from the household of the parents. This European family developed especially in Northwestern and Central Europe and spread over the whole of Europe only during the 19th and 20th centuries. Though it became a global model during the 20th

une histoire sociale," in R. Girault, ed., *L'histoire de la conscience et de l'identité européenne au XXe siècle* (in print). See also G. Crossick & H. Kaelble, eds., *The European Way. Essays on Social Peculiarities of Europe During the 19th and 20th Centuries* (in preparation with Berghahn Publishers).

century, up to the present, the age of first marriage is still distinctly higher in Europe than in the United States or in Eastern Europe and the birth rate is still distinctly lower in Europe than in the rest of the world.¹⁴

A second social peculiarity of 19th- and 20th-century European societies was and is the strong impact of industrial work. The proportion of industrial labor in the active population was much higher in Europe than in all other industrial societies in America or in Asia. Only in European history can a distinct period be found in which industry was the largest employment sector. For some countries such as Britain, Germany or Switzerland this period of industrial society lasted many decades and started already during the 19th century. For Western Europe as a whole this period started in the 1920s and ended in the 1970s. As a consequence, European societies were much more strongly characterized by purely industrial cities such as Sheffield, Vervier, Gelsenkirchen, Katowice, and St. Etienne. Industrial workers were clearly more numerous in European societies than in non-European industrial societies. Hence, working-class culture, working-class quarters and the trade unions had a much stronger impact in Europe than elsewhere. To be sure, tertiary labor became more important than industrial labor since the 1970s in Europe, too, and the Central European communist societies, in which high proportions of industrial labor were preserved, followed this path in a brutal way after 1989. But the industrial work is still more important in Europe than elsewhere. All this is not true for all European societies, but at least for the majority of the Europeans. Perhaps because of these traditions of much industrial labor, the separation between work and non-work outside the household became more distinct in Europe than elsewhere, especially since World War II: During the week, the working hours became more reduced in

¹⁴ J. Hajnal, „European Marriage Patterns in Perspective,“ in D.V. Class & D.E.C. Eversley, eds., *Population in History* (London: Arnold, 1965); P. Laslett, *Family Life and Illicit Love in Earlier Generations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Chapter 1; P. Laslett, „Household and Family as Work Group and Kin Group,“ in R. Wall et al., eds., *Family Forms in Historic Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); P. Laslett, „The European Family and Early Industrialization,“ in J. Baechler et al., eds., *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); M. Mitterauer, *Sozialgeschichte der Jugend* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 28-43; A. Burguière et al., *Histoire de la famille*, Vol. 2 (Paris: Colin, 1986).

Europe than elsewhere. During the year, holidays were longer in Europe than elsewhere and a peculiar European holiday culture emerged; during the life the period of work was shorter in Europe, the entrance into the labor market was later, the age of retirement was earlier and the proportion of women who never worked was larger than elsewhere in the world.¹⁵

A third social peculiarity consisted of a strong impact of unique social milieux on European societies in the 19th and 20th centuries. The most important of these peculiarly European social milieux: the European middle class with its peculiar common family and economic values, with its strong internal connections by marriage, by education, by associations and culture and with its strict social distinction from the aristocracy and from the lower classes; the European working class with its peculiar culture, with its solidarity in individual crises and with its more or less strong links to the labor movement; the European lower middle class with its strong sense of economic independence, with its strong family ties, with much mobility into and out of the lower middle class and with its peculiar culture; the European milieu of peasants with its strong orientation towards the preservation of the family property, with its strong social isolation and strong family ties, with its weak formal school and professional training, with its clear separation from urban culture and its peculiar life styles and values. European societies were not only characterized by these individual milieux, and also by very strict demarcation lines separating these social milieux on the one hand, but also by many exchanges and mutual dependencies between these social milieux. Again, there is no room to present these milieux in a more detailed way. They weakened after World War II in most European societies but many of the institutions and mentalities of these social milieux still persist.¹⁶

¹⁵ Cf. H. Kaelble, „Was Prometheus Most Unbound in Europe? The Labor Force in Europe During the Late 19th and 20th Centuries,” in *Journal of European Economic History* 18 (1989), pp. 65-104; R. Granier, *L'emploi en Europe et aux Etats Unis, analyse comparative de longue durée* (Paris, 1990); C. Conrad, „Die Entstehung des modernen Ruhestands. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich 1850-1960,” in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 14 (1988); International Labor Office, ed., *Economically Active Population, Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025, Vol. 5* (Geneva: ILO, 3rd ed., 1986), p. 160.

¹⁶ J. Kocka, „Middle Class and Bourgeois Society in the 19th Century,” in J. Kocka & A. Mitchell, eds., *Bourgeois Society in 19th Century Europe* (Oxford

A fourth social peculiarity of Europe emerged after World War II in the development of the modern welfare state. The modern welfare state was clearly more developed in Europe than in non-European rich industrial societies. The welfare expenditure in relation to the GNP in most European countries was higher than in non-European Western industrial societies. The proportion of the active and non-active population which was protected by the modern welfare state was distinctly larger in Europe than in industrial societies outside Europe. In most Western European societies almost the total of the population was protected in this way. Moreover, the European welfare state had a longer history than the welfare state in other non-European societies. In pioneering countries such as Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Austria, it started already in the late 19th century. The modern postwar European welfare state built upon this longer welfare state experience. Moreover, during the whole period since World War II the important pressure for the further development of the welfare state

Providence: Berg, 1993) (cf. also the articles by M. Meriggi, A. Tanner, B. Stråth, G. Ránki, W. Dlugoborski, and E. Kaczynska); H. Kaelble, „Die oberen Schichten in Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik seit 1945,“ in *Frankreich Jahrbuch* (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1987), p. 64ff.; E.H. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1975-1914* (London, 1987); K. Tenfelde, „Vom Ende und Erbe der Arbeiterkultur,“ in S. Miller & M. Ristau, ed., *Gesellschaftlicher Wandel, soziale Demokratie. 125 Jahre SPD. Historische Erfahrungen, Gegenwartsfragen, Zukunftskonzepte* (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1988); W. Kaschuba, *Die Kultur der Unterschichten im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1990); J. Mooser, *Arbeiterleben in Deutschland 1900-1970* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984); H. Mendras, *La seconde révolution française 1965-1984* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); R. McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); J.D. Young, *Socialism and the English Working Class: A History of English Labor 1883-1930* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); G. Crossick & H.-G. Haupt, „Introduction,“ in G. Crossick & H.-G. Haupt, eds., *Shopkeepers and Masterartisans in 19th Century Europe* (London: Methuen, 1984); J. Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); A.J. Mayer, *Adelsmacht und Bürgertum. Die Krise der europäischen Gesellschaft 1848-1914* (Munich: Beck, 1984); H.-U. Wehler, ed., *Europäischer Adel 1750-1950* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990); R. Huebscher, „Destruction de la paysannerie?“ in Y. Lequin, *Histoire des français XIXe et XXe siècles, Vol. 2: La société* (Paris: Colin, 1983); cf. also G. Crossick & H. Kaelble, eds., *The European Way* (in preparation).

always came from Europe, especially from Britain and Sweden. Even in the deep crisis of the welfare state during the 1980s, distinct European peculiarities emerged. The alternative to the public welfare state was not only the family and the market, as in non-European societies, but also to a much stronger degree than outside Europe the idea of the non-profit-making, non-bureaucratized small public associations, an idea which built upon a long European tradition of 'friendly societies,' '*secours mutuels*,' and '*Genossenschaften*.'¹⁷

A final social peculiarity of Europe developed only after World War II: the European consumption pattern and the European way of life which unfortunately has not been explored so far by social historians in the international comparative perspective. It seems however that strong national and regional divergences in consumption became less distinct and were in part replaced by common European consumer goods which often are a mixture of goods from various European countries and regions: European food, European drinks, European clothes, European household machines, European cars, European furniture, European housing standards and housing designs. In the center of European cities specifically European urban life styles developed which made shopping in Modena, in Périgueux, in Lausanne, in Freiburg, in Oxford, and in Uppsala rather similar, and certainly more similar than immediately after World War II. A peculiar European holiday culture emerged which is different from holidays in the Americas or in Asia. I can only repeat: though the impact of the American way of life after World War II became stronger than ever before, American consumer goods played only a marginal, though sometimes spectacular, role. Fundamental changes in consumption and the rise of Europe-wide consumption patterns were sometimes discussed as „Americanization.“ However, they were mostly not an imposed alien culture, but basically an Atlantic culture which was just sometimes more developed and more advanced in the US.

¹⁷ For more details cf. P. Flora, *Growth to Limits*; OECD, *Social expenditure 1968-1990* (Paris: OECD, 1985).

The Awareness among Europeans of European Society

Contemporary Europeans were not always aware of the development of interconnections between European societies, of the rising or diminishing international differences and of the evolution of European social commonalities. The debate among Europeans on social commonalities has another history than that which one might expect from what has been presented so far. The awareness of Europeans was not clearly reinforced after World War II with the rising interconnections and diminishing differences between European societies. It also did not always center upon what social historians regard as European social commonalities. It normally was also clearly separate from politics and few Europeans seemed to have had the idea that the commonalities of European civilization might be the base for a political united Europe.

Once again, there is no room to present details about the development of the ideas of social commonalities of European countries. I just want to present four final observations.

First of all, the debate on social commonalities of Europe was far more vivid and far more intensive since the 19th century than one might expect in the period of nationalism and the nation-state. It seems that in this debate on the social characteristics of Europe many more participants were involved than in the debate on the establishment of a politically united Europe. Famous names such as Simone de Beauvoir, James Bryce, Hugo von Hoffmannsthal, Karl Kautsky, Wilhelm Liebknecht, André Siegfried, Werner Sombart, Alexis de Tocqueville, Arnold Toynbee, Max Weber, Carl Zuckmeyer, and hundreds of unknown writers, civil servants, professionals, professors, and travelers participated in this debate. To be sure, the debate was restricted to the public debate of the educated Europeans. The horizon of the common European was too narrow, too regional and even too local. Nevertheless, the educated European often seems to have had an idea of a European society. This idea did not only cover the European past, the common ancient, Judeo-Christian and medieval roots of Europe. It also covered European society in the contemporary period. This idea of Europe was most clearly formulated in comparison with the United States, whereas comparisons with other civilizations such as the Muslim world or the Chinese world or the African world were normally made with

the Western civilization as a whole including the United States rather than Europe alone.

Moreover, contemporary images of European society did not fully coincide with the results of the research by social historians. Contemporary Europeans were aware only of specific aspects of the European family such as the distinct division of role between husbands and wives, rather than the European family as a whole. They did not observe at all the specific importance of industrial employment. They often observed only fragments of the strict demarcation lines between social milieux in Europe and either defended or attacked this European peculiarity. Europeans only gradually became aware of the more modern European social peculiarities such as the welfare state or the European consumption pattern. The same is true for other social peculiarities of Europe such as specific industrial relations, specific types of urbanization, specific ways of business management, specific types of bureaucracy. On the whole, contemporary Europeans had many important insights into the social peculiarities of Europe. But since they did not have the sources which we use today they could not detect the whole range of social commonalities and particularities of Europe.

In addition, social peculiarities of Europe were not simply a matter of scientific research. The debate on social peculiarities of Europe was part of a more comprehensive discussion of social modernization of Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries. The evaluation of the social peculiarities of Europe was often highly controversial. There was no consensus among Europeans about crucial aspects of modernization: Whether Europe was the harbinger of modernization or whether it was falling back, especially behind the United States; whether social change in Europe was to be regarded as a positive result or as a danger; whether the possible model and future of social modernization of Europe, i.e. the United States, was to be judged in a fully positive or totally negative way; whether the predominant trends in Europe were acceptable for one's own country or one's own region or whether a more favorable special way and a deviation from European norm was regarded as preferable. In a period of fundamental change such as the 19th century and parts of the 20th century, the discussion about social peculiarities of Europe was also a discussion on the acceptance or the refusal of this social change. Therefore, a clear contra-

diction between a strong consensus about common European roots and highly controversial evaluations of the common present European society was typical for that period.¹⁸

With the definite establishment of the European power center in Brussels, two developments are possible. On the one hand, the social peculiarities of Europe might become part of a European identity. Substantial symptoms for such a development do not yet exist. On the other hand, with the increasing economic integration and standardization in Europe and with the rise of a strong power center in Brussels, national or regional social and cultural identities might serve more and more as a protection against an economic overstandardization and against too much power for the European institutions in Brussels. This trend is expressed in recent years by various European intellectuals who argue that the major particularity of Europe is her social and cultural variety and heterogeneity. The recent debate is dominated by warnings of the weakening of cultural and social differences between European nations rather than by any enthusiasm about European social commonalities.¹⁹

Concluding Remarks

This concept of a social history of European integration is partly based on intensive empirical evidence, partly also on preliminary indicators. The main arguments: Since World War II, three important social changes took place in the social history of Western Europe or Europe as a whole: First, despite contradictory developments, the exchanges and connections between European societies, especially between Western European societies, clearly intensified in work and education in other European

¹⁸ This debate on social peculiarities of Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries is the theme of one of my current research projects. For a few preliminary conclusions cf. Introduction to the session „Europäische Identität und gesellschaftliche Besonderheiten Europas im 20. Jahrhundert,“ in 38. *Versammlung deutscher Historiker in Bochum 1990* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1991), pp. 210-212; „La représentation de la société européenne à la fin du XIXe et dans la première moitié du XXe siècle,“ in R. Girault, *L'histoire de la conscience et de l'identité européenne au XXe siècle*.

¹⁹ Cf. as examples: Morin, *Penser l'Europe*; Lepenies, *Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa*, pp. 61ff.

countries; in tourism into other European countries; in the exchange of consumer goods between European countries and, though to much less clear degree, in family relations; all this was based upon a strong increase of the knowledge of other European languages. Parallel to these social changes, the geographical experience by the mass of Europeans also changed. It Europeanized with the decline of European colonial empires and with the reduction of the emigration to non-European societies; the experience of other European countries at the same time became less exceptional and less dramatic. It was no longer a matter of wars, enforced migration of the unskilled or ritual migration during adolescence, but became an experience of all Europeans in normal situations of every day life and in almost all ages. Though we do not know very much about the effects of these wide and direct experience on prejudices, the image of the other societies is based now much more on a direct experience. In addition, traveling or living in other European countries and consuming goods from other European countries became a normal part of the every day life of Europeans and hence a part of the material interests of Europeans. Secondly, despite new divergences, partly as a consequence of World War II and partly as a consequence of the division of Europe between East and West, in general social differences between West European societies weakened, partly for economic reasons, i.e. because of the industrialization of the *whole* of Europe, including the periphery, partly because of the unique rise in the standard of living especially in the 1950s and the 1960s, and partly also for political reasons, especially because of the parallel intervention of European governments in social development. This mitigation of social differences between European societies was to a certain degree part of a global development among industrial societies; it was however on top of that more distinct among Western European societies and, hence, reinforced European civilization as an entity. Finally, distinct social peculiarities of European societies as a whole did exist. They did not include every individual European society, but at least the majority of Europeans. These social peculiarities of Europe which can be especially demonstrated in the history of the family, in the history of the active population, in the history of class milieux, in the history of the welfare state and in the history of consumption, probably also in other fields of social history, single out Europe from the modern industrial societies,

though not in the same way from each non-European industrial society. Normally, Europeans are not aware of these commonalities. Hence, so far they have not been the base of a European social identity. Nevertheless, these peculiarities exist.

How should these results be interpreted? On the one hand, it is clear that these European social changes and European social peculiarities do not imply and probably also will not imply anything similar to a national society. Europe as a whole still is far less homogenous than a nation. It remains important that no common language exists in Europe. A common European culture did not yet emerge neither in the sense of the arts or in the sense of popular culture. A European political culture, in institutions of a European-wide public, European-wide parties and social movements do not yet exist. At the same time, all the social developments and structures described above are not yet the characteristics of a European social identity with a similar status to the national identities in Europe.

On the other hand, the social changes and social structures of Europe which have been discussed make European societies fundamentally different from any other group of countries. It seems that European countries are more closely connected, less dissimilar and more clearly identifiable as an peculiar civilization than Southern American societies or Arab societies or East Asian societies or African societies or even GUS societies. Since World War II, there is a distinct reinforcement and revival of a common European civilization which is not any more a matter of a remote ancient or medieval past, but also a matter of the present. It would, however, be naïve to believe that it automatically leads to a stable system of European peace or to full political integration of Europe. It offers us a chance, not more. Peace and political integration remain a matter for political decisions.

UTILISATIONS CONTRADICTOIRES DE L'APPEL A L'IDENTITE CULTURELLE: POINTS DE REPERE

Marie Eliou

L'identité culturelle

Les fondements de l'identité culturelle s'enfoncent dans la terre et dans le temps. Le rapport des groupes humains à leur environnement est déterminant pour la conscience collective. C'est un rapport complexe, tissé d'interactions entre l'homme et la nature, et qui façonne plus qu'un mode de vie: une manière d'être dans le monde; en fait, une sorte d'*habitus* existentiel. Par ailleurs, les expériences partagées pendant une durée suffisante pour créer un passé commun et la conscience d'une continuité, constituent un autre élément essentiel de l'identité culturelle.

Espace et temps se conjuguent dans la mémoire collective, gardienne de la permanence de l'identité -une permanence qui est irriguée, revivifiée, par des apports multiples.

Cependant, la mémoire collective est, comme toute mémoire, sélective. Elle choisit dans le passé en fonction des enjeux du présent, mais surtout en fonction d'un projet qui concerne l'avenir. Ainsi, l'identité culturelle, ethnique ou nationale n'est pas tant une donnée qu'une construction. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle est un artifice ou une imposture. Elle se trouve tout simplement à l'intersection de l'histoire et de l'idéologie. Elle est un lieu où convergent significations et interprétations qui correspondent au projet porté par le groupe. Le groupe social appelant à son identité, se réfère en même temps à un choix. Il choisit les moments de son histoire qu'il veut privilégier, il choisit implicitement ses oublis, il choisit même ses ancêtres.

Recherchant la légitimité qui lui convient, il passera, peut-être, sous silence ses géniteurs, pour se tourner vers des arrière-grands parents, réels ou hypothétiques (voir les filiations „nobles” revendiquées concernant les peuples de l'antiquité: Egyptiens, Juifs, Romains, Thraces . . . et les multiples références récentes à Alexandre le Grand).

Une analyse croisée des options prises pendant une certaine période (qui d'ailleurs n'est pas la même pour les uns et pour les autres) par des historiens grecs et turcs engagés dans la fabrication de la mémoire collective dans leurs pays respectifs, présente en relief ce genre d'omission: „Cette escapade organisée vers le passé le plus lointain a provisoirement endommagé quelques siècles d'histoire récente: l'Empire Othoman et l'Islam pour les Turcs, l'Empire Othoman et Byzance pour les Grecs . . . Il est significatif que tandis qu'en fait, toutes les deux parties c'est l'Occident qu'elles recherchaient -et pas seulement leur propre identité- en remontant le temps si loin en arrière . . ., ce serait précisément dans ces siècles biffés que l'étude de leur rapport (en deçà de l'idéologie) à l'Occident, c'est à dire au monde contemporain, aurait un sens.”¹

La construction „imaginaire” des identités turque et grecque en relation avec une appartenance anticipée à l'Europe fait aussi l'objet des travaux récents de St.Pesmazoglou² et rejoint les interrogations de R. Mihneva: „Une porte de l'Europe, ou une porte vers celle-ci, et de quel côté de la porte sommes-nous, et voudrions-nous nous voir, nous tous, Balkaniques européens ou Européens des Balkans? Une question pleine d'alogismes absurdes, de nervosité journalistique, de toutes sortes de falsifications politiques, nourrissant des conflits ethniques et sociaux, des luttes politiques et toute cette panoplie exploitée régulièrement par les plus „forts” du monde, les Grandes puissances ou par leurs lobbies locaux.”³

C'est ainsi que se dessinent des identités alternatives. Car l'identité culturelle, comme les autres identités collectives dans lesquelles les indi-

¹ E. Skopétéa, „Histoires nationales balkaniques,” dans *Nation-Etat-Nationalisme* (Athènes: Société d'Etudes de la Culture Néohellénique et de Culture générale, 1995), p. 311.

² Voir St. Pesmazoglou, „Constructions Eurocentristes,” dans *Nation-Etat-Nationalisme*, p. 179-207 et du même, l'important ouvrage *Europe-Turquie*, 2 vols. (Athènes: Thémelio, 1993).

³ R. Mihneva, „Notre Europe et 'l'autre' Europe ou 'Européisation' contre évolution et certains problèmes du 'temps' transitoire dans les Balkans,” dans *Etudes Balkaniques* (1994), pp. 9-20.

vidus se reconnaissent en tant que membres solidaires d'un groupe, ne va pas de soi; elle suppose une adhésion implicite.

Devant le processus de construction des identités collectives, des considérations sur leur „légitimité” ou leur „authenticité” sont hors de propos. Produits d'un tissage complexe,⁴ les identités collectives sont l'expression d'une „réalité vécue.”⁵ Il n'y a, par conséquent, pas de contestation possible par les uns de ce qui est vécu par les autres.

Il n'est pas inutile de souligner que la construction des identités nationales, comme celle des nations, n'est pas à l'abri de dynamiques inverses: „Promesse aléatoire, mais construction possible, la nation se crée, de palier en palier, dans un commun devenir. Elle sera le résultat de multiples interactions et de choix cumulés.”⁶ Les nations qui surgissent ou les entités qui se désagrègent sous nos yeux témoignent du caractère fondamentalement historique de ces processus.

Dans un texte au titre significatif, Maurice Agulhon rappelait: „La France n'est pas naturelle, mais quelle autre formation historique l'est vraiment? et y a-t-il d'autre „nature” que de l'artificiel qui ait duré?” et relevait que „la pédagogie nationale, élément de la pédagogie tout court, s'était accompagnée de la diffusion d'un bagage culturel aussi valorisé, aussi uniformément répandu et aussi généralement accepté que le bagage historique, que la nomenclature géographique, que les poids et mesures du système métrique, et que la langue elle-même.”⁷

Les utilisations

Les utilisations de l'aspiration à l'affirmation de l'identité culturelle varieraient donc, selon la finalité poursuivie. Il a déjà été avancé que

⁴ Cf. les interventions de M. Serres et de Cl. Lévi-Strauss dans *L'identité. Séminaire dirigé par Claude Lévi-Strauss* (Paris: B. Grasset, 1977).

⁵ G. Michaud, „Mises au point,” dans *Identités collectives et relations interculturelles*, sous la direction de Guy Michaud (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1978), p. 112.

⁶ M. Eliou, *La formation de la conscience nationale en République populaire du Congo* (Paris: Anthropos, 1977), p. 25.

⁷ M. Agulhon, „La fabrication de la France, problèmes et controverses,” dans *L'autre et le semblable*, présenté par Martine Segalen (Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1989), pp. 112 et 117.

l'identité culturelle peut être utilisée soit comme instrument de libération, soit comme instrument d'oppression.⁸

Un historien grec a relevé que l'idéologie officielle aurait constamment privilégié dans la tradition grecque les continuités réelles et surtout supposées au détriment des ruptures et des contradictions qui témoignaient, peut-être, d'une vitalité de l'identité culturelle beaucoup plus féconde.⁹

L'identité culturelle peut ainsi être manipulée pour servir les intérêts de tel ou tel groupe, en fonction souvent d'un enjeu d'importance capitale qu'est le pouvoir. Il s'ensuit que les identités régionales, par exemple, peuvent être concédées tant que le rapport de forces entre région et pouvoir central demeure constant. Le mouvement revendicatif, détourné vers l'affirmation de l'identité culturelle, peut se trouver dans ce cas désarmé quant à l'essentiel.

Un exemple bien connu de l'utilisation tendencieuse de l'identité culturelle nous avait été fourni par la création des différents „bantoustans,” dans le cadre du régime révolu de l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud.

A noter que le danger de la marginalisation de certains groupes à travers la reconnaissance de leur spécificité culturelle et avec la contribution active de l'école apparaît chaque fois que, dans les dispositions concernant l'éducation des jeunes générations, ne sont pas pris en compte simultanément le droit à l'identité culturelle (à la langue maternelle, à la religion, aux coutumes) et l'égalité en tant que droit de l'homme -et de la femme. De tels cas font l'objet de discussions et d'études concernant les enfants des migrants.

Un autre exemple: la stricte application par la Grèce du traité de Lausanne (1923) concernant la scolarisation des enfants de la minorité musulmane dans un régime bilingue (grec et turc) a abouti à l'exclusion de fait des jeunes musulmans par le concours hautement compétitif qui donne accès à l'enseignement supérieur pour lequel le *numerus clausus* est en

⁸ R. Preiswerk, „Identité culturelle, self-reliance et besoins fondamentaux,” dans *Il faut manger pour vivre... Controverses sur les besoins fondamentaux et le développement* (Paris: PUF/Genève: IUED, 1980), pp. 131-133.

⁹ P. Iliou, «L'utilisation idéologique de la tradition», *Anti* 133 (août 1979), pp. 30-31; cf. aussi du même, „L'utilisation idéologique de l'histoire,” dans *Anti* 46 (mai 1976), pp. 31-34.

vigueur.¹⁰ Ce n'est que tout récemment (été 1995) que le Ministre de l'Éducation a annoncé qu'il envisage d'instituer un quota assurant aux jeunes de cette minorité un nombre minimum de reçus à l'enseignement supérieur. (Il y a près de vingt ans que nous avions proposé des mesures éducatives valorisantes à l'intention de cette minorité: „L'Université de Thrace pourrait par ex. créer un Département d'excellence d'études de turcologie tirant profit de l'existence de l'élément turcophone dans la région.”¹¹) Il se peut aussi qu'un mouvement revendicatif se dirige spontanément vers le terrain culturel, quand d'autres possibilités d'expression, notamment sur le plan politique et syndical, font défaut. Ce mécanisme est à rapprocher du concept de „conscience ethnique dérivée ou réactionnelle” que j'avais proposé antérieurement:

La conscience ethnique, caractérisée surtout par le sentiment de solidarité basé sur un certain nombre d'éléments qui fondent la commune appartenance, a souvent été désignée (elle a aussi été déformée, puis dénoncée) sous le vocable de tribalisme.

Il est nécessaire de clarifier l'amalgame que recouvre cette dernière appellation. La conscience ethnique revêt des significations différentes selon le moment et le contexte dans lequel elle se manifeste. Nous distinguons la *conscience ethnique spontanée* de la *conscience ethnique dérivée* ou *réactionnelle*.

La première existe en tant qu'expression de la réalité ethnique. Force unificatrice, elle assure la cohésion du groupe et fonde la revendication nationalitaire, l'exigence de la reconnaissance de l'identité et des droits de l'ethnie. Appelée „patriotisme ethnique” par G. Balandier, „nationalisme tribal” par P. Mercier, „conscience politique à base ethnique ou nationalisme” par P. van den Berghe, „nationalisme traditionnel” par Ojiaku, „patriotisme traditionnel” ou „ethnisme” par H. Deschamps, „ethnocentrisme”

¹⁰ Voir H. Canakidou, *L'enseignement de la minorité musulmane de la Thrace Occidentale* (Athènes: Hellénica Grammata, 1994), ainsi que Evangélia Tressou-Mylona, „Besoins éducatifs de minorités. Le cas de la minorité musulmane de Thrace,” communication au Colloque de l'Association Grecque d'Éducation Comparée *Education grecque et perspectives Européennes: recherches, divergences, convergences*, Athènes, 9 et 10 Décembre 1994.

¹¹ M. Eliou, „Distribution géographique des chances éducatives,” dans *The Greek Review of Social Research* 28 (1976), p. 267. Cette suggestion est restée un vœu pieux.

par Cl. Rivière et G.L. Hazoumé, la conscience ethnique n'est pas incompatible avec la conscience nationale, au contraire. Elle peut oeuvrer pour la formation de la nation, être un facteur d'intégration dans les nouveaux Etats, jouer un rôle de transition vers la modernité et la construction nationale. Si elle devient objet de répression, elle peut se radicaliser dans le sens de la revendication nationale (contexte colonial) ou du séparatisme (contexte d'un Etat à construction nationale inachevée ou même d'un Etat-nation).

La *conscience ethnique dérivée* apparaît ou bien en tant que réaction à certaines contradictions qui ne trouvent pas d'autre moyen d'expression ou bien en tant que résultat de manipulations idéologiques et de mystifications politiques intéressées. Dans le premier cas, des inégalités économiques, sociales et culturelles se trouvant souvent, pour des raisons historiques et géographiques, croisées avec des différences ethniques, les revendications qui devraient être portées sur le plan politique et social peuvent se cristalliser sur le plan ethnique. Traiter de „tribalisme” ces „néo-ethnismes,” selon l'expression de L. Beltràn, c'est accepter de voir les vrais problèmes être déplacés et contribuer ainsi à les masquer. Dans le second cas, des politiciens cherchent à se constituer une clientèle sur une base ethnique pour accéder au pouvoir ou s'y maintenir. Quelquefois, ils prennent la précaution de qualifier à l'avance la politique de leurs adversaires de „tribaliste” pour mieux réussir leur appel à la conscience ethnique de leur propre groupe ou pour déconsidérer les réactions qu'eux-mêmes ne manqueront pas de susciter. Souvent, tous ces éléments coexistent: déséquilibres répercutés ou perçus en tant qu'inégalités ethniques, structures politiques et syndicales inopérantes, refus (ou impuissance) des autorités de remonter aux véritables causes des disparités, absence de scrupules de politiciens ambitieux.¹²

Ce n'est pas seulement dans les nouveaux Etats que de tels phénomènes se manifestent. Les déplacements vers le culturel se profilent derrière le recours à la symbolique religieuse en tant que dimension majeure de l'identité culturelle et qui surgit à certains moments de crise des institutions en place. Si la crise se développe en l'absence de mécanismes permettant les regroupements, l'expression de mécontentement et la possibilité

¹² M. Eliou, *La formation de la conscience nationale en République populaire du Congo*, pp. 20-21; pour les références utilisées, voir *ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

d'élaboration de solutions appropriés, la mémoire collective part en expédition dans le passé pour y chercher l'appui d'autres solidarités à mobiliser.

En Grèce, c'est la symbolique de la langue qui a pendant longtemps servi pour exprimer des projets de société contradictoires. Le choix de la langue officielle entre la „catharévoussa” (langue puriste, laborieusement construite, sorte d'intermédiaire pédant entre le grec classique de l'antiquité et le grec moderne) et la „démotique” (qui est, en fait, le grec moderne, produit de l'évolution de la langue, tel qu'il est parlé naturellement et écrit dans la littérature néohellénique) a constitué, pendant un siècle et demi, la fameuse „question de la langue” du pays. Ce problème de la vie néohellénique, aux implications politiques, sociales, idéologiques, éducatives, n'a trouvé sa solution qu'avec la promulgation de la Constitution de 1975.

Il n'est pas sans signification que depuis la fondation de l'état grec, c'est l'identité culturelle grecque qui pose problème (et non pas l'identité nationale qui s'est depuis longtemps solidement constituée en utilisant notamment des identités culturelles alternatives), un problème qui accompagne un long, un interminable combat à propos des institutions du pays.

C'est ainsi que l'entrée de la Grèce dans la Communauté Européenne avait, une fois de plus, relancé le débat, sur lequel des problèmes nouveaux venaient se greffer.

1. L'élaboration de projets sociaux.

Les groupes qui portaient des projets sociaux différents et même contradictoires se trouvaient obligés d'incorporer cette nouvelle donnée d'importance majeure dans leur problématique et leur stratégie.

2. L'identité comme condition de l'indépendance.

La définition de l'identité propre apparaît comme une nécessité au moment de l'entrée du pays dans un ensemble plus vaste.

3. L'identité comme condition du développement.

Le développement étant „créateur de différences,”¹³ ne peut procéder que d'une formation sociale qui se pose et s'appréhende comme sujet.

4. Certaines raisons de tactique politique (et électorale).

L'entrée dans la Communauté Européenne ayant été négociée et réalisée par les gouvernements conservateurs des années 1974-1981, les deux principaux partis de l'opposition à l'époque, le PASOK (actuelle majorité) et le Parti Communiste Grec (tendance orthodoxe), avaient choisi de faire appel à l'identité grecque contre le danger qu'aurait représenté l'entrée à la Communauté Européenne.

Le traité d'adhésion de la Grèce à la Communauté Européenne est signé le 28 Mai 1979. La seule traduction de titres de quelques articles de fond parus pendant cette période dans les deux principaux quotidiens, *To Vima* et *Kathimerini*, illustre l'intensité du débat.¹⁴

¹³ H. Lefebvre, *Le manifeste différentialiste* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 38.

¹⁴ An. Peponis (homme politique, PASOK, plusieurs fois ministre, par la suite, dans les gouvernements Papandréou), „L'européanisation' peut aboutir à notre disparition,” dans *To Vima* (13-5-1979); Ad. Papelassis (Directeur de la Banque Agricole); „Européanisation' et changements institutionnels,” dans *To Vima* (2-11-1978) et du même „Restructuration culturelle et entrée dans les Communautés Européennes,” dans *To Vima* (17-5-1979); C. Kalligas (éditorialiste), „Le problème fondamental de l'hellénisme contemporain et notre entrée dans les Communautés Européennes: notre identité grecque sera préservée par la connaissance lucide de soi,” dans *Kathimerini* (27/28-5-1979); D. Fatouros (professeur à l'Université, a été ministre de l'Éducation en 1993-1994), „L'identité culturelle,” dans *To Vima* (6-6-1979); M. Ploritis (éditorialiste), „L'identité': perte de ce qui est déjà perdu et altération de ce qui est déjà altéré,” dans *To Vima* (10-6-1979); Th. Papadopoulos (Directeur du Centre de Recherche scientifique de Chypre), „Formation-contenu épistémologique du concept 'hellénisme,’” *Kathimerini* (série de sept articles, du 15-2-1980 au 1-3-1980); M. Eliou (sociologue), „Éléments de dépendance culturelle,” dans *To Vima* (3-4-1981); D. Agrafiotis (sociologue), „L'identité grecque en tant que (faux) problème,” dans *To Vima* (2-7-1981). Il faudrait aussi rappeler les douze interviews de sociologues, historiens, ethnologues etc. présentées dans le bi-mensuel *Anti* de Mars en Juin 1976 sur les concepts d'identité néohellénique et de tradition populaire. Cette même revue dont l'équipe avait pressenti le

Mais, indépendamment de la conjoncture, la question de l'identité culturelle grecque qui se croise avec la définition de la *tradition grecque* (populaire? savante? néohellénique...?) reste ouverte.¹⁵

Le détournement

L'identité culturelle, comme toute identité, comporte la construction de différences. Ce processus créateur et créatif ne conduit pas nécessairement vers des différenciations hostiles à l'altérité. Ce sont des interventions plus ou moins intéressées qui produisent les détournements du sentiment d'identité culturelle.

Si le concept d'identité culturelle peut être trituré de manière à servir à des fins discutables, il est indispensable de pouvoir signaler ce détournement des aspirations et cette mystification des consciences. Car ces manipulations orientent les individus et les groupes et même les états, soit vers des modèles de vie d'un passé mythifié, soit vers des aventures douteuses basées sur l'autoglorification et le mépris des autres et qui peuvent déboucher sur la guerre; soit vers les deux à la fois: passéisme et agressivité. Elles ont d'ailleurs un point commun: le décalage par rapport aux conditions et aux problèmes du présent. Elles sont donc dangereuses dans tous

débat qui allait se développer ultérieurement, confiait une page, de Janvier 1981 jusqu'à Juin 1983, à un dessinateur à l'humour incisif qui, sous le titre „L'Européen“ (le Grec après son entrée dans la Communauté) procédait chaque fois à une critique des pratiques sociales et politiques; en arrière fond transparaissait l'interrogation sur l'avenir européen d'un pays aux structures anachroniques.

¹⁵ Rappelons que pendant la période sensible 1979-1981, il y a eu de nombreuses manifestations de cet intérêt pour l'„identité“ et la „tradition“ dont: a) proclamation par le Ministère de l'Education de l'année 1979 comme „l'année de la tradition“; b) semaine de Rencontres organisée par la 3ème chaîne de la Radio (Radio-Culture) sur le thème: „Débat sur la signification actuelle de la tradition populaire“ (août 1979); c) symposium organisé par la Ligue de l'Art Contemporain sur le thème „Art contemporain et tradition“ (mai 1981); d) semaine de Rencontres organisée par l'Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Politiques sur le thème „Hellénisme et grécité: l'idéologique et le vécu dans la société néohellénique“ (mai 1981); les Actes de cette importante manifestation ont été publiés sous la direction de D. Tsaoussis (Athènes: Hestia, 1983); e) la TV a diffusé un film sur les Rencontres organisées en août 1979 par Radio-Culture, suivi d'un débat entre invités de marque sur „la signification actuelle de la tradition“ (juillet 1981).

les cas, aussi bien au dedans qu'au dehors. Et, dans tous les cas, elles conduisent à des impasses.

La régression

C'est ainsi que, parfois, des sociétés archaïques sont proposées comme une vision d'avenir. La nostalgie du „bon vieux temps“ et la mythification d'une société agraire idéalisée échappant à l'histoire, cristallisent des sentiments diffus de mécontentement. Des religions qui, par définition, ont leurs racines dans un passé lointain, sont présentées aux fidèles vidées de leurs sources vives qui permettraient leur insertion novatrice dans le monde actuel, et sont appréhendées de manière formelle, figée, isolationniste. On en voit des expressions dans les différentes formes de fondamentalisme et d'intégrisme religieux: chrétien (orthodoxe ou catholique), juif, islamique... Les exemples concrets abondent et nous pouvons les repérer en commençant par nos propres sociétés.

Certaines campagnes d'„authenticité“ ou de culte des „origines“ s'inscrivent dans une telle perspective anachronique.

Une oeuvre littéraire exprime parfois mieux qu'une étude les phénomènes sociaux dans leur dynamique actuelle. Dans une oeuvre satirique de l'écrivain congolais Tchicaya U Tam'Si, le concept de „régressisme“ (et ses variations: „régressivité“, „régressité“ et surtout „révolution régressiste“) vaut bien une analyse de l'utilisation tendancieuse de l'identité culturelle: „Vous comprenez, n'est ce pas, que nous voulions appauvrir notre pauvreté! Toute notre grandeur est là. C'est notre régressivité. Nos ancêtres vivaient de cueillette et d'eau de pluie! Nous sommes fiers d'eux“¹⁶.

Cette évocation congolaise rejoint un stéréotype bien connu dans mon pays et pendant longtemps répandu avec plus ou moins d'innocence, concernant la „frugalité du Grec“ se nourrissant „de pain sec et d'oignons.“

Il est clair que les mouvements qui font miroiter le passé comme constituant notre avenir, marginalisent les groupes qui y adhèrent, empêchent l'évolution de leurs pays et consolident des situations de dépendance.

¹⁶ T. U Tam'Si, *Le destin glorieux du Maréchal Nnikon Nniku Prince qu'on sort, comédie-farce-sinistre en trois plans* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1979), p. 78 (cf. aussi pp. 63, 65, 66, 70, 78, 79).

L'agression

Une autre forme de détournement de l'identité culturelle est sa transformation perverse en ethnocentrisme ou en sociocentrisme.¹⁷ Dans les expressions les moins dures, il s'agit d'une agression symbolique, à travers la dévalorisation et la négation de l'"autre." Même dans ce cas, l'ethnocentrisme prépare le terrain pour des agressions futures plus concrètes et les légitime d'avance: la colonisation, l'ethnocide, la guerre. Ou encore, il les accompagne allégrement. „Ils sont venus un soir / . . . un soir innocent / voler et / violer la négraille / civiliser la négrerie," écrit un poète africain.¹⁸

Les Balkans présentent de nos jours, une nouvelle fois, de tragiques illustrations du processus qui conduit de l'utilisation de l'identité culturelle à l'ethnocentrisme, l'intolérance, le racisme, la guerre. (Il ne faudrait, toutefois, pas négliger le fait que simultanément il y a, dans certains cas, défaut ou crise des institutions politiques garantissant les droits des groupes.)

Le différent actuel sur la Macédoine (différent qui a une profondeur historique généralement négligée par les instances et l'opinion publique internationales, mais aussi par les intéressés eux-mêmes qui opposent une histoire mythifiée à la géopolitique ou l'archéologie à l'idéologie et vice versa) se développe sur une base de manipulations multiples des peuples concernés.

La résistance à de tels phénomènes serait d'autant plus efficace qu'elle serait précoce; et qu'elle ait lieu à l'intérieur de chaque pays. Mais dans ces conditions, tout engagement comporte des risques personnels.

Quelques exemples:

En Mai 1992, quatre jeunes gens signataires d'un tract dont les positions étaient contraires aux positions officielles de la Grèce sur la Macédoine, ont été condamnés pour cela par le tribunal correctionnel d'Athènes à de lourdes peines. Dans un mouvement de solidarité, mais surtout d'inquiétude pour les libertés publiques et l'escalade nationaliste, 169 personnalités dont de nombreux professeurs d'Université ont co-signé le même tract, en demandant publiquement d'être jugés à leur tour dans les mêmes conditions. Ces personnes ont subi depuis plusieurs vexations.

¹⁷ R. Preiswerk et D. Perrot, *Ethnocentrisme et Histoire. L'Afrique, l'Amérique indienne et l'Asie dans les manuels occidentaux* (Paris: Anthropos, 1975).

¹⁸ M. Ndebeka, *Soleils neufs* (Yaoundé: Éditions Clé, 1969), p. 33.

certaines ont été convoquées chez le juge d'instruction; les quatre jeunes gens, pourvus en appel, ont vu plusieurs fois leur nouveau procès ajourné jusqu'à ce que, finalement, l'action contre eux soit éteinte par une mesure législative, tandis que l'action contre les 169 est restée en suspense . . .

Il y a eu et il y a encore plusieurs autres manifestations et prises de position lucides en Grèce sur ces questions sensibles, bien qu'elles soient encore minoritaires. Au slogan largement diffusé (et dénié implicitement, bien qu'avec un grand retard, par le ministère des Affaires Etrangères¹⁹), „Il n'y a qu'une seule Macédoine et elle est grecque,“ a répondu l'affirmation: „La Macédoine grecque est grecque,“ que la revue *Politis* a mis en couverture dans son numéro d'Octobre-Décembre 1992.

A la formule désobligeante „l'Etat fallacieux de Skopje“ utilisée souvent par les media, riposte en permanence la rubrique régulière de Périclès Korovessis dans le quotidien *Eleftherotypia* que l'écrivain a choisi de sur-titrer: „Dans l'Etat fallacieux d'Athènes.“

Dans son introduction à l'édition grecque de certains de ses textes, Michael Löwy, après avoir rendu hommage aux intellectuels, étudiants et journalistes grecs qui résistent au climat ambiant, affirme: „Il est dommage que la position officielle nationaliste est la seule connue et diffusée par les medias internationaux, pendant qu'une partie de la gauche grecque élève la voix contre celle-ci en défendant le droit des Macédoniens de l'ex-Yougoslavie à l'auto-détermination.“²⁰

Le rôle de l'éducation

Le rôle de l'école est essentiel pour ne pas faire rimer identité culturelle et patriotisme avec ethnocentrisme et nationalisme au cours du processus de socialisation des jeunes générations. Et pour faire connaître aux enfants et aux jeunes la valeur des autres cultures, la légitimité de toutes les religions, la créativité de la contestation, le droit à la différence.

La révision des manuels scolaires constitue un puissant moyen dans ce sens²¹. Il est significatif que l'analyse des manuels scolaires des pays

¹⁹ C'est sur son intervention que le Service des Postes a retiré le tampon qui apposait ce slogan sur la correspondance publique et privée.

²⁰ M. Löwy, *La question nationale de Marx jusqu'à aujourd'hui* (Athènes: Éditions Stachy, 1993), p. 16.

²¹ Voir, entre autres, l'action de l'Unesco dans ce domaine et en particulier la série de brochures *Vers la compréhension internationale* qu'elle a publié à

balkaniques met en lumière aussi bien l'ethnocentrisme que la xenophobie -- en particulier envers le voisin balkanique. Depuis quelques années, certains chercheurs tentent l'analyse critique des manuels scolaires dans ces pays, en vue de démontrer les mécanismes de cet engrenage. Déjà en 1983, N. Achlis publiait à Salonique des résultats de recherches révélateurs.²² Il avait été précédé par A. Heraclides,²³ dont les travaux, publiés en anglais, n'avaient pas bénéficié d'une large diffusion en Grèce. D'autres chercheurs grecs, surtout des historiens mais pas uniquement (H. Bélia, Th. Katsoulakos et C. Tsantinis, Ev. Kofos, A. Konstantakopoulou, St. Pesmazoglou, E. Skopétéa, S. Vouri, plus particulièrement Christina Koulouri et Lina Ventouras) ont développé des recherches, pendant la dernière décennie, vers ces problèmes. Depuis 1985, je fais faire à mes étudiants, futurs enseignants, d'abord à Jannina, puis à Athènes, des travaux de recherche d'éléments d'ethnocentrisme dans les manuels scolaires grecs, avec des résultats intéressants.

Début 1992, Nadja Danova publiait un compte-rendu des travaux de recherches bulgares sur „L'image de l'autre dans les Balkans“²⁴ et faisait, par ailleurs, connaître la fondation à Sofia du Centre International pour les Etudes sur les Minorités et les Relations Interculturelles. En 1992, le professeur Panayotis Xochellis fonde à l'Université de Salonique une „Unité de Recherche sur les Manuels Scolaires“, dans laquelle se développent des recherches entreprises depuis quelques années sur ces thèmes. En 1994, cette Unité organise à Salonique un colloque sur les manuels scolaires des pays balkaniques dans lequel sont présentés des résultats de recherches portant, entre autres, sur l'image d'autrui dans les manuels grecs, turcs, bulgares, serbes. La même année, le Département de l'Education Pré-scolaire de l'Université d'Athènes a organisé à Delphes un colloque euro-

l'usage des éducateurs aux lendemains de la seconde guerre mondiale. Pour les comparatistes de l'éducation, la brochure XI de la série présente un intérêt spécial: J.A. Lauwerys, *Les manuels d'histoire et la compréhension internationale* (Paris: Unesco, 1953).

²² N. Achlis, *Bulgares et Turcs, peuples qui sont nos voisins, dans les manuels scolaires du Gymnase et du Lycée* (Salonique: Éd. Kyriakidis, 1983). (Publié dans une série d'Etudes et de Recherches en Education dirigée par les professeurs P.D. Xochellis, N.P. Terzis et A.G. Kapsalis).

²³ A. Heraclides, „Socializations to conflict,“ dans *The Greek Review of Social Research* 58 (January-April 1980), pp. 16-42.

²⁴ Dans *Etudes Balkaniques* 2 (1992), pp. 110-112.

péen sur le thème: „Ethnocentrisme et Education. Discriminations culturelles et système d'éducation national dans la nouvelle Europe.“ Un programme de recherche sur le thème „Représentations de l'“autre“ national dans le contexte du système d'enseignement grec“ se développe actuellement sous la direction de A.Frangoudaki et Th.Dragonas, professeurs au même Département. Un très intéressant livre au titre significatif sur les manuels scolaires yougoslaves est publié la même année à Belgrade.²⁵ D'importants travaux d'historiens bulgares (N.Danova, V.Dimova, E.Drosneva et autres) sur l'image de l'autre sont publiés dans les nos de 1994 des *Etudes Balkaniques*.

Les résultats de ces travaux sont saisissants. D'après les recherches de N.Achlis, sur 104 références aux Bulgares dans les manuels scolaires grecs, 60 (57,7%) étaient négatives, 41 (39,4%) neutres et 3 (2,9%) seulement positives. Dans ces mêmes manuels, sur 315 références aux Turcs, 191 (60,6%) étaient négatives, 120 (38,1%) neutres et seulement 4 (1,3%) positives. Il est par ailleurs significatif qu'une très grande partie de ces références (41,26% de celles qui concernent les Bulgares et 51,8% de celles qui concernent les Turcs) se rapportent au caractère supposé de ces voisins et à leur comportement.

Ces manuels scolaires ont été depuis remplacés. L'évolution positive qu'on constate dans ce domaine doit beaucoup au patient travail des chercheurs et de tous ceux qui refusent l'endoctrinement direct ou indirect des élèves. Mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire, car les images stéréotypées ont été longtemps cultivées par les uns et par les autres. L'historienne Nadja Danova fait remonter les stéréotypes bulgares concernant l'image des voisins balkaniques à l'*Histoire slavo-bulgare*, rédigée en 1762 par le moine Paisij, publiée pour la première fois en 1844 et diffusée largement depuis.²⁶

Déjà en 1927 était publiée une étude de Dimitri Glinos, un grand visionnaire et réformateur de l'éducation grec: „Enquête sur les livres

²⁵ R. Rosandic et V. Pesic, eds., *Warfare, Patriotism, Patriarchy. The analysis of elementary school textbooks* (Belgrade: Center for Anti-War Action and Association MOST, 1994).

²⁶ N. Danova, „L'image du grec dans la littérature bulgare (XVe-milieu du XIXe siècle),“ dans *Etudes Balkaniques* 2 (1994), pp. 15-40.

scolaires grecs," étude parue dans un volume collectif, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*.²⁷

Il s'agit d'une étude de fond basée sur l'analyse d'environ 80 livres scolaires de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire et d'une dizaine d'autres livres pour enfants et jeunes.

L'étude, composée d'une introduction et de trois chapitres (1. L'esprit de l'enseignement grec pendant le 19^e siècle et jusqu'aux guerres balkaniques, 2. Les livres scolaires de l'enseignement primaire de la Grèce pendant la période 1914-1917 et 3. Les livres scolaires de l'enseignement primaire de la Grèce de 1917 à 1926) se propose de donner l'image „des tendances idéologiques de l'enseignement grec développées consécutivement aux événements historiques des dernières décennies." En effet, l'analyse du contenu des livres est constamment reliée à l'évolution historique et politique de la Grèce et des Balkans et aux rapports changeants, sous l'influence des événements, entre pays balkaniques. Le nationalisme, les stéréotypes et l'ethnocentrisme, comme, par ailleurs, le patriotisme et l'humanisme, sont repérés dans les textes des livres scolaires. L'étude se termine sur ce paragraphe d'une inquiétante actualité:

„Si la pensée des philosophes, des scientifiques, de l'élite intellectuelle des peuples balkaniques réussit à transpercer les nuages constitués par les tensions politiques et ethniques cultivées souvent habilement par des tiers et si elle se penche sans préjugés et avec le souci de l'homme et de sa culture sur les problèmes actuels, elle contribuera à leur solution beaucoup plus efficacement que si elle se mettait au service des penchants aveugles et des passions qui ne peuvent qu'engendrer de nouveaux et inimaginables échecs aux peuples balkaniques souffrant depuis des siècles."²⁸

²⁷ Cf. M. Eliou, „Dimitri Glinos (1882-1943)," dans *Perspectives XXIII*, n° 87/88, dans *Penseurs de l'Education* 2 (1993), pp. 573-588.

²⁸ Nous avons traduit ce paragraphe du texte original en grec, jamais encore publié et qui sera compris dans le volume IV des *Oeuvres complètes* de D. Glinos en cours d'édition par Ph. Iliou. L'étude de Glinos a été publiée en traduction française dans: Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale. Direction des Relations et de l'Education, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*. Volume II (Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1927), épuisé dès 1928.

L'identité culturelle en tant qu'appel mobilisateur en vue d'un projet, est vérifiée dans certaines solidarités fondamentales qui permettent l'élaboration collective de processus d'action et de formes pertinentes d'expression.

Il y a une relation certaine entre les processus différenciateurs et l'élaboration collective de projets sociaux. La préservation et la création de différences constituent par elles-mêmes une contestation fondamentale de la concentration et de l'extension du pouvoir - de l'abus de pouvoir.²⁹ Ce n'est donc pas étonnant que le pouvoir ruse pour utiliser l'identité culturelle en vue de l'enfermement des forces contestataires. Il trouvera des alliés naturels parmi les forces sociales sécurisées par la répétition et le conformisme et qui se méfient, pour cette raison même, de ce qui peut menacer les anciens équilibres.

²⁹ On ne peut qu'évoquer le „combat titanesque,“ les „luttres qui se déroulent dans la pratique sociale et politique entre les 'pouvoirs homogénéisants' et les 'capacités différentielles' (Lefebvre, *Le manifeste différentialiste*, pp. 49 et 93).

EUROPEAN AND CULTURAL IDENTITY AT THE EUROPEAN, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS: FURTHER COMPARISONS

Nigel Grant

The Question of Identity

The increasing internationalization in many countries of institutions and habits, from European integration to what we eat and drink, has been accompanied in recent years by the self-reassertion of cultural and linguistic minorities. In Eastern Europe, for example, we have seen a „revival of nationalism,” which many have seen as a liberating development. But, unsurprisingly, this has its negative side. In some countries, like Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany, demands for national rights can slip over into the centuries-old and familiar tendency to deny everyone else's. Virulent anti-Slav sentiment (and action too) has raised its head in Germany, where overt anti-Semitism is on the increase, as it is in Russia and elsewhere in the east. It is clear that the appeal of nationalism has grown to fill the void left by state communism or Stalinism; „proletarian internationalism” does not seem to have gone deep in the consciousness of the post-war generation.

These can be found in the west as well. Extremist and violent forms of self-assertion, such as the IRA or the ETA in the Basque Country, are confined to small minorities. But they are not typical of them, any more than the British National Party in the UK, or the *Front National* in France, the *Fuerza Nueva* in Spain or the German *Republikaner* are typical of the majorities. Most of the anti-centrist, home rule or cultural revival move-

ments -- not always the same thing -- express their aspirations within a wider international framework. In the United Kingdom, both the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru campaign for independence within Europe; many other Scots and Welsh, not going that far, are pressing for home rule, with the EU as a counterbalance to the central power of Westminster. Many Catalans, Basques and Galicians see their future as autonomous communities in Spain, with the EU providing a counterpoise to Madrid.

The mood that seems to affect such movements is not exclusively „separatist,” indeed, this aspect may be absent. In Scotland, for instance, support for the SNP is, at the time of writing (1994), more than that of the Conservatives (33% as against 11% when last polled);¹ but support for home rule is massive, over 80 %, including some Conservative voters. „Separatism” is not the only form of self-assertion by minorities. The essential aim appears to be for control over one's own affairs, and access to the wider world in one's own right.

Naturally, there are cultural aspects to this tendency. One of these involves language, one of the chief „markers” of identity for any group, and education, one of the most potent forces in helping or hindering a language's survival or development. It is not the only one; the role of the media, publishing, the arts, mobility in or out of the area, economic and demographic pressures, can also be crucial. In Wales and Catalonia, for example, the strong position of the languages in the media, the arts and the professions has contributed much to their present position. So has education; indeed, it seems to have been decisive in the growth of the number of children speaking Welsh in the anglophone south, and in helping to revive the status of Catalan and to enable the children of non-Catalan-speaking immigrants to learn it.² It must also be remembered, however, that the imposition of exclusive Castilian during the Franco years did not manage to kill Catalan off.

¹ *Glasgow Herald*, 23 August 1994, or any paper around this time.

² J. McNair, „The Contribution of the Schools to the Restoration of Regional Autonomy in Spain,” in *Comparative Education* 16 (1) (1980), pp. 33-54; N. Grant & J. Docherty, „Language Policy and Education: Some Scottish-Catalan Comparisons,” in *Comparative Education* 28 (2) (1992), pp. 145-166.

Markers of Identity

All cultures have many distinctive features in the complex of characteristics that make them up. Cultures not under pressure have no particular need to focus on any of them as irreducible. But even cultural contact can create the need to decide which aspects of another culture to adopt, even at the cost of replacing that aspect of one's own – dress, for example. Cultures struggling to survive are likely to fix on a limited number of characteristics – let us call them *markers*³ which seem to their members essential to indicate their identity. The most common seem to be:

1. *Religion*. For many people, and peoples, religion is their primary marker. It not only prescribes their ceremonies, rituals, even diet, it provides the basis for their social and moral values. Even individuals who have come to reject the theology may continue to identify with the group, and even comply with its observances. Expressions like „I may be an atheist, but I'm a Protestant atheist" are rather more than a joke. Parallels may be found in many other religions.

Important though religion may be, few groups identify themselves primarily by religious affiliation. In medieval times, the great divide was between Christianity, Islam and Judaism. (Allegiance played a part too, but nationality -- except for an awkward squad like the Scots⁴ -- did not reach its heyday till the 18th century.) There are some examples in the contemporary world, all of which have educational implications, ranging from opportunities for religious observance, dietary and social needs and even special schooling „suffused" by the values of the faith.

For example, Jews are, of course, not a „racial" group but a heterogeneous religious-cultural one. The long history of persecution, mainly religious, culminated in modern anti-Semitism and Nazi racism. Many non-observing Jews still identify with the culture, or aspects of it. In some countries, Jewish schools are available, or religious instruction may be offered by a visiting rabbi, or instruction may be offered in the synagogue. Respect for and aspiration to formal learning is prominent among many

³ The term „*markers*" is my own. Smolicz uses „underpinning values" in much the same way, but suggests more content than markers usually have.

⁴ The Scots declared in the Declaration of Arbroath to the Pope in 1320 that their own rights as a nation overrode those of the King.

European and North American Jews, partly because they were banned from other occupations in the past.

Catholics in Northern Ireland are the descendants of the native Irish population, while the Protestant majority are descended from the Scots and English planted in Ulster by James VI and I and his successors (notably Cromwell). Catholics and Protestants have separate school systems, characterized not only by the teaching of their respective creeds but of their distinctive interpretations of history. „Catholic” and „Protestant” (or „Nationalist” and „Unionist”) are the main markers for the two communities standing for a much more complex historical identity, but can be doubted if the late, often murderous, struggle could properly be called religious at all; one does not hear of attempts to convert anyone.

Muslims in Europe may use the country of origin, or some may accept the designation „black” if that is the kind of discrimination they have most often met. At times of crisis (the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War), the religious identity may be uppermost, and educational demands may range, at one end of the scale, from the opportunity to pray, wear their own national dress (especially for girls), and eat *Hallal* food, to separate Muslim schools at the other. It would seem that most Muslims in Europe do not want separate schooling, but are more inclined to press for attention to their religious and cultural needs within the school system.

Sikhs in Europe and North America do not generally demand separate schooling or even religious instruction, preferring to leave that to the *gurdwara*. Demands on the school system may include the availability of Punjabi, but tend to concentrate on freedom from discrimination and the right wear the distinctive dress. The turban is not a religious requirement, but the uncut hair -- *kesh* -- is.

Nationality is a useful shorthand for what might be termed historical identity, institutions, custom; it may exist quite independent of citizenship (and usually is, in the case of minorities), or language or religion. Some groups, not necessarily distinguished by language, nonetheless feel themselves different because of their historical experience, institutions, social ethos and other aspects of their culture. This again has implications for education, for it may affect attitudes to educational policy, pedagogy, and the content of such subjects as history, geography, literature and the arts. Some sovereign nations are in this position: the Canadians are not Americans, the Austrians and the German-speaking Swiss are not Germans.

Among the minorities, the most obvious examples are the smaller nationalities in the United Kingdom, the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish, none of whom is English.

2. „Race.“ This is, of course, not a scientific concept at all, and is based on much more trivial characteristics than the above, a small range of physical differences to which some people attach importance. Some accept classification as „black“ or whatever the majority call them. Other cultural markers may be associated with this, such as religion, but not necessarily.

3. *Language.* This can be so intimately bound up with identity as often to define it. It does not stand alone, but the way we speak, and thus order our thoughts and feelings, is a fundamental way of defining who we are. Multilingualism is the norm in most countries; indeed, a linguistically homogeneous country is hard to find. It is much easier to find countries whose governments behave as if they were homogeneous, which can make reliable figures hard to obtain. France has several substantial minorities, but no official figures are published.⁵ One therefore has to rely on the figures produced by the cultural lobbies, which may not be objective. This illustrates one kind of difficulty over data; governments and pressure groups alike may let the figures, if any, be colored by their own wishes.

Another difficulty lies in the imprecision of data because of unclear questions. The 1991 Census in Scotland, for example, asked four questions about Gaelic: respondents were asked to tick the appropriate boxes if they could speak, read and write Gaelic, or if they did not know Gaelic.⁶ But since nothing was asked about levels of competence, the figures are at best an approximation. (Answers can also be biased by individual perception. It is likely that some respondents might deny or exaggerate their knowledge, according to their view of the language's standing. The choice was between knowing and not knowing, and even a

⁵ M. Stephens, *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe* (Llandysyl: Gomer Press, 1977); P. Sérant, *La France des minorités* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965); P. Denez, *The Future of the Celtic Nations within the EEC* (Edinburgh: Institut Français d'Ecosse, 1984).

⁶ *Census 1981 Scotland: Gaelic Report* (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1983). The figures for the 1991 Census were not available at the time of writing. See also N. Grant, „Gaelic in Education: Needs and Possibilities,“ in *Modern Languages in Scotland* 27 (January 1985), pp. 141-150.

little is more than none.) We therefore have to make allowances for whatever figures are available.

This article does not make extensive use of statistics, nor does it make any claims to completeness; that would be a much longer exercise. It attempts merely 1) to describe and categorize the main kinds of linguistic situations in the modern world; 2) to categorize the types of response, in policy and practice, to these situations; and 3) to identify some general trends and suggest some guidelines for what we hope will provide the basis for a democratic 21st century.

Linguistic Situations: An Attempted Categorization

The linguistic compositions of various societies tend to overlap and blend, but it may prove useful to categorize them as below. Naturally, there are also marginal cases.

1) *Homogeneous societies* are those without significant linguistic minorities or major varieties of language. Norway, for example, does not count, not only because of the small Saami (Lapp) minority, but because the Norwegian language itself has several distinctive forms. Homogeneous societies are rare and often small, such as Iceland, the Faeroes, San Marino, Liechtenstein and Burundi. But there are some bigger ones, like certain Arab states.

2) *Small minority*. These are societies where identifiable minorities exist within their own areas (thus forming local majorities, but where the majority language is dominant in society as a whole). Some of these groups are very small, absolutely and proportionally. Examples include the Sorbs in Germany, the Gaels in the Scottish Gàidhealtachd, the Saami (Lapps) in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, and the Frisians in the Netherlands and Germany. Also small, though a majority elsewhere, are the „overspill” peoples in Europe, such as the Slovenes in Austria, the Danes in Germany and the Germans in Denmark, Italy and Belgium.⁷ Others are more substantial. The Hungarian minority in Romania (the *Magyar Székelyi* of Transylvania) number about two million. In Spain, where there are well-defined areas of Basques, Galicians, Andalucians and

⁷ Stephens, *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe*.

Catalans, the last of these numbering something like six million. There are Catalans and Basques in France also, together with the Latin Occitans and Corsicans, the Celtic Bretons, the Dutch speakers of Artois (Westhoek) and the German-speakers of Alsace. The same holds good for the minorities in Turkey (Kurds and Armenians), in Iran (Kurds, Bakhtiari and the Arabs of Khuzestan), and in Ethiopia (Somalis, Galla, Tigré and others), for their existence is hardly recognized at all, except when forced by armed uprising.

Turkey does not allow the appellation „Kurd”; they have to be called „mountain Turks,” though linguistically they are not Turkish at all. Even the possession of a Kurdish book or cassette was a crime until recently, when the Turkish authorities, in a sudden access of liberalism, decreed that it was no longer an offense for them to speak their own language among themselves.

This category would also include some Latin American countries where the indigenous groups are numerous, such as the Guaraní in Paraguay and the Quechua and Aymará in Bolivia and Peru.⁸ In one sense, the USSR qualified too. Minorities ranged in size from a few hundreds to over 50 millions. The breakup of the Soviet Union has rearranged rather than resolved the issue.⁹

3) *Dispersed minority*. This kind of minority may have certain areas of concentration, like Gaels in parts of Glasgow or West Indians in parts of London, but nowhere form a distinct local majority. Many dispersed minorities are the legacy of former colonial or dependent relations, a common pattern being the recruitment of workers from the dependent territories, who settle and are later joined by their families. This was the origin of the settlement of West Indians and Asians in the UK, Algerians, Moroccans and Vietnamese in France, and Indonesians in the Netherlands. The circumstances that brought groups of Greenlanders to Denmark and

⁸ P. Trudgill, *Sociolinguistics: An Introduction* (Penguin, 1974), pp. 147ff.

⁹ *Naselenie SSSR po dannym perepisi 1979 goda* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980). See also N. Grant, „Linguistic and Ethnic Minorities in the USSR: Educational Policies and Developments,” in J.J. Tomiak, ed., *Soviet Education in the 1980s* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 24-49; N. Grant, „Soviet Education -- The Last Phase,” in *Compare* 22 (1) (1992), pp. 69-80; and N. Grant, „Chapter 4” in Michael Kirkwood, ed., *Language Planning in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1989).

Hispanics to the USA were slightly more complex, but the relationship was broadly similar. In certain cases, the settled majority can fill a substantial niche and grow to the point where it comes close to being a majority itself, as with the Indians in Fiji and the Chinese in Malaysia. More recent has been the coming of the *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) to the more prosperous parts of Europe, like Germany, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland from poorer countries like Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰ There is a good deal of internal migration also, especially in Italy, where the cultural differences between north and south are still wide. Internal migrant minorities remain citizens of the same country, but the *Gastarbeiter* do not. (Just to press the point, some official German publications have taken to calling them *Ausländer*, or foreigners.) The assumption underlying this attitude is that they will go back to Turkey or wherever eventually. This is unrealistic, however, and the authorities in some countries are caught between policies of mother-tongue maintenance in schools (to equip the children to return to their homeland) and attempts to assimilate (which would imply permanent residence).

Dispersed minorities are particularly vulnerable as far as language maintenance is concerned. Even if they have areas of concentration in certain towns, the main linguistic environment will be that of the majority language, spoken and written, and their own language will lack some of the social support that even small minorities can expect when they have their own geographical areas. Consequently, the role of the school is particularly important.

4) *Large minority.* In some cases, the minorities are large enough to have an impact on national policies. The classic example is Canada, where French speakers are a substantial local majority in one Province, namely Quebec. (Indeed, Quebec is officially a francophone province, despite its sizable English-speaking minority, and Ontario, with a large French-speaking minority, is officially Anglophone. The only officially bilingual

¹⁰ H. Steedman, „The Education of Migrant Workers' Children in EEC Countries: From Assimilation to Cultural Pluralism,“ in *Comparative Education* 15 (3) (1979), pp. 251-268.

province is New Brunswick, though its French-speaking population is much smaller than that of Ontario.)¹¹

Generally, the large minorities tend to have strong geographical bases, which carries further implications for social and educational policy at local and national level

5) *Pluralist or fragmented*. The first of these sounds more positive, but either describes the situation in some countries where the population is so diverse that no group comes near to having majority or even dominant status. Among other things, this precludes the identification of any one indigenous national language. The situation arose from the way these countries were created. With very few exceptions, modern African states are the successors of former colonial territories, and these were defined by lines drawn on a map in Berlin by politicians who knew little of the people who actually lived there, and cared less. Hence, the peoples of northern Nigeria have more in common with their neighbors in Chad than with their compatriots in the south. This is typical of most of black Africa, and will remain; politicians of all persuasions regard their present frontiers as sacrosanct, since any redrawing of the boundaries along ethnic lines could lead to the breakup of most states.¹²

Very occasionally, one language has proved viable and acceptable. Burundi is highly unusual in being almost homogeneous; Kirundi is spoken by Watutsi and Bahutu alike, whatever their other differences might be, as recently in next-door Rwanda. Occasionally, again, a viable indigenous *lingua franca* may be found. Hausa, for example, is acceptable throughout northern Nigeria and in many neighboring states as well, but not in the south. Swahili, originally the Arabized Bantu language of the slave-traders of Zanzibar, long enjoyed wide currency as a trade language of East Africa. In Tanzania, where the fragmentation of the country is much more extreme than in Kenya or Uganda, Kiswahili has been adopted as the

¹¹ D. Dorotich & W. Stephan, „Multicultural education in Canada and Yugoslavia,” in T.E. Corner, ed., *Education in Multicultural Societies* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 96-116; R. Edwards, „Language Politics and Ethnicity as Educational Variables: The Quebec Case,” in *Compare* 8 (1) (1978), pp. 15-30; M. Lupul, „Multiculturalism and Educational Policies in Canada,” *ibid*, pp. 45-50.

¹² M. Bray, „Education, National Unity and Cultural Pluralism in Nigeria,” in T.E. Corner, *Education in Multicultural Societies*, pp. 235-246.

national language. It was already widely used, and has the advantage of being African but not the prerogative of any particular people. (By contrast, major languages like Kigikuyu in Kenya or Luganda in Uganda would not be acceptable, because of their association with single -- and powerful -- tribes.) The position of Swahili, however, is exceptional; most post-colonial African countries consist of minorities, and for a combination of demographic and political reasons are denied any common indigenous medium.¹³

Policies and Practices

Policies range from total imposition of the majority language to complete equality of all languages. Needless to say, declared policy and actual practice do not always match. Again, policies may overlap or display ambiguities, but an attempt is made here to move towards a classification.

1) *Unitary policies* ignore or suppress minority languages, recognizing only the minority one in education and other forms or social activity.

Until recently, this was by far the most common response, and was often carried out with the acquiescence of parents from minority groups themselves. In some cases it was merely yielding to *force majeure*, but more often it was often thought to be to the children's advantage. If English or French or whatever was the language of opportunity, children would have to learn it to get on; and since the notion of the „bilingual deficit“ was almost universally accepted until recently, it was assumed that even knowing the majority language would hinder acquisition of the majority one.

There are not many countries that take this position now, at least openly. Thailand and Malaysia do,¹⁴ but more as an objective than a policy; perforce, they have to accept pluralism for the moment, if only as a transitional stage. Turkey, as we have seen, refuses to recognize that the minorities exist at all. The United Kingdom, the United States and France pursued unitary policies openly until fairly recently, but have modified

¹³ J. Dakin, B. Tiffen & H.G. Widdowson, *Language in Education* (Oxford: UP, 1968).

¹⁴ K. Watson, „Cultural Pluralism in the ASEAN Countries of Southeast Asia,“ in Corner, *Education in Multiultural Societies*.

them. France, indeed, was the classic example of centrist and unitary policies; it is not all that long since new teachers posted to Brittany, for example, were told by the *inspecteur d'académie* that their principal task was to kill the Breton language.¹⁵ Spain under Franco was another clear case; only Castilian could be used in the schools, all other languages being forbidden.¹⁶

2) *Concessionary policies* might be described as still essentially unitary but with some allowances, usually minimal and grudging, towards the minority languages. Until recently Scotland could with no great unfairness be placed in this category. There has been a shift to a more supportive policy – even backed by money – since about 1985. In France, nowadays, it is possible to study minority languages as school *subjects* but not to use them as teaching *media*. Even this concession is hedged about with difficulties. It is not possible, for example, to train as a teacher of Breton; one must train as a teacher of something else first, and then offer Breton as an extra.¹⁷

3) *Pluralist policies* involve the recognition of minority languages for a wide range of purposes, including their use as media of instruction. In practice, implementation varies from grudging acceptance through tokenism to (sometimes) active encouragement. Practice varies a great deal; but at the level of policy we can identify those which require the learning of a common medium as well, and those which do not.

4) *Pluralist policies with a common medium required.* An educational system may permit the use of minority languages, both as subjects of study and as teaching media, but require the teaching of a common national language as well. A good example of this was the USSR, where the minority languages were accorded various degrees of status in the educational system (from the availability of the whole range of educational provision down to a little oral work in the primary classes, depending largely on numbers).¹⁸

¹⁵ Stephens, *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe*; Denez, *The Future of the Celtic Nations*.

¹⁶ McNair, „The Contribution of the Schools to the Restoration of Regional Autonomy in Spain;“ Grant & Docherty, „Language Policy and Education.“

¹⁷ Denez, *The Future of the Celtic Nations*.

¹⁸ Grant, „Linguistic and Ethnic Minorities in the USSR.“

Spain, since the death of Franco and the restoration of democracy, has revived the devolved governments of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia; the minority tongues are now allowed, and the regional governments strongly encourage them in the schools and elsewhere. But Castilian, designated in the Constitution as the national language of all Spain (and which all Spaniards have a duty to learn) has to be taught as well.¹⁹ The same applies to Danish schools in Germany and German schools in Denmark. In most countries where the minority language has a role in the schools, the national language still retains a prime position.

5) *Pluralist policies without a common medium* are much less usual, and are normally formed where there is a delicate political and demographic balance (as in Belgium), or a loose federal structure (as in Switzerland). In Belgium, where the main tension has been between the speakers of French and Dutch, there are now designated areas where the schools teach in one language and provide the other as a subject. As a side-effect of this compromise, German speakers in border areas like Eupen also have schools in their own language. About 75% of all Swiss speak German; although one language does have a clear majority, the looseness of the Confederation ensures that each Canton uses its own language. Thus, four languages have equal official status – German, French, Italian and Rumansch. Most Swiss learn German and French anyway.

6) *Importation* of a national medium occurs when the linguistic composition of the population is so fragmented that no viable indigenous medium exists at all. Politics notwithstanding, this is generally the language of the former colonial power, for purely practical reasons. Thus, English is used in most African ex-imperial territories, French in former French and Belgian possessions and Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau. The advantage of using the former imperial language is, of course, that it is tribally neutral; the disadvantage (apart from its being alien in the first place) that adequate mastery of it, in a country with limited educational resources, may be confined to an urban, educated elite, thus widening the gap between the rulers and the ruled.

¹⁹ P.E. Russell, ed., *Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies* (London: Methuen, 1973); John Hooper, *The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain* (Penguin, 1987).

7) *Revivalist policies* may include attempts to restore a historic language to reinforce national identity. Sanskrit is one of the languages recognized by the Indian Constitution, though only a few thousand claim to speak it. (Even this is surprisingly high, since it is claimed as a *mother-tongue* by a group consisting almost entirely of men.) Ireland, similarly, gives special recognition to Irish, though *native* speakers are a tiny proportion of the population; perhaps 20% have learned it to a reasonable degree of competence.²⁰ In public life, however its use is still largely symbolic.

The revival of Finnish is rather different, for it had never ceased to be the spoken language of the majority. What centuries of foreign rule did was to make Swedish (and later, Russian) the official and elite language, reducing Finnish to the status of a despised peasant tongue. As elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Romania), nationalist intellectuals during the 19th century strove to give the language literary status, and political independence confirmed the trend. Swedish is still spoken in some parts of Finland; but there is no doubting its continued weakness, and the strength that Finnish has acquired this century in all walks of life, partly at least as a result of the efforts of the educational system.

Developments in Israel were different again. Hebrew had been replaced by Aramaic, then Yiddish and Ladino. Hebrew continued to be studied as a sacred and scholarly language, but was not spoken until attempts were made to revive it by the modern Zionist movement. The political and educational efforts of the Zionists may have played some part in restoring Hebrew as a spoken language, but the mixed composition on the new state of Israel was probably decisive.

There are a few other cases that come near this category. At any rate, they are examples of governments, using the educational system as well as the bureaucracy, trying to revive or create a more „authentic” form of the language; usually, this has involved developing a contemporary version if

²⁰ D. Fennel, „Can a Shrinking Linguistic Minority Be Saved? Lessons from the Irish Experience” in F. Haugen, J.D. McClure & D. Thomson, eds., *Minority Languages Today* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1981), pp. 32-39. D. Corkery, *The Fortunes of the Irish Language* (Cork: Ercier, 1968). R. Bell & N. Grant, *Patterns of Education in the British Isles* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977).

the spoken language by standardizing it, devising the necessary new vocabulary, etc. In Norway, independence from Denmark stimulated the standardization of the various rural dialects (known collectively as *Landsmål* or country speech) and creating *Nynorsk* (new Norwegian) to be as distinctive as possible from *Riksmål* (government language) or *Bokmål* (literary language), a form very close to Danish, except in pronunciation.²¹ In Iceland, Icelandic was spoken continuously from the time of the original Norse settlement, but in modern times Danish was the language of education and officialdom until Iceland declared independence during the Second World War. Icelandic was raised to official status, deriving its legitimacy from being the spoken language of the people and being very close to the authentic Norse of the sagas, having changed very little over the centuries, unlike the main Scandinavian languages.²²

Modern Greece presents a curious development. By the time of independence in the 19th century and the various wars to settle the borders in the 20th, the Greek language had moved a long way from the *Koiné* of Roman times, itself a version of the classical Attic form. Grammar had been simplified, pronunciation drastically modified, vocabulary altered in significant respects. Also, lacking official status, it had fragmented into a variety of local dialects. Cultural nationalism of the 19th century produced two tendencies: one was to create a common popular form, *demotiki*, based on the spoken language, and the other produced a „purified” form, *katharevousa*, somewhat closer to the classical (though still with modern pronunciation). By the 20th century, the two had reached a kind of symbiosis; *katharevousa* was used in official documents and publications, and most newspapers. No one actually spoke it conversationally, but it was used for lectures and formal orations. *Demotiki* was used by all classes for creative writing, and by the left-wing press. This uneasy co-existence lasted until the Colonels’ coup in the 1970s, when the regime decided that only it was to be used officially and educationally, and that much more classical Greek was to be taught as well. The fall of the Colonels produced a reaction, and *demotiki* was made the official

²¹ Trudgill, *Sociolinguistics*.

²² E.V. Gordon, *An Introduction to Old Norse* (Oxford, 1927 & 1974). M.O.C. Walshe, *Introduction to the Scandinavian Languages* (London: Deutsch, 1965).

language. The occasional traditional form still creeps in.²³ This is an unusual example of governments of different complexions trying to create „authentic” national languages -- one traditional, one popular.²⁴ Whatever the differences, each case involved the use of legislation, bureaucracy and education to change a country's actual use of language.

From this, a number of general trends emerge. Unitary policies seem to be in decline, at least as openly stated positions. This *could* be because of growing skepticism about the notion of the „bilingual deficit,” but it seems more likely to be the result of political pressure from the minority groups themselves. The shift has been from unitary to concessionary policies, rather than genuinely pluralist ones. Bilingualism and multiculturalism are still regarded as rather a nuisance by national bureaucracies, and response to stated government policies is often minimal and reluctant. There has been some shift in Scotland with regard to Gaelic, but not Scots. There appears to be some correlation not only between language revival and the resurgence of national identity, which would hardly be surprising;²⁴ but there seems also to be a connection with growing *internationalism*, which on the face of it is rather more surprising. One hypothesis to explain this is that contemporary internationalism is of a different kind from its 19th-century precursor. The earlier form assumed only *one* culture, including the language, prevailing over others, usually through some kind of colonial expansion. From this, a unitary viewpoint followed logically enough. The most recent forms, however, are *supranational* in circumstances where no one culture or language prevails. (The EU is the classic example, but not the only one.) In one sense, this weakens the homogeneous nation-state internationally, by taking certain powers to a level where none is supreme. Consequently, nation-states have to accept some degree of pluralism at the international level. In the EU, even the English, French and Germans are minorities.

Another factor has been the growth of *imported* multiculturalism within many nation-states as a result of immigration or Gastarbeiter, the second generation of whom are less prepared than their parents to accept simple integration (largely because of the discrimination encountered by many on

²³ Trudgill, *Sociolinguistics*.

²⁴ B. Kay, *The Mother Tongue* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1982). Bell & Grant, *Patterns of Education in the British Isles*.

grounds of race). Many of them assert their own identity as a reaction to this.

The growing size of supranational groupings (formal and informal) and the acceptance of pluralism by national governments at the international level, can strengthen the desire of minorities to assert their own identity at the *national* level. Viewed thus, the minority revival can be seen not as a contradiction to the growth of internationalism, but as a logical development. They are two sides of the same coin.

The Center and the Periphery

A common perception is that minorities are „peripheral,” not only geographically, but in importance and concern. The „center-periphery” model requires closer consideration. True, many minority peoples are on the periphery of Europe, of their own nation-states, as a glance at the map will indicate. On this model, the Scots and the Gaels in Scotland, the Northern Irish, the Bretons, the Basques, the Galicians, the people of the Italian Mezzogiorno, the Sicilians and the Sards, the Occitans, the Corsicans and the Frisians could be regarded as Europe-peripheral. Additionally, the Dutch of Westhoek, the Alsations, the Catalans (both in France and Spain), the Welsh, the Valdotains and the Friulans in Italy (plus the inhabitants of the Alto Adige), the Germans in Belgium, the Danes in Germany and the Germans in Denmark, etc., are nation-state peripheral. In either case, they are likely to be further from the center of power, wealth and decision-making than the majority peoples, and are often liable to cultural domination, sometimes enforced.

But it is not always as simple as that; the Catalans and the Basques in Spain (unlike their counterparts in France) enjoy a higher living standard than the rest of the country, have relatively vigorous economies, and have considerable control over their own cultural affairs. Also, „peripheral” peoples do not always see themselves as such. Few Scots now see London as the center of the universe, and there are few in Barcelona or Florence who feel the slightest need to acknowledge the cultural supremacy of Madrid or Rome. For most of us, since the centralized nation-state began to weaken under the pressures of internationalization, the center is where we are standing.

But most of us are also aware of the macroeconomic realities. There are not many working in British higher education who are unaware of the baleful dominance of the „golden triangle” of Oxford, Cambridge and London. It is still difficult to shake, but at least there are fewer outsiders who accept the inevitable rightness of this. The dominance of Paris in French cultural life is not seriously challenged, though one of the more positive outcomes of political division in Germany was to prevent its being dominated by one center, be it Berlin or Bonn. In most countries, though, the capital still tends to dominate. In Denmark, itself uneasy about encroachments on sovereignty (and possible domination by Germany), the primacy of Copenhagen is clear. Even nation-states outside the European „golden triangle” of Paris-Amsterdam-Bonn can feel some disquiet at the danger of being marginalized.

Peripherality is a complex phenomenon. It unquestionably exists, but the perceptions of those involved can be highly ambivalent.

Democracy and Pluralism: An Agenda for the 21st century

Language. It is of course nonsense to claim that some language are *intrinsically* incapable of handling the vocabulary required for education; all languages, including English and Russian, have had to create vocabularies to meet new needs, as did Latin and Greek in their day. But some minority tongues, having been limited in the register of use, have difficulties in developing in certain fields, without being swamped by foreign material. (This almost happened to English between the 11th and 14th centuries.) Some languages, like Catalan, have little problem here, having a long-standing literary and established use in every register. Others, like Basque and Breton, had little literature until the 19th century. Others again, like Gaelic and Scots, have ancient literature (and some great poetry), but little expository prose.²⁵ For some languages, there is a developmental task to be undertaken as well as an educational one.

Almost all minority languages have a history of oppression, later changing to neglect and even encouragement. In Britain, there has been some move in this direction in the last fifty years, though more in the case of Welsh than Gaelic or Scots. France's departure from linguistic genocide

²⁵ Fennel, „Can a Shrinking Linguistic Minority Be Saved?”

has been recent and possibly reluctant. Spain saw modification of the ferocious policy of Castilianization; but real encouragement had to wait for Franco's death, the restoration of democracy and the reinstatement of minority languages in the curriculum, and the effectiveness of their promotion, is not altogether separate from political commitment. But the Irish experience suggests that this, of itself, does not *guarantee* anything.

Culture -- history, literature, geography, arts. In most countries, it is taken as axiomatic that whatever else children learn, it must include basic knowledge of and feeling for these aspects of their own culture and identity. In the case of minorities, however, this has rarely been the case; for much of modern times, the French, Spanish and British states have used their control of the curriculum to focus on the center and marginalize or even exclude the minorities. A centralized system makes this easier to do, and it requires a shift of power or a change of heart to alter it; this has been the Spanish experience. In Great Britain, which has never had a centrally controlled curriculum, mechanisms have been more subtle. (The so-called „national curriculum” actually applies to England and Wales only.) Other mechanisms, however, especially the economics of publishing, have led to considerable Anglicization of the Scottish curriculum. This is especially true of history. Scottish history is taught in some schools, but this is usually succeeded by „British” (which usually means English) history. Apart from dependent territories, the Scots must be almost the only people whose children learn more about someone else's history than their own.

Some correction is called for here. In countries like Ireland and Catalonia, this has been done.

Needless to say, this has to be done within a European and international context. Given the will and the expertise, it is entirely possible to teach one's own history, literature and culture, and those of neighbors and something of the general European framework; countries like Denmark do this quite well, largely because the Danes are aware of being a small country with big neighbors, and know that understanding both their own culture and others' is essential if they are to be themselves, rather than pale copies of someone else, in an inevitably multicultural world.

Commitment to the European dimension in languages and culture carries the danger of assuming that this takes international concern far enough. But a Eurocentric curriculum will not meet the needs of future generations much more than an Anglocentric or Francocentric one did in

the heyday of the 19th-century nation-state. Europe is not the world, but part of an interdependent world system. If the curriculum cannot give *some* understanding of non-European cultures as well, it will be serving future generations ill. It is not only that these cultures are part of our own world; they are part of our own countries now, as well. Unless we can address the cultural need of the various people in our midst, accord them proper recognition and learn from them, the future is bleak indeed. The increase in racist activity in Europe is a salutary reminder of the dangers that all societies, in the Union and beyond, face.


The barriers sealing in the nation-states of the 18th and 19th centuries have been becoming increasingly porous. The creation of the European Union has been an important factor, but there are many others -- the huge increase in travel since the Second World War, multinational production of films and TV, the growth of information technology, the internationalization of so many of our institutions and economies -- which make it difficult to think of a single center in politics, economics and education any more. Minorities in particular are grasping the idea of multiple identity. If it is possible to be, say, British or Spanish *and* European, there is no need to stop there: one can be Highland *and* Scots *and* British *and* European. It is hardly a marginal issue; something like 40 million in the EU speak „Lesser-used Languages,“ an odd term meaning minorities, and if the countries in the waiting-room are admitted there will be many more, for as we have seen culturally homogeneous countries are rare, whatever some governments pretend.

But it has to be remembered that simple majority decision is not necessarily democratic. There are grave dangers that some minorities, having rearranged the map to make themselves majorities in their own areas, will mete out the same treatment to others (whether members of the former majority or not) as they themselves suffered under the old dispensation. It has happened countless times before, as in Hungary after the *Ausgleich* in the 19th century or in Northern Ireland in this. Northern Ireland is a telling example of what can happen when simple majoritarianism is applied. In the early 20th century the majority of Irish wanted home rule, but this was unacceptable to the Protestant community, who were concentrated in part of the province of Ulster. The Partition Treaty, imposed by the British government, detached six of Ulster's nine counties and created a mini-state, the largest possible in which the Protestant Unionists could form a

majority and dominate the local minority. We are just trying to deal with this problem after years of violence. This is not democracy, but tribalism. Of course education must instil pride in one's own nation's achievements, but it will have to sensitize young people to the rights of others in an inevitably pluralist world.

All this suggests more tasks for the curriculum, and time is limited. People are capable of learning more than was formerly thought, but pressure on time is bound to force selectivity of material. We can recognize that one's learning needs for a lifetime cannot any more be met by a once-off process in childhood or youth, it will have to be a recurrent process, and we could give more thought to providing the tools for future learning in a system of *éducation permanente*. This should include understanding of the facts and nature of cultural diversity, and the strands that link cultures in a common human framework. No one pretends that this is easy, but it has to be tried, and tried hard. The alternative can be seen (at the time of writing) in Bosnia. Education for pluralism is an essential precondition -- and it is only one -- if the 21st century is to be worth living in.

Map 1: Europe-Peripheral and State-Peripheral Minorities



EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERCULTURAL CURRICULA

Jagdish Gundara

Social Diversity and European Institutions

The two European organizations which have had an impact on the educational developments which relate to social diversity in European society are the Council of Europe and the European Community. Their impact on national educational policies has, however, been limited because the European states have not allowed these organizations to interfere in the educational domain, which is seen as only being part of the national jurisdiction.

The Council of Europe and the European Community have focused on issues revolving around social diversity, through their concerns about the education of „migrants.“ The migrations which informed these policies started in the late 1950s when the de-colonization process began to gather momentum.

The Council of Europe began to survey the position of „migrant“ children's education in 1966. During each subsequent year resolutions were adopted by the Council on different aspects of the education of „migrant“ families. This process culminated in the launch of a five year „Project No. 7“ in 1980. The European Community developed a program in the 1970s, and it also initiated discussions about education of „migrant“ workers, and issued a directive to this effect in 1977. While the Council of Europe has increasingly focused on an intercultural approach to education, the underlying assumption appears to be that the European nation-states

are cohesive and coherent. What has so far developed in relation to educational policies, such as they are, is a response at the wider European level which does not take into account the underlying diverse natures of European societies. It instead focuses in on the immigrant dimension and ignores how, for instance, educational policies for immigrants ought to be formulated in the context of general educational policies which include indigenous European minorities and policies towards their education. There is also an absence of engagement with the educative role which the education systems can or should play. The concerns however ought to be broader than merely those raised by presence of the immigrant communities.

At the present time the governance of nations, particularly in Europe, has become an extremely problematic issue. The rise of instability is made worse by the ways in which economic decline in many areas of Europe is leading to a rise in tensions and a disintegration of communities. Where these communities are diverse the tensions are greater. The development of narrow nationalisms east of the Elbe has had dangerous consequences in the western European context of providing strength to presumed purer „ethnic“ identities which construct an imagined past which excludes diversities.

Social scientists in the so-called developed countries have been concerned for a long time with the integration of the new nations in the developing countries. What has been forgotten is that national integration is a permanent issue for all nations whether old or new, „developing“ or „developed.“ The tendencies towards disintegration may be linked to different factors in different contexts but the need to re-examine the basis on which nations are governed require continual appraisal.

At another level the education systems have a major role to play in ensuring that the educational and informational process does take on the substantive issues of the „belongingness“ of all groups to the polity. The representation of „the other“ and the knowledge which construct the immigrant as an alien do not help.

The problems of housing and employment, or difficulties in education are shared by many or all members of the community. They do not have to be given an ethnic or racial gloss. They are shared problems. The only justification for separating out issues which have to do with different

communities would be to illustrate how shared problems are sometimes worse for minority groups. What tends to be projected and emphasized is difference.

The national project which set out to make „one out of the many“ has faltered and there is also a lack of solidarity because people have become surplus to the requirement of the state.¹ This solidarity of all groups within Europe has to be an inclusive proposition so that the national minorities, immigrant communities and the under-class are all seen to belong to it.

The notion of a nation-state which is caring and nurturing of all the citizens has received a serious setback. Within western Europe the malaise of racism has assisted in disintegrating communities, which may yet aid and abet the process of disintegrating nations, as it has in the case of the now fragmented Yugoslavian state and parts of eastern Europe.² There is a present danger of the rise of the violent notions of „ethnic cleansing“ attracting a form of legitimacy in Europe, merely fifty years after they were defeated. The spillover of this abominable notion into other parts of Europe would have catastrophic consequences. It should also be noted that the phrase „ethnic cleansing“ has become acceptable for unproblematic use in many contexts in describing complex issues.

If citizens within the state feel that they are treated fairly, that they belong, and are accorded their full rights, they would then fulfill their obligations. Therefore, the accordance of full citizenship rights would lead to the loyalties which are necessary for nation-states to function. In the recent phase of frenzy about the market, social rights of groups have also been negated with a consequent withdrawal by groups from their social responsibilities. In the absence of greater equalities siege communities are being established which hark back to narrow nationalism and fundamentalisms.³

¹ The General Strike in Spain on January 27, 1994, is one example of the growing frustration of the work force with the diminishment of their significance and prospects. At the other end of the scale, IBM has recently become profitable once again -- at the expense of 15% of its existing (international) workforce!

² See B. Denitch, *The End of the Cold War: European Unity, Socialism and Shift in Global Power* (London: Verso, 1990).

³ J. Gundara, „The Dominant Nation: Subordinated Nations and Racial Inequalities,“ in J. Lynch, C. Mogdil, S. Mogdil, eds., *Equity or Excellence? Education and Cultural Reproduction, Vol. III* (London: The Falmer Press, 1992).

Analysis of the aspirations of these communities is disregarded in the media. Instead the discourses of the new democracies are those of rabid monetarism disguised as radical reform. In such a climate racism fester and grow.

The notion of the secular state has received setbacks at various levels. The lack of a commitment by politicians to secular ideals and a corruption of the polity has led to an increase of what Galbraith famously described as private wealth and public squalor, and this has lost the state the loyalty of many people. In Britain the reference to monarchy raises issues of whether they are worth keeping for financial reasons. Yet, at the underlying level a Poujadist government has unleashed this argument. The irony is that they have undermined the legitimacy of the Crown by denying that there is any notion of society at the underlying level. This market-orientated approach, applied to every aspect of British life, propelled by new conservatism has led to the thinning of the glue that has held the imagined British national community together. The marginalization of large groups of people from different localities, regions and nationalities in European countries undermines the fabric of European nation-states. If at times of hardship and economic crises, immigrant groups are seen as being the only element of diversity in societies, they can be constructed as being the visible signifier of „our“ ills. In certain European contexts they are being blamed for causing many of the social problems, thus activating the syndrome of blaming the victim.

The European states have indigenous diversities on the basis of religion, language, and social class through regional or national minorities. Now, in the post-World War period, many of these countries have acquired new groups of settlers. These groups have different patterns of settlement, social class affiliations, legal statuses as well as levels of family reunification.

The earlier distinction between the countries into which people migrated in northern Europe and the southern European countries from which emigration took place has changed. Even the emigration countries in southern Europe have now become immigration countries. Schools in both northern and southern Europe have extremely diverse student populations.

With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of an open market in the European Union, a newer pattern of intra-European

Union migration is also taking place. The position of the earlier postwar immigrants from outside Europe, who had to fight for their and their children's educational and training rights, is markedly different from the European Union immigrants who as a matter of right, demand high levels of social policy and educational provision for their children.

As the larger processes of integration take place and there is a greater need for specialization and social differentiation within societies, each state would have to ensure that economic, political and cultural policies are developed to enable greater cooperation. Such measures will also have to take account of the local and national peculiarities. Above all, such policies will have to be mediated/represented to the peoples through the media. There is no longer space (or time) for the reconstruction of comfortable ideological positions which mistake the recognition of culinary diversity for intercultural understanding. Nor communities based around spurious notions of blood and soil or other metaphorical abominations. In the new „order“ there will be a need for the polity to recognize diversity, tension and contradiction and to work through them to the establishment of communities in productive flux. Such communities do not need racism in order to thrive. Neither do they need their „nationalism“ preformed and prepackaged.

Few European governments have provided the newly settled communities with confidence in their place in European societies.

Redefining Nationalities

As immigrants have become more settled in Europe there has been a concern about defining their legal and political position within European societies. In Germany the situation is compounded by the „ethnic“ Germans arriving from Eastern Europe and Russia and acquiring citizenship rights soon after their arrival. This is in sharp contrast to the *Ausländer* („foreigners“) who have been resident in Germany for a long time, and cannot acquire such rights. The new settlers to Europe have come from states and most of these states have diverse populations. These settlers are therefore either nationals of the country of origin or of the country of settlement. Their position in legal and political terms is continually being undermined through legislation. This legislation is racist in its intent and is not directed against the „ethnicity“ of the new settlers. The

use of „ethnicity“ by social anthropologists has certainly not helped in clarifying this complex issue. It is necessary for those involved with such issues to undertake a more systematic analysis of the basis of European states in historical and contemporary terms so that a clear definition may emerge. For instance, what are the differences between the national minorities and „ethnic“ minorities? Do the national minorities (in Jura, Scotland, Brittany, Wales) accept the states as defined by the dominant nationalities? There is furthermore, a need to define the nature of European societies and their relationship to the structures of the state.

The national minorities in Europe generally have a territorial basis (Scotland, Wales) which is constitutionally recognized by the state. The newly- settled communities however, also occupy urban spaces which may not be constitutionally recognized but nevertheless, represent the birth of these new communities. The black communities in Brixton, Southall and Harmondsworth, live as part of the working class. Similarly, the Turks in Kreuzberg in West Berlin live in a „sanctuary“ against racism which, nevertheless, they still experience. Schools in these neighborhoods reflect the communities in which children live. But it has to be noted that such communities are often misrepresented as „other“ cultures which are planted in the „host“ communities. Apart from the somewhat spurious notion that before the arrival of others there have always been „communities“ living in idyllic harmony, the fact is that many of these so-called other communities are very much alive, growing, changing. The black community in Britain has, through its music, been able to develop what has been described as a sense of „lived blackness,“ but it has also been influential on the „cultural“ identities of many other young people. Paul Gilroy has also pointed out that some of Britain's Asian community have „borrowed the sound system . . . as part of their invention of a new mode of cultural production with an identity to match.“⁴ The point is that the new communities are something of which we are all a part. Attempts to halt change will not work.

The ghetto-ization of otherness is one discursive means of dealing with communities which have to be constantly redefined as alien. So much of

⁴ P. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 72-110.

the violence and xenophobia which is mediated is premised upon a passed sense of identity rather than one for the future.

Eurocentrism And Education

At the one level the issue which is being raised is how does Europe construct itself as an entity and how are notions of inclusion and exclusion articulated, at least in the educational and knowledge domain.

Knowledge systems confront dual challenges as European integration takes shape. On the one hand Europe confronts a Eurocentric tradition in many domains of knowledge. These hegemonic understandings are informed by the imperialism of Europe. As Edward Said writes:

Without significant exception the universalizing discourses of modern Europe and the United States assume the silence, willing or otherwise, of the non-European world. There is incorporation; there is inclusion; there is direct rule; there is coercion. But there is only infrequently an acknowledgement that the colonized people should be heard from, their ideas known.⁵

As a result of the imperial enterprise not only is Europe in the world but the world is in Europe. Ostensibly this has profound implications for the transfer of knowledge. Yet, discourses from the colonized peripheries are still treated as being marginal in contemporary Europe.

Martin Bernal indicated how in the 18th and 19th centuries Europeans developed a historiography which denied the earlier understanding that the Greeks in the Classical and Hellenistic periods had learnt as a result of colonization and interaction between Egyptians, Phoenicians and Greeks.⁶ Part of the reason for this new historiography has been that with the rise of racism and anti-Semitism in Europe, the European Romantics and racists wanted to distance Greece from the Egyptians and Phoenicians and construct it as the pure childhood of Europe. It was unacceptable from their

⁵ E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993).

⁶ M. Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, Vol. I (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

perspective that, the Europeans would have developed any learning and understandings from the Africans or the Semites.

The notion of a European culture separated from the world south of the Mediterranean is a mythical construction. The contributions to knowledge in the ancient period from this immediate region include Mesopotamian astronomy, the Egyptian calendar and Greek mathematics, enriched by the Arabs. As Samir Amin states:

The opposition Greece = the West; Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Persia = the East is itself a later artificial construct of Eurocentrism. For the boundary in the region separates the backward North African and European West from the advanced East; and the geographic unities constituting Europe, Africa and Asia have no importance on the level of the history of civilization, even if Eurocentrism in its reading of the past is projected onto the past the modern North-South line of demarcation passing through the Mediterranean.⁷

The debate about how and where „civilization“ arose is an interesting one for educationalists and students, but it is only a part of a wider concern with the intellectual straightjacket that Eurocentric education can become. In this sense it is always necessary to consider ways in which the curriculum, both formal and informal, can be modified or changed. As long as history is studied from the perspective of one or another nationalist claim to truth, rather than from one or another paradigm of historiography, education will remain trapped in the tram-lines of nationalist tautology. And within this questions of racism, xenophobia and violence will rattle meaninglessly around. Educationalists would do well to consider several alternative definitions of history before planning their lessons or mediations.

The dominant-marginal perspective in educational and media discourses needs to be constantly challenged and often redrawn. The issues being presented here are historically significant and of the gravest importance for the future of education as well as the political and social structures of Europe. It requires a combination of pedagogical patience and persistence. There has to be a constant and fundamental reappraisal of

⁷ S. Amin, *Eurocentrism* (London: Zed Books, 1989).

the histories and national identities into which we have all been inducted with such care. The answer does not lie in trying to establish either a liberal or a „back-to-basics“ curriculum founded in that Eurocentric, nationalist and empire-based intellectual milieu which has done so much to contribute to our present predicament.

For European education systems the challenge is to engage in a wide-ranging establishment of connections with other cultures and civilizations which are part of the fabric of contemporary European society, and also develop an understanding of its past which includes, Greece, Egypt and the Near Eastern connections.

It is also a question of disentangling, of decoding, of identifying the operation and structures of those discourses which help to sustain the present relations of power and subordination in our societies. This is of particular significance in relation to discourses which construct difference as suspect, culture as fixed (and „ours“), and otherness as the root causes of xenophobia and nationalism. It is not otherness which is the key educational issue, but sameness.

The issue of Eurocentrism is not simply an issue of prejudices and errors which heighten xenophobia and chauvinism. Eurocentrism, according to Amin,

has replaced rational explanations of history with partial pseudo-theories, patched together and even self-contradictory at times . . . The Eurocentric distortion that makes the dominant capitalist culture negates the universalist ambition on which that culture claims to be founded.⁸

The Enlightenment came not as a universal phenomenon, despite attempts to learn from other cultures, but as a narrowly defined European response to the obscurantism of Christianity.

There are obvious contributions that the academic and educational systems can make in the context of democratic egalitarianism which are also a feature of European societies. Such theoretical issues should have implications for what constitutes the common curricula and shared knowledge in European schools and communities. Without such a curriculum and educational changes individual groups are likely to demand separate

⁸ S. Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p. 104.

political structures, schools and media systems for their own religious or ethnic groups.

The political realities and the ideological underpinnings of developments in Europe need to become part of the discourses of those who consider themselves to be the „normal“ citizens of Europe.

Intercultural Curriculum

The issue of intercultural curriculum is an issue within the public dominion. This is an important issue for the academic and not something that education systems could or should reject out of hand by labelling it an issue of political correctness. In order not to slip into the acrimonious debate which have raged in the United States issues ought to be critically examined to institute prophylactic action and make „strategic interventions.“

If certain education systems were a lead in this field such action would have reverberations internationally.

There is little conceptual theoretical work in this field, although increasingly more literature in various domains of knowledge is surfacing.

The first issue that needs to be raised is that oppressed groups who have experienced exclusion of their knowledge and unequal educational outcomes are making separatist demands in polities which embody various indices of diversity but continue to be governed by hegemonic state apparatuses. This has set in motion what one might call a „Politics of Recognition.“ At one level the demand for separate Black or Islamic schools demonstrates this phenomena. The next step is then to demand a „curriculum of recognition,“ which has included courses like black, Irish, south Asian and women's studies. It is time to reappraise what from these courses has been the impact on the single disciplines, or knowledge systems as a whole.

The marginalization through the under-resourcing of such courses is now leading to demands for Afrocentric or Islamocentric knowledge to counteract Eurocentrism. In other words binary oppositions are being set-up. E. Said, it would seem correctly, states:

The whole effort to deconsecrate Eurocentrism cannot be interpreted, least of all by those who participate in the enterprise, as an effort to

supplant Eurocentrism with, for instance, Afrocentric or Islamocentric approaches. On its own, ethnic particularity does not provide for intellectual process -- quite the contrary.⁹

This is partly the case because separating schools or curricula does not assist in bringing about intercultural understandings. Within complex societies the need to develop cross-cultural negotiations and learnings is an important issue. While it is important for blacks to know black history it is more important that whites understand this. This is partly the case because there is an urgent need to develop common and shared core values within the public domain. The role that a rigorously selective but intercultural curriculum can play in helping shape such values is fairly critical.

One of the problems of devising what E. Said calls a „many-windowed house of human culture as a whole,¹⁰ is that such proposals do not carry much weight within universities. The serious question is how such proposals should be presented so that they will be considered seriously and implemented.

Part of the problem is that issues presented in the field generally described as „multicultural“ are seen to relate to immigrants, as the work of the European Community and Council of Europe demonstrates. Since they are a minority or are seen as a marginal group anything as emanating from such quarters particularly in the present political climate of conservative restoration is either rejected or not considered seriously.

In socially diverse societies a narrowly-defined curriculum can only lead in reactive terms to ethnic, religious and nationalistic values. A more substantive issue for academic and educational systems generally is how to assist in devising a civic culture in a civil society which would ensure rights and responsibilities of all individuals and groups in a secular society. Yet, there is very little being done either within humanities or social science disciplines to ensure that the public square and its inclusive values are being validated and nurtured. The question here is how can a changed curriculum assist towards actualizing these social ends? Or one could argue that it is not the function of curricular change. The threats to

⁹ C. McCarthy & O.W. Crithlow, *Race Identity and Representation in Education* (Routledge, 1993), p. 311.

¹⁰ E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 312.

secular politics by Christian fundamentalists, Islamic and Hindu revivalists across the world is something which cannot be ignored. A secular polity is needed to protect the sacred at the private level.

Liberal education itself at time of a chance can lead to a battle between the Ancients and the Moderns. There may be a need to effect a creative truce to establish a rationale for change rather than the setting up of barricades.

As Samir Amin points out, after 1492 with continual Europeanization of the globe, Eurocentrism became crystallized as a global project. This Europeanization of the globe bears within it a de-universalization of knowledge. Not only does Eurocentrism have a theory of world history but it is also a global political project. From this perspective the so called Western thought and philosophy emerges from Greece and is based on „rational principles“ while the „Orient“ does not move beyond „Metaphysics.“¹¹ The curricular question is how can we liberate universalism from the limits of Eurocentrism. The current habits of thought within universities inhibit such a development.

To reinstate „this voice“ of the disenfranchised would require a great deal of diplomacy and sophistication, particularly if the desired changes are not to be relegated to the margins.

At the school level the changes brought about by the Education Reform Act (1988) and the National Curriculum and its Assessment in England need to be countenanced by higher education. In just one curriculum area, the language and literature curriculum, many of the government's own experts felt that teaching of language and literatures would be made barren and anti-intellectual. Eighteen of the authors who were in fact recommended for reading complained about such an „authoritarian approach.“ Professor Cox, who himself is no left-winger, stated that the right-wing attack on the curriculum was „intended to restore a unity and stability based on hegemony imposed by upper and middle classes in the 1930s and before.“

The higher education institutions in England would therefore probably have future intake of students who may have a romantic notion of the common English literary culture. Yet the real challenge at the school and university level is that the literary and cultural output is extremely diverse.

¹¹ S. Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p. 91.

The assumptions of a common culture based on the canon not only is extremely restrictive, but not a reality.

There is also the important basic knowledge of how the national and international literature should be taught. Since all students bring a baggage from the school this raises important issues of what the higher education can do.

In order to teach art history western dominance also needs to be displaced in knowledge terms, because it has succeeded in suppressing the past and artistic history as part and parcel of human knowledge. As an example of one particular discipline, Art History is not located in any one civilization. It is multifaceted and multifocal in its origins and developments, which are unfortunately not allowed to surface by academic neo-colonialism. In the 18th century the discipline had a multicultural outlook which needs to be reinstated by art historians. Indeed art historians would be reclaiming a territory which became ethnocentric in the 19th and 20th centuries.

As dominance of Europe over other civilizations became entrenched, collecting became formalized as part of ethnology. Ethnographic Museums were opened (Copenhagen 1841; Berlin 1856; Leiden 1864; Cambridge, Mass, 1866; Dresden, 1876; and Paris 1878) where utensils, implements and sculptures from Polynesia, Melanesia, New Zealand, North and South America, and Africa were displayed. This was done so that visitors could determine, as Edward Tylor at the Department of Anthropology at Oxford put it „the relation of the mental condition of savages to that of the civilized man.“ To fit these arts into the canon of art appreciation, a new category, „primitive art,“ was created.

The great international exhibitions of the 19th century displayed the cultures of the world with a similar assumption. The Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 was supposed to exhibit the collective output of humanity. In describing the Indian exhibits, the catalogue stated that while some techniques had started in India they has matured in Europe.

To the „primitive art“ category there has now been added the „ethnic arts“ for the work of the present. Such categorization obviously excludes the Europeans as having an „ethnicity.“ Attempting to reinstate bodies of knowledge into the mainstream curriculum raises some difficult questions including ones about aesthetics of understanding these arts and literatures.

Issues of this type need to be examined across the curriculum to ascertain substantive questions about exclusion which have nothing to do with political correctness.

One of the issues presented here is how to develop a literary and artistic aesthetic which will not be constructed from a very narrow reading.

Both in the study of literatures as well as the history of art the question of developing an appropriate intercultural, intellectual perspective and aesthetic is an issue of priority. Otherwise, students will obviously reject texts and artifacts which are unfamiliar.

Institutions of higher education in whatever country ought to be as universalistic as possible, and such a project would then necessitate staff development of its tutors.

Issues of intercultural understanding by tutors within higher education can be undertaken initially at least at two levels:

1. The intercultural dimensions of humanities, social sciences and natural sciences which students need to learn about from different domains of knowledge, (scientists about social responsibility and social scientists about technology).
2. The intercultural dimensions from a cultural point of view of each discipline and domain, which then can inform the undertaking of cross-multicultural and inter-disciplinary work. Such developments require academic structures to facilitate this work. In this context students may themselves do original and useful research which would better inform the field.

INDIGENOUS CULTURES AND EUROPEAN EDUCATION: MINORITY LANGUAGES IN THE CURRICULUM¹

Wim Jan Th. Renkema

The Position of Minority Languages in the School Curriculum

Indigenous European Minorities

Broadly speaking, two types of ethnic minorities can be distinguished in contemporary Western-European societies.² On the one hand there are immigrant minorities, who have recently arrived in European societies. Examples are the Turkish community in Germany and the Pakistani

¹ This article draws on and extends earlier work reported in W.J.T. Renkema, „Ethnic Identity and Schooling: the Education of Regional Minorities in Western-Europe,“ paper presented at the seminar ‘Ethnocultural Identity of European Minorities: Continuity and Change,’ Institute of Sociology, University of Gdansk, Poland, September 1994; and *Understanding the Position of Lesser-used Languages in European Educational Systems: The Contribution of Comparative Education* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1995). It is based on a paper presented at the 16th CESE-Conference, Copenhagen, June 1994. An abbreviated version of this paper was previously published as „Regional Identities in Europe: The Position of Lesser-used Languages in the Educational Systems of the European Union,“ in *Tertium Comparationis: Journal für Internationale Bildungsforschung* 1 (1) (1995), pp. 42-62. The current article elaborates the original paper considerably.

² Cf. B. Holmes, „Cultural Diversity and Education,“ in W. Mitter & J. Swift, eds., *Education and the Diversity of Cultures: The Contribution of Comparative Education* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1985), pp. 693-712.

community in Great-Britain. All European societies have immigrant minorities within their territories. On the other hand there are indigenous minorities, such as the Welsh community in Great-Britain and the Saami communities in the Scandinavian countries.³ The latter type of minority has also been referred to as autochthonous minorities or regional minorities. This article deals with the schooling of these indigenous European minorities. It should be stressed that this division between immigrant minorities and indigenous minorities is somewhat artificial. Husén, Tuijnman and Halls state that „questions relating to national minorities and to immigrant groups are basically of the same order.“⁴ The subtle difference between them is the time factor: „A fine distinction may be drawn between a *minority group that has lived for a long while within a given nation-state* and one of more recent date, initially temporary, which may be classified as an immigrant group, but which with the passage of time may become permanent, as bids fair to be the case in Europe today.“⁵ It is therefore to be expected that, with the passing of time, the education of indigenous minorities may offer examples for that of other communities.

Within the category of indigenous minorities a further distinction can be made. The first group constitutes of those are that a minority group in only one or sometimes more nation-states. They are ‘nations without states,’ often predating the nation-states by which they have been engulfed. These minorities are unique, as their language and culture exist nowhere else. Examples of these are the Basques in both Spain and France and the Sorbs in Germany. The second group constitutes of minorities who are a minority group in one state, but who constitute the majority in another.

³ The concept ‘indigenous minority’ is often associated with small native groups, such as the Native Americans, the Saami people and the Aborigines. In this article, it is defined as a distinct ethnic group that has lived for a lengthy time in a particular territory, now part of a contemporary state. Current European indigenous groups may be a numerically small minority in the region they inhabit, such as the North Frisians in Schleswig Holstein (FRG) or may actually constitute the majority, such as the Catalans in Catalonia (Spain) or the Germans in South Tyrol (Italy).

⁴ T. Husén, A. Tuijnman & W.D. Halls, *Schooling in Modern European Society: A Report of the Academia Europaea* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1992), p. 185.

⁵ Ibid.

They are also called 'national minorities.' An example are the Alsatians, the German-speaking regional minority in France.

Within the European Union the existence of indigenous minorities is most poignantly illustrated by the linguistic variety of the Union. Within the present 15 member states of the European Union, up to 40 million people in over 40 different communities speak a 'regional or minority language.'⁶ All of these languages are spoken by a minority in the state involved⁷. An overview of these minority language communities is presented in Figure 1. The concept of 'regional or minority language' embraces:⁸

- a) Unique languages spoken in only one EU-member state, e.g. Welsh in the United Kingdom, Galician in Spain, Sardinian in Italy or Sorbian in Germany;
- b) Unique languages spread over more than one EU-member state, e.g. Basque, both in Spain and France;
- c) Languages spoken by an indigenous minority in a particular EU-member state, but which are also the language of the majority in another (EU-member) state: e.g. German as spoken in Italy, France, Belgium and Denmark, Danish in Germany or Slovene in Italy;
- d) Languages which are national languages at EU-member state level, but which do not enjoy the status of official working language of the European Union, to wit Luxembourgish and Irish (Gaelic).

⁶ Another term often used for 'regional or minority languages' is 'lesser-used languages.' However, the latter term is also used for the smaller official languages of the European Union, such as Danish and Greek.

⁷ Luxembourgish is not spoken by a minority of the people in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Nearly all inhabitants of this country speak Luxembourgish. It is nevertheless considered a 'lesser-used language' due to its status in the European Union.

⁸ This classification is based on the one proposed by the European Bureau for Lesser-used Languages in Dublin. For more information concerning the work of this institute, refer to Ó. Riagáin, 'The European Bureau for Lesser-used Languages: A Defender of the Linguistic and Cultural Rights of the Regions,' in *Regional Contact* 1 (1987), pp. 55-61.



Figure 1: Map of minority language communities in the 15 member-states of the European Union

© Mercator-Education, Ljouwert/Leeuwarden (Netherlands), 1995.

Mercator-Education is concerned with the position of all these regional or minority languages within the educational systems of the member states of the European Union. All schooling, public as well as private, is included in Mercator-Education's research. Mercator-Education functions as a network of currently 17 participating centres, each of which represents a European minority language community. It is one of the four branches that together make up Mercator, a large documentation, information and research network on regional or minority languages.⁹ Mercator is supported by the European Commission in Brussels and is coordinated by DG XXII (Human Resources, Education, Training and Youth). Mercator-Education is based at the Fryske Akademy Ljouwert/Leeuwarden, the Netherlands.¹⁰

The educational position of both immigrant and indigenous minorities has been object of study of comparative educationists. The bulk of studies in this area has focused on the education of immigrants.¹¹ Much of the comparative research conducted on these ethnic minorities has been

⁹ The four Mercator branches focus on various topics, to wit media (Aberystwyth, Wales, U.K.), general issues of linguistic minorities (Paris, France), legislation (Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain) and education (Ljouwert, Friesland, the Netherlands). Mercator bears the name of Gerard Mercator, the 16th century cartographer who was the first to mark geographical names on maps in the language of the area concerned.

¹⁰ The Fryske Akademy in Ljouwert/Leeuwarden is an institute that conducts research regarding the bilingual province of Friesland. Its three main interests are the Frisian language (Department of Lexicography and Department of Linguistics), Frisian history and literature (Department of Literature, History and Onomastics) and Frisian society, including sociolinguistic aspects (Department of Social Sciences). Within the Fryske Akademy, Mercator-Education's activities are carried out in the Department of Social Sciences.

¹¹ A few examples of the many studies in comparative education may be found in H. Steedman, "The Education of Migrant Workers' Children in EEC Countries: From Assimilation to Cultural Pluralism?" in *Comparative Education* 15 (3) (1979), pp. 259-268; M. McLean, "Education and Cultural Diversity in Britain: Recent Immigrant Groups," in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 179-191; S. Oppen, "Multiculturalism in Sweden: A Case of Assimilation and Integration," in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 193-212; J.J. Smolicz, "The Mono-ethnic Tradition and the Education of Minority Youth in West Germany from an Australian Multicultural Perspective," in *Comparative Education* 26 (1) (1990), pp. 27-43.

informed by the work of e.g. Schermerhorn¹² and Ogbu.¹³ Mobin Shorish and Wirt emphasize that studies on schooling and ethnicity have used notions such as power and control.¹⁴ The educational position of indigenous minorities has obtained limited attention in comparative research.¹⁵

¹² R.A. Schermerhorn's main work has been within the American tradition of race relations research. His most influential publication is *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), in which he distinguishes between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups in society. For Schermerhorn a subordinate minority is a group which is relatively small of size and that is unable to exert power. Schermerhorn defines 'ethnicity' as „a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of peoplehood“ (Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations*, p. 6).

¹³ Ogbu also relates minority status to power relations between groups. He distinguishes several types of (ethnic) minorities: autonomous minorities, caste-like minorities and immigrant minorities. Ogbu has elaborated his views on the position of minorities and the function of the educational system in e.g. J.U. Ogbu, *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1978) and „Minority Status and Schooling in Plural Societies,“ in *Comparative Education Review* 27 (2) (1983), pp. 168-190.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Mobin Shorish & F.M. Wirt, „The Uses of Comparative Ethnicity Research,“ in *Comparative Education Review* 37 (1) (1993), pp. 1-8.

¹⁵ European indigenous minorities were studied by e.g. J. Tusquets & J.A. Benavent, „Linguistic and Cultural Unity and Diversity in Spanish Education,“ in *Compare* 8 (1) (1978), pp. 101-111; J. McNair, „The Contribution of the Schools to the Restoration of Regional Autonomy in Spain,“ in *Comparative Education* 16 (1) (1980), pp. 33-44; R. Brinley Jones, „Wales: A Case of Identity,“ in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 155-160; J.L. García Garrido, „Education in the Spain of Autonomous Regions,“ in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 161-167; N. Grant, „The British Isles as an Area of Study in Comparative Education,“ in *Compare* 11 (2) (1981), pp. 135-146; „Multicultural Education in Scotland,“ in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 133-153; „The Education of Minority and Peripheral Cultures: An Introduction,“ in *Comparative Education* 24 (2) (1988), pp. 155-166; T. Corner, „The Maritime and Border Regions of Western Europe,“ in *Comparative Education* 24 (2) (1988), pp. 229-245; G. Morgan, „The Place of School in the Maintenance of the Welsh Language,“ in *Comparative Education* 24 (2) (1988), pp. 247-255; P. Petherbridge-Hernandez, „Reconceptualizing Liberating Non-formal Education: A Catalan Case-Study,“ in *Compare* 20 (1) (1990), pp.

Finally, the Saami have been studied by Paulston¹⁶ and were included by Wirt in his comparative analysis of ethnic minorities.¹⁷ In general, of the over 40 minority language communities in Western-Europe, in particular the Basques, Catalans, Welshmen, Saami and the Gaelic community of Scotland have been examined. These comparative education studies of indigenous minorities have been predominantly descriptive. The advancement of theory has unfortunately been very limited. Mostly, merely a factual description of minority situation characteristics is given or a typology of minorities is proposed.¹⁸ At this moment, there is no comprehensive theory that seeks to explain the actual place of indigenous minority languages in the school curriculum. An attempt to investigate to what extent these languages are in fact used in educational systems in Europe has been made by Mercator-Education. During the last years, it has been executing a number of comparative inventories in this area.

Comparative inventories of the position of minority languages in education

During 1986-1988 the Fryske Akademy executed the EMU-project.¹⁹ It aimed at an inventory of the position of minority languages in primary education in the member states of the European Community. The project resulted in a total of 34 separate regional studies and a comparative

41-52; N. Grant & J. Docherty, „Language Policy and Education: Some Scottish-Catalan Comparisons,” in *Comparative Education* 28 (2) (1992), pp. 145-166.

¹⁶ R.G. Paulston, „Ethnic Revival and Educational Conflict in Swedish Lapland,” in *Comparative Education Review* 20 (2) (1976), pp. 179-192.

¹⁷ F.M. Wirt, „The Stranger within my Gate: Ethnic Minorities and School Policy in Europe,” in *Comparative Education Review* 23 (1) (1979), pp. 17-40.

¹⁸ E.g. Corner, „The Maritime and Border Regions of Western Europe;” Grant, „The British Isles as an Area of Study.”

¹⁹ The name ‘EMU’ was derived from the Frisian project title: Europeeske Minderheidstalen yn it primêre Underwiis (European minority languages in primary education). See J. Sikma & D. Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: An Inventory* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/EMU-project, 1988).

synthesis report.²⁰ In the early nineties Mercator-Education carried out 3 new projects, which were all conducted in a way more or less similar to the EMU-projects. These dealt with teacher training, instructional material and pre-primary education.²¹ All these projects aimed at a comparative inventory. The two distinctive elements of such a comparative inventory are the collection of data directly from minority language communities in Europe, followed by comparison in order to be able to draw conclusions. Data-collection in the regions was accomplished by the use of expert-correspondents, who are able to report on educational developments at grass roots level. Comparison was carried out by means of constructing a synthesis of these reports according to established criteria.²² In most projects an attempt was made to compare the diverse regional situations according to a „strength-weakness“ dimension, in order to describe the relative position of minority languages in curricula. The result is a classification as shown in Table 1 for primary education.

²⁰ Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: An Inventory*; J. Sikma & D. Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: Inventory and Proceedings of the Colloquy* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden, Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1991).

²¹ For teacher training (EMOL, 1990-1993), refer to A. Dekkers, *Teacher Training of Minority Languages for Primary and Secondary Education* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1995); for instructional material (LEMA, 1992-1993), refer to R.S. Tjeerdsma & J.A. Sikma, *Provision of Learning Materials for Primary and Pre-primary Education* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1994); for Education of Regional or Minority Languages in the EU (LEMA, 1994) and pre-primary education (PREP, 1992-1993), refer to A. van der Goot, W.J.T. Renkema & M.B. Stuijt, eds., *Pre-Primary Education: An Inventory of the Current Position of Lesser-Used Languages in Pre-Primary Education in some Member States of the European Union* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1994).

²² For details concerning both the conduct and results of the comparative inventories undertaken by Mercator-Education, refer to A. van der Goot, *Education and Lesser-Used Languages in the European Union: Data Collection by Mercator-Education* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Mercator-Education, 1994); and Renkema, „Regional Identities in Europe: The Position of Lesser-used Languages in the Educational Systems of the European Union.“

Strong	Middle	Weak
Basque (Spain)	Basque (France)	Albanian (Italy)
Catalan (Spain)	Breton (France)	Catalan (Italy)
Danish (FRG)	Catalan (France)	Cornish (UK)
French (Italy)	Corsican (France)	Croatian (Italy)
Frisian (NL)	German (France)	Flemish (France)
Galician (Spain)	Ladin (Italy)	Friulian (Italy)
German (Belgium)	Occitan (France)	Greek (Italy)
German (Denmark)	Scottish Gaelic (UK)	Irish (N-Ireland, UK)
German (Italy)		North Frisian (FRG)
Irish (Ireland)		Occitan (Italy)
Luxembourgish (L)		
Slovene (Italy)		
Welsh (UK)		

Table 1: Relative position of 31 European regional or minority languages in primary education²³

From the EMU-project it can be concluded that primary education making use of the languages of indigenous minorities has been expanding, although it still makes up only a relatively minor element of European curricula. For the largest part, minority language education exists at the margins of European educational systems. Indigenous minorities have only been partly successful in organizing schooling in their own language within the public education system, nor have they been able to establish private educational provisions. As a consequence, even in regions classified in the strongest group, not all pupils are able to receive some of their

²³ Adapted from Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: An Inventory*; Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: Inventory and Proceedings*; D. Gorter, „Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education in the European Community,” in K. Jaspaert & S. Kroon, eds., *Ethnic Minority Languages and Education* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1991), pp. 57-69. Note: Saterfrisian (FRG), Romani (Italy) and Sardinian (Italy) also were included in the EMU-inventory. It appeared that they were the only three indigenous minorities responding in which no schooling in the minority language was available on the primary level.

primary education in their first language. Gorter observes that only in a few cases are there „developments towards a full-fledged educational system that exists side by side with the traditional system or replaces the older majority language dominated system, at least in part.“²⁴ These cases, in which indigenous minorities have been able to realize considerable educational changes, include the Basque Country (Spain), Catalonia (Spain), Ireland and the German-speaking community of South Tyrol (Italy).²⁵ All four have been ranked in the strongest category. Other indigenous minorities have found themselves in a situation in which it has been very difficult to arrange educational provisions according to their wishes. Groups such as the Flemish in France and the Friulians in Italy, both ranked in the weakest group, have hardly been able to develop minority language education at the primary level. Several constraints for the further development of minority language education in primary schools were distinguished in the EMU-project, for example insufficient legal provisions, the lack of competent teachers and the shortage of adequate instructional material.²⁶ These are dealt with, besides a range of other questions, in the other projects of Mercator-Education.

The issue of the differences between regions is returned to in the third section of this article. First, the question why indigenous minorities in general strive towards inclusion of the minority language in curricula is answered. Although immigrant and indigenous minorities have a lot in common, an important distinction can be made between them as concerns the rationales for minority language education.

²⁴ Gorter, „Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education in the European Community,“ p. 62.

²⁵ Cf. Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: Inventory and Proceedings*, pp. 109-110.

²⁶ Gorter, „Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education in the European Community,“ pp. 62-63.

Minority language education, ethnic identity and the curriculum

Introduction: minorities and language

The similarity between immigrant and indigenous minorities lies in the fact that both are, or consider themselves to be distinct from the majority of inhabitants in a given nation-state.²⁷ Different languages spoken in one nation-state point to the presence of different cultural groups.²⁸ However, language differences do not imply the same type of education for immigrant minorities and indigenous minorities. For both, the language of instruction and the inclusion of their language as a school subject is considered critical by them. They have different reasons for doing so. For the first group, immigrant minorities, speaking a language other than that of the dominant majority, has primarily been regarded an obstacle for reaching scholastic achievement similar to that of majority children.²⁹ In their case, concern for the school careers of their children has resulted in the establishment of bilingual education provisions for them (e.g. in Germany³⁰). There is a remedial connotation around bilingual education for immigrant minority children. Such provisions in general have a transitional aim: the child's first language (L1) is used in education in order to facilitate the transfer to majority language education (L2).

For Western-European indigenous minorities, however, the minority language nowadays is hardly viewed as a possible handicap for the school careers of minority children, much as it is seen as the main component of identity.³¹ They do not strive towards transition but towards maintenance.

²⁷ Husén, Tuijnman and Halls, *Schooling in Modern European Society*, pp. 185-186.

²⁸ Cf. Holmes, „Cultural Diversity and Education.“

²⁹ Cf. B. Troyna, „Paradigm Regained: A Critique of 'Cultural Deficit' Perspectives in Contemporary Educational Research,“ in *Comparative Education* 24 (3) (1988), pp. 273-283.

³⁰ B. McLaughlin & P. Graf, „Bilingual Education in West Germany, Recent Developments,“ in *Comparative Education* 21 (3) (1985), pp. 179-191.

³¹ Although immigrant minorities are also increasingly showing concern for the preservation of their own identity (cf. K. Liebkind, ed., *New Identities in Europe: Immigrant Ancestry and the Ethnic Identity of Youth* (Gower/Strasbourg: European Science Foundation, 1989), their first interest has in

The next section provides an analysis of the relationship between the introduction of minority languages in the curriculum, the maintenance of minority languages and the strengthening of identity.

The minority language in education: strengthening ethnic identity

Indigenous European minorities emphasize their language as the group characteristic that designates their identity: the minority language is their principal group symbol.³² For this reason indigenous European minorities are often called linguistic minorities.³³ They strive towards maintaining their distinctive identity. Ó Murchú summarizes this concern of indigenous minorities, when she states that „our aim must be to remain minorities; our *survival* [italics added] depends on our remaining minorities -- in the sense of retaining those qualities of *distinctiveness* of language/culture which make/have made us *different*, have made us minorities.”³⁴

The inclusion of minority languages in school curricula can be regarded as a means of reinforcing the ethnic identity of indigenous minorities.³⁵ For

general been the integration into the majority, in particular with regard to the socio-economic domain.

³² Cf. J. Edwards, „Bilingualism, Education and Identity,” in *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 9 (1-2) (1988), pp. 203-210.

³³ S. Churchill, *The Education of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the OECD Countries* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1986); C.B. Paulston, *Linguistic Minorities in Multilingual Settings: Implications for Language Policies* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1994).

³⁴ H. Ó. Murchú, *Pre-primary Education in some European Lesser-used Languages* (Dublin: European Bureau of Lesser-used Languages, 1987), p. 39.

³⁵ Terms such as ‘cultural identity,’ ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘regional identity’ are used both in political and academic spheres. The topic of minority identity carries the problem that „cultural and ethnic identity have become highly politicized concepts, loaded with symbolic significance. Ethnicity is first and foremost a political question.” C. Wilpert, „Ethnic and Cultural Identity: Ethnicity and the Second Generation in the Context of European Migration,” in K. Liebkind, ed., *New Identities in Europe: Immigrant Ancestry and the Ethnic Identity of Youth* (Hants: Gower/Strasbourg: European Science Foundation, 1989), pp. 6-24. „This politicization creates difficulties for a more detached analysis of minority identity. In this article, the standpoint of a research group working within the framework of the European Science Foundation is shared, to wit: it is not our task . . . to defend what may be assumed to be cultural identity,

them, the fact that they speak another language than the majority is the essence of their identity. With regard to this strong link between minority language and minority identity, Heyman remarks that language, more than any other minority group characteristic, „can become the rallying point for minority *identity* [*italics added*] concerns, partly because of its identification with the many cultural aspects of group identity and partly because of its relationship with the identity of the self.“³⁶ This relation between minority language and identity has been observed by e.g. Brinley Jones, who calls the Welsh language the most distinctive feature of Welsh identity.³⁷ If language is being regarded as essential for identity, it becomes clear that the continued existence of the minority language is necessary for maintaining or reviving ethnic identity. The existence of the minority language is depending on its use by the younger generations. The first argument for the inclusion of the minority language in school curricula, as a subject or as the medium of instruction, can therefore be found in the concerns about the possible loss of the minority language. Such loss of language would imply the loss of identity. Representatives of indigenous minorities underscore this significance of the use of the minority language in education for strengthening identity. Already at the pre-primary level of the educational system, the use of the minority language is perceived as essential for the preservation of ethnic identity, as the following two quotes from a Mercator-Education study on minority languages in pre-primary education show:

Beweggründe der Pädagogen für die Arbeit in unserer sorbischen Einrichtung sind: *Erhalt des sorbischen Volkes, Erhalt der sorbischen Sprache und Kultur* [*italics added*] . . . In der Zukunft wird es noch wichtiger sein, intensiver die sorbische Sprache zu pflegen, damit das sorbische Volk bleibt.³⁸

but to attempt to systematically study and explore how this is expressed and what form it may be taking.“

³⁶ R.D. Heyman, „A Political Economy of Minority Group Knowledge Demands,“ in *Compare* 8 (1) (1978), pp. 3-13.

³⁷ Brinley Jones, „Wales: A Case of Identity,“, p. 157.

³⁸ M. Döring, „Situation der Minderheitensprache in unserer sorbischen Tagesstätte,“ in A.Sj. van der Goot, W.J.T. Renkema & M.B. Stuijt, eds., *Pre-Primary Education: An Inventory of the Current Position of Lesser-Used*

In general, in bilingual situations, where two or more languages and cultures are combined, there are differences in the status of the different languages and the use made of them. . . . Bilingualism does not mean the same for all. *Wherever human communities have acquired a collective identity, they have defended their languages. In the case of the Basque Country, Euskera is a significant element in maintaining that identity* [italics added] . . . Bilingual education is spreading more and more in the Basque Country. This commitment to reviving Euskera by integrating it into the educational system did not prosper under the new regime after the fall of the Republic.³⁹

In this view, the inclusion of the minority language in curricula, either as subject or as medium of instruction, is a means towards 'ethnic survival'.⁴⁰ The school functions as an institute of language planning and thus identity planning.⁴¹ In Figure 2 this relation between minority language education, minority language maintenance and strengthening is graphically shown.

Languages in Pre-Primary Education in some Member States of the European Union (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1994), pp. 129-131.

³⁹ F.E. Sagastume, „The Position of the Basque Language in Pre-primary Education in Spain,“ in A.S. van der Goot, W.J.T. Renkema & M.B. Stuijt, eds., *Pre-primary Education: An Inventory of the Current Position of Lesser-used Languages in Pre-primary Education in some Member States of the European Union* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education, 1994), pp. 269-284.

⁴⁰ M. Byram, *Minority Education and Ethnic Survival: Case Study of a German School in Denmark* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1986).

⁴¹ Identity planning is the counterpart of language planning, as language and identity are interrelated (cf. J. Pool, „Language Planning and Identity Planning,“ in *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 20 (1979), pp. 5-21.




Figure 2: The relation between the inclusion of the minority language in the school curriculum, minority language maintenance and ethnic identity

In this view, a stronger position of the minority language in education leads to a strengthening of ethnic identity. The inclusion of minority languages in education can thus be seen as instrumental in the strengthening of ethnic identities in Europe. This presumed relationship between curriculum, language maintenance and identity does not exist in a vacuum. The fear of indigenous minorities, whether they are unique minorities or national minorities, that their identity is at stake stems from tangible political, cultural and economical developments. Contemporary indigenous minorities in Europe share the historical experience of subordination to a political, cultural and, often also an economic center.

Regionalism

In Europe, processes of nation-building, political centralization and rapid transition from traditional societies into modern societies have led to the marginalisation of indigenous minorities. In all European nation-states a political midpoint has developed, which is the center of government and economic life. Regions turn into the periphery of this center. For this process the concept of 'internal colonization' has been used.⁴² This concept has most frequently been used to describe the economic dependency of peripheral regions on the center of a nation-state. Yet, it has important

⁴² Cf. N. Evans, „Internal Colonialism? Colonization, Economic Development and Political Mobilization in Wales, Scotland and Ireland,“ in G. Day & G. Rees, eds., *Regions, Nations and European Integration: Remaking the Celtic Periphery* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1991), pp. 235-264; J. Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 73-74; and especially M. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1530-1966* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

political and cultural dimensions. Politically, the formation of nation-states has resulted in the centralization of political power. Small political entities have been engulfed by the larger nation-state and their territories have been absorbed. Some indigenous minorities nevertheless still carry a memory of bygone political self-governance.

Culturally, the process of centralization has resulted in the homogenization of languages and cultures, existing within the territory of the nation-state. Bahrenberg remarks that „regarding culture, internal colonization means homogenization of originally divergent ‘regional’ cultures and the gradual establishment of an ‘advanced culture’ . . . by means of educational systems and national cultural institutions. An important element in this process is a uniform literary language, which often develops from the administrative language of the national center. Deviating languages become dialects. The cultural traditions which are not in accordance with the advanced culture are being regarded as folklore.“⁴³ As a consequence of this process of ‘internal colonization’ the languages and cultures of in particular rural or maritime minorities have been driven to the periphery of modern society. Other European indigenous minorities, or better put, their territories, have been transferred from one state to another as a consequence of international conflicts and agreements, as a result of which people have ended up in the margins of a culture that is not their own.

In all these cases, the culture and language of the dominant majority differ from the minority. For indigenous minorities, the post-war construction of a unified Europe, although in itself submitting a problem to the integrity of homogeneous nation-states, has meant the integration into an even larger political, economic and cultural entity. These processes of national and international homogenization are counterbalanced remarkably by ‘regionalism.’ Regionalism is the resistance to the state’s center from peripheral areas.⁴⁴ Halls underscores this apparent contradiction between processes of increasing integration and the need for upholding local diversity stating that it is „a paradox that in an era when nations combine in international organizations as never before, the pull for regionalism has

⁴³ G. Bahrenberg, „Dimensions of Regionalism,“ in E. Dirven, J. Groenewegen & S. van Hoof, eds., *Stuck in the Region? Changing Scales for Regional Identity* (Utrecht:KNAG/VUGS, 1993), pp. 15-38, p. 67.

⁴⁴ P. Alter, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 135.

never been stronger . . . Where culture is becoming homogenized, an instinctive necessity is felt to preserve local particularisms."⁴⁵

The current surge of regionalism in Europe clearly has political and economical components.⁴⁶ Politically, it can be stated that in a number of European states there has been little allegiance to the political center and only limited acceptance of shared political aims during the last decades. Economically, disparity abounds within contemporary European states, as economic activities are unevenly dispersed. Yet, foremost in regionalism is the revival of regional identities in Europe. Such a process of revival entails the conscious (re)construction of ethnic identities: symbolic communities are created.⁴⁷ Elements used in this creation include a common past, literature and in particular language.⁴⁸ Hoekveld defines regional identity as: „a representation of some selected and integrated properties of the region as expressed by its inhabitants or by outsiders for whom this selection has a particular meaning and/or interest, while the integration of properties is either real or imagined.“⁴⁹ The selected property, or group symbol, most frequently used is the minority language. So, more portentous than the various political and economic aspects of regionalism is the fact that individuals are collectively strengthening their perceived shared identity. Alter concludes:

The common bond between all varieties of regionalism, irrespective of their individual differences, is a firmly stated conviction that distinct and

⁴⁵ W.D. Halls, „Belgium: A Case Study in Educational Regionalism,“ in *Comparative Education* 19 (2) (1983), pp. 169-177.

⁴⁶ Alter, *Nationalism*, pp. 135-143; Bahrenberg, „Dimensions of Regionalism.“

⁴⁷ G. Hoekveld, „Regional Identity as the Product of Regional Integration,“ in E. Dirven, J. Groenewegen & S. van Hoof, eds., *Stuck in the Region? Changing Scales for Regional Identity* (Utrecht: KNAG/VUGS, 1993), p. 35.

⁴⁸ Cf. S. Macdonald, „Identity Complexes in Western Europe: Social Anthropological Perspectives,“ in S. Macdonald, ed., *Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe* (Providence/Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp. 1-26; Hoekveld, „Regional Identity as the Product of Regional Integration.“

⁴⁹ Hoekveld, „Regional Identity as the Product of Regional Integration,“ pp. 15-16.

unitary social, historical, cultural and geographic groups exist, and that these must be given more say in running their local lives.⁵⁰

Minority language education can thus be seen as affiliated with the regionalist reaction against forces of centralism and homogenization. For indigenous minorities in Europe 'language' and 'identity' are very closely related. For them, the use of the minority language in education is viewed as an instrument for the strengthening ethnic identity, by maintaining the minority language. In other words: their collective identity largely depends upon the maintenance of the minority language, which is supported by the use of this language in education. The curriculum is viewed as „an agent of social change . . . , as a force for sustained group identity seen to be at risk.“⁵¹

The minority language in education: indigenous cultures and curriculum change

The relationship between the use of minority language in education and ethnic identity that was sketched above is ideal-typical. The curriculum is viewed as the independent variable influencing ethnic identity, the dependent variable. In practice, the goal of strengthening ethnic identity is rarely uttered by policy-makers, teachers or parents from indigenous minorities. Also, it is questionable whether the school can indeed play an influential role in processes of language shift and identity formation.⁵² The fact that this identity factor is much less outspokenly put forward, does not indicate its insignificance. As was argued above, an important rationale for minor-

⁵⁰ Alter, *Nationalism*, p. 142.

⁵¹ J. Edwards, *Multilingualism* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 194.

⁵² Cf. Edwards, „Bilingualism, Education and Identity,“ p. 206; Edwards, *Multilingualism*. To view the school as an instrument for sustaining minority language and strengthening identity is not without difficulties. It seems that quite a lot is expected from schooling: „The major problem in using the educational setting to bolster minority language and identity is that school programs are typically put in place to assist groups seen to be at risk. Given that a complex of social factors has produced this very situation, it is apparent that . . . the school is essentially being asked to counteract, or even to reverse, larger societal dynamics . . . There can be, in other words, too much emphasis upon what schools alone can do . . .“

ity language education lies in the strengthening of identity. Nevertheless, the arguments that more often have been used for minority language education are ones relating directly to language policy or to educational issues. A typical language policy argument is the fact that the minority language itself, rather than minority identity, should be conserved. Instead of focusing on these language policy arguments, the analysis now shifts to the educational arguments.

An educational argument previously often used is that children's transfer from family to school demands the inclusion of their first language in the curriculum. This argument, still regularly uttered used in defense of specific education for immigrant children, nowadays seldomly is heard in indigenous minority communities. Another educational argument, more often used, is the fact that school should prepare children to function adequately in society. As the surrounding society is multilingual, schools should include the minority language in the school curriculum. The larger society is multilingual and shows the coexistence of diverse identities. Such a multicultural society requires 'education for multiculturalism.' Indigenous minorities justify the use of minority languages in education by pointing to societal multilingualism. From the point of view of the individual child this means that it has the right to be educated in its own language. Thus, the perspective on multilingual education has shifted: rather than viewing the child's language as a problem to be tackled, its language is seen as a rightful element of the school curriculum.

The relationship between the school curriculum and identity is complementary: it can be stated that the strengthening of regional identities has consequences for language use in European education. In this part of the analysis, identity is viewed as the independent variable, influencing the school curriculum. The revival of regional identities in Europe has repercussions for education, as indigenous minorities demand that their language is included in the school curriculum. The term 'curriculum' relates to all aspects of the content of schooling, as opposed to the structure of the educational system and the process of instruction. The school curriculum defines 'what knowledge should be taught in schools.' Usually, the curriculum has been regarded as an agent for transfer of culture. However, not all cultural characteristics of man's development can be included in the curriculum, because of limited school time and the explosive growth

of knowledge. The school curriculum should specify the knowledge most worthy to be transferred to future generations. The development of the school curriculum therefore requires careful selection. The issue of what constitutes the actual content of schooling mostly is not consciously addressed, as social consensus is presupposed around what are valuable cultural 'goods'.⁵³ In practice, the relation between culture and curriculum has been informed by a unitary and integrative idea of what should be mediated: the majority language, the history of the dominant group in society and the values of this group.⁵⁴

Adjacent to progress in the sociology of education,⁵⁵ comparative educationists have started to use a notion of 'culture' that is less unitary and integrative.⁵⁶ Welch underscores that the idea of the school curriculum as a 'neutral' selection of cultural attributes around which consensus exists increasingly is being abandoned. Neither culture nor school knowledge can be regarded neutral any more. Rather, both have become „arenas of contest, with classes, gender groupings, or *ethnic groups* [italics added] vying for control. Moreover, different aspects of knowledge and culture have

⁵³ Commenting on proposals for a core curriculum of 'common culture,' Aronowitz and Giroux analyze the concept of culture in this view of the relation between culture and curriculum: 'From this perspective culture ... is not a terrain of struggle: it is merely an artifact, a warehouse of goods, posited either as a canon of knowledge or a canon of information that has simply to be transmitted' See S. Aronowitz & H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture and Social Criticism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 38.

⁵⁴ A.R. Welch, „Class, Culture and the State in Comparative Education: Problems, Perspectives and Prospects," in *Comparative Education* 29 (1) (1993), pp. 7-27.

⁵⁵ E.g. M.F.D. Young, ed., *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education* (London, Collier-Macmillan, 1971); P. Bourdieu & J.C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London: Sage, 1977. Paperback edition, with new preface, 1990); M.W. Apple, „Ideology, Reproduction and Educational Reform," in P.G. Altbach & G.P. Kelly, eds., *New Approaches to Comparative Education* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 51-71; and *Ideology and Curriculum* (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 2nd. ed. 1990).

⁵⁶ Cf. A.R. Welch, „Knowledge and Legitimation in Comparative Education," in *Comparative Education Review* 35 (3) (1991), pp. 508-531; and Welch, „Class, Culture and the State in Comparative Education."

more or less power and status and are connected to the distribution of power in society in particular ways. The notion of 'cultural capital' or 'cultural power' expresses this relationship.⁵⁷ Developing the school curriculum implies that merely some cultural aspects are included: the curriculum describes what definition of 'culture' is considered as valuable. This definition is linked to the position of groups in society. Culture is a domain of social struggle, „largely unequal, in which the dominant group gains, or retains, control over a cultural definition which is thus seen as more legitimate, and of higher status -- and which is subsequently confirmed in schools.“⁵⁸ Since dominant groups are able to define what knowledge is legitimate and of higher status, the school curriculum does not merely reflect 'what' knowledge is of most worth but in particular 'whose.'

Instead of regarding school knowledge as a 'neutral' selection of cultural characteristics, it should be analyzed in relation with the distribution of power in society.⁵⁹ Dominant groups to a large extent are able to define culture and its embodiment in the school curriculum. Apple observes that schools are agents of cultural reproduction, as he refers to them as a system of institutions helping to „produce the type of knowledge . . . that is needed to maintain the dominant economic, political, and cultural [italics added] arrangements that now exist.“⁶⁰ Such cultural arrangements do not include the cultures of minorities. Aronowitz and Giroux notice that the culture „transmitted by the school is related to the various cultures that make up the wider society, in that it confirms and sustains the culture of the dominant groups while marginalizing and silencing the cultures of subordinate groups . . .“⁶¹

⁵⁷ Welch, „Knowledge and Legitimation in Comparative Education,“ pp. 530-531.

⁵⁸ Welch, „Class, Culture and the State in Comparative Education,“ p. 8.

⁵⁹ The relation between education and power is dialectical, as Young has underlined. He states that there exists a: 'dialectical relationship between access to power and the opportunity to legitimize certain dominant categories, and the processes by which the availability of such categories to some groups enables them to assert power and control over others' (Young, *Knowledge and Control*, p. 8).

⁶⁰ Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. x.

⁶¹ Aronowitz & Giroux, *Postmodern Education*, p. 49.




Figure 3: The relation between the revival of identities, processes of curriculum change and the actual place of minority languages in the school curriculum.

In other words: the dominant majority employs schooling to reproduce the dominant (high-status) majority culture, rejecting subordinate (low-status) minority cultures. Dominance over indigenous minorities, however, has revealed itself to be partial as is shown by the successful resistance from regions to political, economic and cultural centres. The content of schooling has become subject of contest. Indigenous European minorities are increasingly able to transfer the school knowledge which is valuable to them. They successfully have started to discredit the legitimacy of majority knowledge, by implementing minority language education. In Figure 3 this relation between regionalism, curriculum change and minority language education is pictured. It should be noted that the process of curriculum change entails deliberate actions of minority groups. It is hardly to be expected that the dominant majority chooses to have minority languages included in the school curriculum. Processes of curriculum change in European regions should therefore be thought as processes of struggle. The inclusion of minority languages in curricula can be portrayed as a consequence from struggle over legitimate definitions of school knowledge. Such curriculum struggle is rooted in the revival of regional identities in Europe.

Differences between European regions

The relative position of minority languages in the curriculum

Throughout many European regions monolingual (minority language) schools and bilingual schools have come up. In European education, minority languages have a growing place in the curriculum. As such, this educational phenomenon can be explained as the expression of increasing regional identities in an unifying Europe. Regionalism has had considerable aftermaths in curricula. For indigenous minorities, minority language education is assumed to contribute to language maintenance and thereby the strengthening of identity. The rise of education in and about minority languages in Europe can thus satisfactorily be explained as correlating with the revival of regional identities. This conclusion involves the absolute position of the indigenous minority languages in European education: there is an overall increase at the costs of the place of dominant languages in the school curriculum. The differences between regions are considerable. Catalan in Spain appears to have a much more solid position in education when compared with for example Occitan in France. Concerning the relative position of minority languages in education (the position of minority languages in curricula *vis à vis* each other) the Fryske Akademy/Mercator-Education studies⁶² have listed a number of factors that influence this position, such as:

- legal protection: does a minority language receive any formal protection by state and regional authorities, through which its position in the public educational system is safeguarded?
- responsibility and policy issues: do public authorities take responsibility for the inclusion of minority language

⁶² Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: Inventory and Proceedings*; Tjeerdsma & Sikma, *Provision of Learning Materials for Primary and Pre-primary Education*; van der Goot, Renkema & Stuijt, *Pre-Primary Education: An Inventory of the Current Position of Lesser-Used Languages*; Dekkers, *Teacher Training of Minority Languages*.

instruction in the educational system or, if not, do they support the initiatives of private bodies aiming at the establishment of educational provisions in this area?

- attitudes of vital actors involved: do parents and teachers have positive attitudes toward the inclusion of the minority language in the school curriculum, also if this implies supplementary financial investments and extra duties for educationists and teachers?

The establishment of a classification, such as the one presented in Table 1, implies a precise description of the current relative position of minority languages in educational systems, on a national and international scale. Yet, to go beyond a mere description of the position of minority languages in European educational systems would mean that an explanation of their position can be given. In other words: such an explanation would clarify why the place of a minority language in the curriculum is strong or weak, in a particular system of education. For this reason, a theoretical model aiming at explanation, albeit of a tentative nature, is much needed.

Towards explanation?

Within the field of the sociology of language, numerous comparative analyses have been made of minority language situations.⁶³ Such comparisons have resulted in a number of theoretical frameworks.⁶⁴ These, how-

⁶³ C. Bratt Paulston, „Catalan and Occitan: Comparative Test Cases for a Theory of Language Maintenance and Shift,“ in *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 63 (1987), pp. 31-62; J. Fishman, *Reversing Language Shift: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Assistance to Threatened Languages* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1991), pp. 122-336.

⁶⁴ E.g. J. Edwards, „Notes for a Minority-Language Typology: Procedures and Justification,“ in D. Gorter et al., eds., *Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages: General Papers* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), pp. 137-151; and A.B. Anderson, „Comparative Analysis of Language Minorities: A Sociopolitical Framework,“ in D. Gorter et al., eds., *Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages: General Papers* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), pp. 119-136.

ever, focus on the central question of minority language maintenance and shift rather than concentrating on the position of the minority language in education. In this section an attempt is made to outline a model that addresses curricular differences between minority regions.

The Mercator-Education studies have shown that there is an increasing use of indigenous minority languages in European education. Its comparative inventories also reveal that curriculum differences between minority language regions are considerable. It has been argued here that the growth of minority language education is associated with the revival of regional identities in Europe. Regionalism entails the (re)construction of ethnic identity by minority groups. An essential element of the identity of indigenous minorities is their language, being their principal group symbol. The inclusion of the minority language in education is therefore vital for the maintenance of identity. At the same time, the revival of regional identities in Europe has had consequences for European curricula. From Figures 2 and 3 it can be deduced that a recursive relation exists between ethnic identity on the one hand and the actual place of a minority language in the school curriculum on the other. This is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: The recursive relation between the place of the minority language in the school curriculum and ethnic identity

From the above analysis (section 2) it can be argued that a stronger position of the minority language in the curriculum will lead to language maintenance, and therefore to a stronger proclaimed ethnic identity of the indigenous minority. It can also be argued that such a stronger identity will lead to curriculum change, as a more assertive minority will claim a stronger position of the minority language in the school curriculum. Theoretically, both factors can reinforce each other, thus sustaining a process of identity formation and curriculum change. Yet, this process takes place in

usually given political and educational circumstances. Two major determinants of the actual situation in European regions are the public educational system and political conditions. Both can be seen as confinements for the process of identity formation and curriculum change.

The first and most important determinant is the public educational system. Some differences between educational systems in Europe are essential to consider when studying minority language education. The public system in a state may or may not permit regional educational differences. There is an obvious difference between the degree of centralization of the public educational system in e.g. France and Germany. In some European states the regional level of government has full authority in educational affairs whereas in other the regional governments' responsibilities deliberately exclude education. Within one state system, differences between several regions, as concerns educational responsibilities, can diverge largely. Within for example the Spanish and Italian public educational system, varying degrees of authority and policy-making have been transferred to different regions. Also the locus of educational policy from the center accounts for differences between indigenous minority education, as not always curricular aspects are part of central decision-making. In this respect, the recent introduction of the National Curriculum in Great-Britain presents an interesting case. Another aspect is the ease with which (educational) interest groups are able to influence educational policy-making in general and curriculum development in particular. Characteristics of the public educational system such as these have a major impact upon the provision of minority schooling. They generate the range of strategies minorities will actually opt for. The ways in which the public educational system responds to the demands of minorities, affects further actions of indigenous minorities claiming instruction in their own language. A minority that discovers itself in a situation in which the public educational system offers inadequate possibilities for minority language education, may indeed choose to start establishing private schools. At the pre-primary and primary level this alternative has successfully been pursued by in particular smaller indigenous minorities in Europe.⁶⁵ In

⁶⁵ Sikma and Gorter, *European Lesser-used Languages in Primary Education: Inventory and Proceedings*; van der Goot, Renkema & Stuijt, *Pre-primary*

contrast with this mostly small-scale involvement with private schooling, the largest indigenous minority in a contemporary European state, the Catalans in Spain, have employed the public system of education for language planning purposes, including the immersion of non-Catalan immigrants. This use of the public system, however, was preceded by a period of non-formal, often clandestine, private education of Catalan during centralist rule.⁶⁶ The characteristics and role of the public educational system appear to have a major impact on the actual state of minority language education.

The educational system itself should be distinguished from political circumstances, although both are closely related. Discussions about the provision of minority language education are part of a wider political context. The fact that issues such as minority language education should be negotiated with a dominant majority leads to the question of political conditions. Concerning such political conditions Corner states that cultural and linguistic minorities have „found themselves locked into the political and educational system of the majority which has only limited empathy towards recognizing their needs. Economic and political factors seem to greatly determine the extent to which cultural and educational development can be created from a position of dependency . . . “⁶⁷ The dependency of ethnic minorities on the political system of the majority obviously is an important determinant of their relative position in education. This dependency controls the degree to which their curriculum demands are responded to as well as the possibilities they have of establishing their own provisions.⁶⁸ The evident reaction of ethnic minorities to this dependency is a call for autonomy. The process of identity (re)construction and curriculum

Education: An Inventory of the Current Position of Lesser-used Languages in Pre-primary Education in some Member States of the European Union.

⁶⁶ Petherbridge-Hernandez, „Reconceptualizing Liberating Non-formal Education“; P. Petherbridge-Hernandez, „The Recatalonization of Catalonia’s Schools,“ in *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 3 (2) (1990), pp. 97-108.

⁶⁷ Corner, „The Maritime and Border Regions of Western Europe,“ p. 232.

⁶⁸ For a more thorough review of the relative success of ethnic and linguistic minorities in controlling their own education, refer to Churchill, 1986, p. 31. Issues of finance, organization and governance that influence ‘the extent to which the minority group exercises control over . . . the education offered to its members . . .’ are identified.

change sketched above, from a political point of view raises questions such as what still constitutes national identity and whether political cohesion will be guaranteed on a nation-state level in Europe. Yet, appraisals about the inevitability of political autonomy should be made with care. Corner, comparing Catalonia and the Basque Country, points in this regard to the fact that the perception of autonomy which the minority regards itself as having also deserves notice.⁶⁹ A plea for linguistic pluralism in domains such as education does not necessarily imply an attempt at the establishment of political independence. The question can be asked to which degree cultural autonomy in fact requires political self-governance.⁷⁰ However, it is obvious that the actual political conditions in which minorities attempt to foster their identity and strive towards minority language education, form an important contextual factor when analysing minority schooling.⁷¹

As was argued in section 2 of this article the use of the minority language in education is expected to sustain ethnic identity, whereas the revival of ethnic identity affects curriculum. 'Ethnic identity' and 'curriculum' are the two central factors in the process of identity formation and curriculum change that was sketched. Between these two factors, both characteristics of the public educational system and actual political conditions can be placed, resulting in the explanatory model shown in Figure 5.

⁶⁹ Corner, „The Maritime and Border Regions of Western Europe,“ pp. 236-237.

⁷⁰ J. Penrose, „Globalization, Fragmentation and a Dysfunctional Concept of Nation: The Death Knell of 'Nation-States' and the Salvation of Cultural Diversity?“ Paper presented at the Seminar 'Ethnocultural Identity of European Minorities: Continuity and Change,' Institute of Sociology, University of Gdansk, Poland, September 1994.

⁷¹ Cf. P. Petherbridge-Hernandez & Latiner Raby, R., „Twentieth-century Transformations in Catalonia and the Ukraine: Ethnic Implications in Education,“ in *Comparative Education Review* 37 (1) (1993), pp. 31-49.




Figure 5: Tentative explanatory model of minority language education

This model is rudimentary and is definitely not sophisticated enough to explain satisfactorily the current differences between regions. Yet, both the identification of the recursive relation between identity and curriculum and the description of two determinants of processes taking place in European regions are of importance for successive comparative studies of the education of indigenous minorities.

An agenda for comparative education: suggestions for further research

In comparative education, neither the study of regions within European states nor the use of notions such as 'ethnicity' or 'regional identity' have been prominent matter on the research agenda. The current wave of regionalism across the European continent certainly presents a challenge to the field of comparative studies. The notion of Europe as a whole of solid nation-states, working towards further integration will have to be replaced by one that takes into account the particularities of regional and local cultural developments. Further study of the ways in which indigenous European minorities are asserting their identities and are changing the content of education according to their needs is much needed. Their views on cultural pluralism will undoubtedly influence the educational needs and

demands of immigrant minorities. In this article, a tentative model of minority language education has been presented. This model, rudimentary and incomplete as it is, may be a favourable start for subsequent comparative studies. In further research it seems necessary to analyze more systematically to what extent differences between regional developments can be attributed to characteristics of the minority itself, the public educational system and political conditions.

Characteristics of the indigenous minority itself include quantitative aspects, such as for example the number of minority language speakers, and more qualitative aspects such as the societal benefits and prestige of the language involved. A usable framework for such an analysis of a minority is offered by ethnolinguistic vitality theory.⁷² Both the objective support for the minority language in e.g. media and public life and subjective ethnolinguistic vitality as evaluated by minority language speakers should be considered.⁷³ In this regard, an interesting issue would be the degree to which the language itself is considered critical for ethnic identity.⁷⁴ People can in fact identify themselves as indigenous minority members, without being able to speak the minority language.⁷⁵ As a consequence, minority elites and minority members may disagree concerning the need of minority language protection for the maintenance of identity. Thus, the use of schooling as a means towards ethnic survival may be disputed within indigenous minority groups.⁷⁶

⁷² Cf. H. Giles, L. Leets & N. Coupland, „Minority Language Group Status: A Theoretical Consensus“, in D. Gorter et al., eds., *Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages: General Papers* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), pp. 37-55; R. Allard & R. Landry, „Ethnolinguistic Vitality Beliefs and Language Maintenance and Loss“, in W. Fase, K. Jaspaert & S. Kroon, eds., *Maintenance and Loss of Minority Languages* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1992), pp. 171-196.

⁷³ E.g. J. Ytsma et al., „Ethnolinguistic Vitality and Ethnic Identity: Some Catalan and Frisian Data“, in *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 108 (1994), pp. 63-78.

⁷⁴ Cf. Edwards, „Bilingualism, Education and Identity.“

⁷⁵ J. Ytsma, „Frisian Self-identity and Other-identity.“ Paper presented at the 5th ICML, Cardiff, July 1993.

⁷⁶ M. Byram, „Bilingualism in Minority Education: The Conflict of Interest Between Minorities and their Members“, in K. Jaspaert & S. Kroon, eds.,

In this article, curriculum change achieved by indigenous minorities has been described as a struggle around the legitimacy of school knowledge. Such a curriculum struggle is rooted in regionalism. This struggle, to a large extent, is constrained by a given educational and political context. Characteristics of the educational system to be considered when analyzing minority language education, are in particular the degree and nature of centralization and the ease with which interest groups are able to influence educational policy-making in general and curriculum development in particular. The actual steps taken by indigenous minorities in processes of curriculum change have hardly been studied. The political conditions in which minorities have to organise minority language education are of eminent importance. The endeavour of indigenous minorities to establish educational provisions according to their demands raises the wider question of cultural autonomy and the feasibility of distinctive cultural politics of particular groups.

Summing up: if comparative education would aim for explanation of regional educational development within European states, it is important to focus on the above sketched process of (re)construction of identity and curriculum change. Elements to be considered for further comparative inquiry include characteristics of particular minorities, as well as the capacities of different educational systems and diverse political conditions. It is especially the interaction of these three components in a specific region that demands further research. The nature of these questions suggests that such research should employ in-depth case-studies.⁷⁷ The cultural and educational politics of diverse groups within European states, be it traditional majorities, long resident indigenous minorities or relatively recently arrived immigrants, and the interaction between them undoubtedly will be on the future agenda of comparative education.

Ethnic Minority Languages and Education (Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger, 1991), pp. 15-23; Edwards, *Multilingualism*.

⁷⁷ W.J.T. Renkema, „Case Studies in Comparative Education: Beyond the Particular?“, Paper presented at the methodological workshop for young researchers in comparative education, 16th CESE-Conference, Copenhagen, June 1994; Renkema, „Regional Identities in Europe: The Position of Lesser-used Languages in the Educational Systems of the European Union.“

EUROPEAN CULTURE: UNITY AND FRACTURES

David Coulby

Regional, National and European Cultures: Beyond the Folklore Museum

This article examines the cultural implications of the implementation of the theme of the European dimension into the curricula of schools and universities in the member states of the European Union (EU). It considers this firstly from the point of view of the regional cultures of Europe and then from the position of those groups who have moved into the cities of the Union through international migration. In both sections the article uses languages and history as curricular examples.

The theme of Europeanization and the European Dimension in Education, espoused by the various bureaucracies of the Union is based on an assumption of stable and readily recognizable boundaries to the continent. In fact these boundaries are far from clear whether considered in political, economic or cultural terms. In political terms the boundaries of Europe might self-evidently be identified with the boundaries of the Union itself. But the boundaries of Europe are actually highly problematic. Even in terms of the EU, Europe will expand next year when four additional member states sign the Maastricht Treaty. A queue of would-be members stretches across the Carpathians and the Bosphorous. Less obviously, the day will come when nations wish to leave the EU. This political and

administrative identification will one day shrink even as it is now expanding.

In economic terms the European Union is a major participant in world trade. Despite its huge internal production and market, the Union has no aspiration to limit its trade with the rest of the world, though it might attempt to control it through mechanisms such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). It continues the pattern of international trade and, wherever possible, exploitation, on which the success of Europe's cities is based. The cultural boundaries of Europe are considered throughout this article.

Behind the impulsion towards the creation of the EU there were cultural forces as well as and at least as strong as the political and economic justifications. The states and cities which Europeans perceive to have played the most active part in the formation of their culture now probably all belong to the EU. This would not have been the case without, say Athens or Amsterdam. The theme of Europeanization is itself a manifestation of the power of this cultural impulsion. Of course there is a political reason for the EU being prepared to spend such generous sums on this theme. The more the children of Europe learn within a Europeanized curriculum the more they are likely to grow up to endorse European union and the political and bureaucratic institutions which support it. Furthermore, the more the curricula of member states become Europeanized the stronger will grow those cultural impulsions towards unity. The Europeanization of the school and university curricula is a political intervention on the culture of the continent. The creation of a unitary cosmopolitan culture includes European science and knowledge within its delineation of curricular systems.¹ This confluence may be seen as a progressive and creative fusion, a harmonization. As a powerful and deep-rooted cultural force, it may, however, have costs as well as benefits.

¹ D. Coulby, "Urban Civic Culture and Education" in D. Coulby & C. Jones, eds., *World Yearbook of Education: Education and Urbanization* (London: Kogan Page, 1992); "Cultural and Epistemological Relativism and European Curricula," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 3 (2-3) (1993), pp. 7-18; D. Coulby & C. Jones, *Postmodernity and European Education Systems: Cultural Diversity and Centralist Knowledge* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham, 1995).

The impulsion towards unity, for instance might not work towards the aspiration of widening as well as deepening the Union. If the Europeanized curricula stress the traditionalist account of European culture then some countries on the periphery may be increasingly perceived as marginal or even hostile. If European knowledge and culture are perceived as being Christian in terms of Catholicism and Protestantism and democratic-capitalist, then how will the Europeanized curriculum present the cultures of Islamic and Orthodox countries and of those now emerging from totalitarian state-directed economies? Are the proponents of Europeanized culture and knowledge prepared to recognize the contributions of Prague, Moscow and Istanbul to its formation? Or of Cluj, Timosoara and Brasov? The curriculum may set in train cultural forces which limit the growth of the EU at the same time as they encourage a strengthening and homogenization within its boundaries.

In one sense Europeanization flies in the face of fact. Neither Europe nor its cultures are unitary. There is not a common culture between the United Kingdom and Spain. To concentrate on the common culture between the two states may be to seek a lowest common denominator which takes away the richness of each. Indeed there is no common culture within the United Kingdom or Spain. The histories of the formation of the European states are a record of the attempt to impose unity on heterogeneity.² The success of the unitary modernist endeavour is still very much in doubt in Catalonia, Brittany, Scotland and Lombardy. Can the Spanish curriculum adequately reflect the contribution of Barcelona, let alone the conflicts between Castile and Catalonia?

Some exemplification is offered in the next paragraphs to explain the links between curriculum, cultural formation and reformation and regional, national and continental identities. At this stage, and again below, this article considers two brief examples, languages and history, but other areas of the school curriculum, especially national language and literature teaching, religious education and science, would provide equally interesting results.

² F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th to 18th Century*, 3 vols. (London: Collins, 1985); and F. Braudel, *The Identity of France, Vol. 1: History and Environment* (London: Fontana, 1989), *Vol. 2: People and Production*. (London: Fontana, 1990).

A firm plank in the Europeanization of the school curriculum is the expansion of language teaching: more pupils should be able to learn more languages. This, it might be supposed, would lead to more heterogeneity and away from unitary knowledge. But language teaching in the Union is overwhelmingly the teaching of English. Even in those school systems, rapidly decreasing in number, where English is not the first taught foreign language, pupils and students opt with their purses during or after the school years by attending commercial language classes. There are sound career reasons for this in the current economic order, reasons which are connected with financial history and in no way related to the qualities of English as a language: despite its apparent current global position English will eventually pass the way of other international languages. Where English is not the first foreign language or where there are second and third options available to pupils and students, the languages studied tend to be those of the other large powers of the Union; French and German and, to a lesser extent, Spanish and Italian. There are reasons to be concerned about the future of the less powerful official languages of the Union; Greek, Dutch, Danish and Portuguese. This is even more the case for those minority languages which are spoken within or between the states of the Union. Welsh is still taught in Wales and Catalan in Catalonia. But how much is Welsh taught in England or Catalan in Castile? Not at all of course. The idea of teaching Catalan to English pupils would be considered absurd.

Another popular theme for the European dimension in the curriculum is history.³ This need not be the history of the formation, struggles and imperialism of the great European powers; Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, England (sic), Germany and Italy. But these three themes -- formation, internal struggles and imperialism -- do actually describe much of the history curriculum, even where it has been Europeanized. A more genuinely European history might look at the development of the religious and economic beliefs and institutions alongside that of the political

³ A-L. Hostermark Tarrou, "The Goals of Enhancing National and International Cultures. Challenges to Teacher Education," in *European Journal of Teacher Education* 16 (2) (1993), pp. 95-112; G. Millat, "Britain and European Integration through British History Schoolbooks Published Between 1961 and 1971," in *European Journal of Teacher Education* 16 (2) (1993), pp. 125-136.

systems. The Thirty Years War⁴ and the Industrial Revolution might be themes that open a more European understanding for students than the conquests of, say, Ferdinand and Isabella or of Napoleon. But even so the history and achievement of the minority populations of Europe and of the less dominant regions would remain hidden. Indeed the very process whereby they had become minority and hidden -- the long painful histories of Brittany and the Vendée or of the Mezzogiorno -- would be concealed. Before England embarked on world conquest it dominated first Wales, Scotland and Ireland. The domination of Scotland culminated at Culloden and led to the pacification (depopulation) of the Highlands and Islands. At the very time that this was happening, intellectuals in the Lowlands of Scotland, especially in Edinburgh, were playing a major part in the emerging Enlightenment. Should the European theme in history make some explanation of these events available to pupils in Inverness? in London? in Grenada? If such explanations are not made available then the histories and even the major achievements -- the Scottish Enlightenment, the Cordoba Caliphate -- of minority populations and less politically and economically favored regions will become invisible; folklore museums for uncomprehending and bored tourists from the central European metropolis.

These cannot be dismissed as small scale or marginal issues: a far from comprehensive list and one which tactfully steered clear of some of the major internal conflicts within the EU would include Andalusia, Catalonia, the Basque country, Brittany, Languedoc, Friesland, the Alto Adige, the Mezzogiorno, Wales and Scotland. In linguistic, if not historic terms, some of the actual states of the Union find themselves excluded from the Europeanization of the curriculum. I stress that I am not arguing that Europeanization and the European dimension in the curriculum are a Bad Thing. Would that the issue were so simple. What I am seeking to analyze is a conflict between, on the one hand, the centripetal force of Europeanization pulling culture and knowledge towards the metropolitan center and, on the other, the centrifugal forces of local, regional and even national identities pulling outwards towards the preservation and reformulation of heterogeneity.

⁴ R. Rogers, "Common Core History for Young Europeans," in *European Journal of Teacher Education* 16 (2) (1993), pp. 113-124.

International Migration and European Culture: Empires and Error

This conflict model with its familiar cultural cartography of center and periphery would present a readily comprehensible theoretic, but it is actually by no means the whole story. This simple model is hopelessly complicated by historical and recent patterns of migration within and between the countries of the EU and into the Union from outside. The demographic patterns of these migrations are well described elsewhere.⁵ From the point of view of European culture, these patterns of migration add a further layer of complexity to the languages and knowledge systems held by the people of the EU.⁶ The main thrust of this section of the argument concerns those populations from Anatolia, Asia, Africa and Latin and Caribbean America who have settled in the cities of the EU in the period of economic expansion which followed 1945. However, the argument could also be extended to the inter-European migration patterns

⁵ D. Noin & R. Woods, eds., *The Changing Population of Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

⁶ J. Broadbent, "Education for a Multicultural Society in the United Kingdom," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (3) (1994), pp. 3-13; G. Campani, "Intercultural Education in Italy," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (3) (1994), pp. 44-53; C. Liauzu, "Interculturalism: New Lands to Discover in France," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (3) (1994), pp. 25-31; W. Fase, "Intercultural Education: The Dutch Way," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 49-58; F.J. Garcia-Castano & R.A.P. Moyano, "Multicultural Education: Some Reflections on the Spanish Case," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 67-80; E. Lammers, "Intercultural Education: A Danish Point of View," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 29-39; G. Marcou, "Intercultural Education in Multicultural Greece," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (3) (1993), pp. 32-43; M. Martiniello & A. Manco, "Intercultural Education in French-speaking Belgium: An Overview of Ideology, Legislation and Practice," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 19-27; H.H. Reich, "Intercultural Education in Germany," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (3) (1994), pp. 14-24; L.T. Szabio, "Values and Value Conflicts in Hungarian Education: The Case of the National Core Curriculum -- An Unfinished Story," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (1) (1993), pp. 57-64; M.B.R. Trindade & M.L.S. Medes, "Portugal: A Profile of Intercultural Education," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 59-65.

especially of people from the South and the East to the cities of the North or indeed, more simply, from all countries of Europe into the cities of the Western part of Germany. In addition the itinerant population of gypsies and travellers provides member states with an unrecognized and misunderstood culture and with unresolved educational difficulties.⁷ Furthermore, German speaking people „returning“ to the cities of the West from East Prussia or Transylvania bring with them distinct traditions and cultural patterns almost as fragile in Cologne as in present day Romania and Poland.

At this stage it is necessary to insist on the wider interpretation of the concept of culture. The populations from Africa and Asia which have become resident in the cities of the EU bring with them not quaint, folkloric habits of costume and gastronomically adventurous cuisines and dietary practices. The cultures they represent include languages, some of major international importance such as Chinese, Hindi or Bengali, others much more limited and fragile; in many cases the groups speak more than one language or regional dialect. Their religions too are often representative of huge international faith communities such as Moslems, Hindus or Sikhs. Others continue the little known religious systems of smaller groups. The cultures associated with these languages and religions include

⁷ Council of Europe, *Migrant Culture in a Changing Society: Multicultural Europe by the Year 2000* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1983); *Training Teachers in Intercultural Education?* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1986); *The Education and Cultural Development of Migrants. Abstract of the Final Report of the Project Group* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1987); *Gypsy Children in Schools: Training for Teachers and other Personnel* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1989); *Final Educational Evaluation of the Programme of Experiments in Intercultural Education from 1986 to 1991* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1990); *Europe 1990-2000: Multiculturalism in the City. The Integration of Immigrants* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1991); *Towards Intercultural Education -- Training for Teachers of Gypsy Pupils* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1992); *School Provision for Gypsy and Traveller Children: Distance Learning and Pedagogical Follow-Up* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1992); *Schooling for Gypsies' and Travellers' Children -- Evaluating Innovation* (Council of Europe: Strasbourg, 1992).

not only literature, art and music but also philosophy, science, technology, medicine and law.⁸

The impact of these populations on the cultural and educational map of the EU is profound. Their presence, especially in the large cities of the Union, is a further exposure of the absurdity of a unitary national or pan-European culture. There are nearly two hundred languages spoken by children in the schools of London. Islam is a major religious and communal force in Frankfurt and Berlin. These populations have often migrated to the metropolitan centers of the previously colonizing (politically and/or economically) power: Surinamese and Moluccans to Amsterdam, Magrhebians to Paris and Marseilles, West Indians and people from the subcontinent of India to London and Birmingham, Turks to Stuttgart and Munich, Chilean refugees to Madrid and now Ethiopians and Magrhebians to Naples and Milan. Consequently they have views concerning European imperialism and economic colonialism which may be in stark contrast with that of other constituents of the urban population or indeed of state controlled school and university systems.

In terms of languages, then, the school curriculum is faced with a set of political difficulties. It seems uncontested that all children should learn the language of the state in which they live. But some countries of the Union and indeed some large cities have more than one official language. Should Arabic-speaking children in Brussels learn French or Flemish or both? Should Bangladeshi-speaking young people in Cardiff learn Welsh or English or both? The nature of the languages supported also needs to be addressed. Should the school systems of the Union attempt to maintain the heritage languages of the children and young people in the schools and universities? This is administratively possible, if politically unpopular, in areas of high concentration such as with Arabic-speaking people in Lyons or Bangladeshi-speakers in the Tower Hamlets area of East London. In areas where there is a high diversity of heritage languages, and some primary schools in London have over forty languages spoken by their

⁸ T. Van Boven, "The European Context for Intercultural Education," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (1) (1993), pp. 7-14; F. Wittek, et al., "Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in the Education Systems of the European Community," in *European Journal of Intercultural Studies* 4 (2) (1993), pp. 7-17.

children, the very administration of heritage language development presents almost insuperable difficulties.

Languages present curriculum planners with a political minefield. I will use the example of London here only because it is one of the most complex. Parallel issues exist in all the countries of the Union with the possible exception of Greece. When Bangladeshi-speaking Londoners are taught a language at school why should this be French or German as against Bengali itself? If they are not able to achieve accredited examination success in their own language then their academic and commercial potential is surely being as under-utilized as their culture is being unrecognized. Furthermore, when English speaking pupils from an area of London with a high percentage of Bangladeshi speakers choose a language why should this not be Bangladeshi rather than French or German? Bangladeshi is the more widely-spoken language internationally of the three and furthermore it is likely to allow the pupils to communicate with their neighbors on a daily basis rather than with other Europeans on an occasional holiday or academic conference. The theme of Europeanization would insist that the English speaking pupils (above all!) should learn other languages of the Union but this is again to neglect and negate the actual cultural and linguistic diversity of London. The linguistic, cultural and commercial strength of London, as of so many cities of the Union, lies in its diversity. Any attempt to homogenise it in the interests of Europeanization will only lead to the destruction of this diversity and the erosion of this strength.

The example of history need not be so anglocentric nor so detailed, especially since it is an important dimension of those state defined curricular systems considered in the concluding section. The point about history is well made in one of my favorite quotations from Braudel:

Similarly, the present-day territory of France . . . is not the only standard of measurement we need refer to. Within it are sub-measurements: regions, provinces, *pays*, which long maintained, and which still do maintain a significant degree of autonomy; while beyond it there is Europe and beyond Europe the world. . . one might go on to say „there is no such thing as European history, there is world history“ . . .⁹

⁹ Braudel, *The Identity of France*, Vol. 1, p. 20.

The chronicle of centralization and domination within and between the states which now make up the Union is not confined to the peoples within their boundaries however these are defined. The Empires of Portugal, Spain, Holland, England and France have had a profound influence on the economies, politics and cultures of huge areas of the world. Belgium, Germany and Italy played a smaller but not insignificant part in these transformations. Many of the major imperialistic powers of the last millennium are now member states of the Union. Any history of these states individually or collectively must either be world history or be error. Yet seen from a world perspective this is a history of conquest, subjugation, slavery, genocide and exploitation which hardly reflects creditably on the countries concerned. This perspective is frequently that of those urban migrant groups whose countries have witnessed the record of European imperialism from the receiving end. The history curricula of the European states are in some cases attempting to address these issues and in others to avoid them.

To the extent to which states attempt to ignore or disguise these issues they fail among other things to reflect the heterogeneity of the culture of present day Europe. But this heterogeneity is itself only new in degree rather than in kind. Heterogeneity has been a feature of the large powerful cities of the continent at least since the Roman Republic. The mighty cities of Europe's emergence -- Venice, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London -- bear witness to an openness to the outside world. Certainly this openness is most obviously seen in terms of trade and subsequent conquest, but it is also there in a receptivity to new ideas, products and practices.¹⁰ Furthermore, a cultural diversity of population characterized these powerful cities in the past just as it does today.

This openness may be demonstrated in cultural and knowledge terms. A detailed analysis of Islamic and Byzantine influences on the Renaissance is hardly needed here. The Moorish-Norman buildings of Naples and Sicily make the point as strongly as the Byzantine basilica of St Mark's. But the influences go beyond art and architecture into technical, financial and mercantile processes, exegesis of Greek and Roman texts, science and mathematics. Indeed mathematics, so often presented as one of the highest planes

¹⁰ Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*.

of European achievement, is at least as much the product of Asian and African skill.¹¹ Indeed, Europe's cultural strength may be seen to reside in its periods of openness to its own heterogeneity rather than in any attempts at closure or imposed unity. The record of cultural closure is one of Europe's bloodiest, through crusades, inquisitions and slavery to the holocaust. The influence of migrating groups within Europe and from beyond is not a new phenomenon, but over a long period one of the most important influences on the formation of European knowledge and culture.

Conclusion: Nationalist Knowledge

This article has presented some of the conflicts between the heterogeneous knowledge and culture current within the EU and the well-meant process of Europeanization. In order to sharpen the contrast it has deliberately overlooked the still dominant curricular influence in many of the member states, namely central national governments. In some countries of the Union, such as Greece, curricular prescription continues even to the extent of the designation of textbooks. In other countries, such as France, a central system is slowly relaxing its tight grip.¹² In England and Wales a National Curriculum is being remarkably unsuccessfully enforced on reluctant schools and localities.¹³

These national curricular systems, of which that in England and Wales is a prime and retrograde example, are impervious to either regional influence or multicultural knowledge systems on the one hand or to Europeanization on the other. They are typified by at least the following characteristics: a concentration on the purity of the national language; an emphasis on national literature, science and technology stressed as adjuncts to capitalist enterprise; a revisionist concentration on national history, ideologically codified to present a chronicle of the heroic progress of human civilization; religion presented in partial and often compulsory denominational codes.

¹¹ G.G. Joseph, *The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).

¹² M. McLean, *Britain and a Single Market Europe: Prospects for a Common School Curriculum* (London: Kogan Page, 1990).

¹³ L. Bash & D. Coulby, *The Education Reform Act: Competition and Control*. (London: Cassell, 1989); D. Coulby & L. Bash, *Contradiction and Conflict: The 1988 Education Act in Action* (London: Cassell, 1991).

National and nationalist curricular systems tend to employ the rhetoric of heritage. The heritage is exclusive to the people who can claim their ancestry back into a proud chauvinistic past. Regional and immigrant groups are the victims of this curriculum just as in the past they were the victims of events and movements now jingoistically reinterpreted: „the birth of the nation,“ „the national language,“ etc. The state curricula purvey cultural imperialism within the countries of the EU as much as Europe's literatures, films, pop music and commodity fetishism penetrate beyond the boundaries of the continent.

Such a curriculum is touchingly untroubled by the difficulties of introducing Europeanization. Against the National Curriculum of England and Wales or the language obsessions of the current French government, the European theme would be a breath of fresh air. At least through Europeanization some sense of a wider international community, a richer and less certain history, a more heterogeneous and interactive culture may be accessed.

Depending on the existing cultural practices within a state region or institution, then, the European dimension may a threat or a source of liberation. It is a threat to the heterogeneous vitality of the continent's culture but it could offer a source of liberation from the dominant nationalistic knowledge systems of triumphalist states.

Section III

The European Dimension in Education

TEACHING A LINGUA FRANCA FOR A MULTICULTURAL EUROPE: SOME REMARKS ON EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL SUMMER LANGUAGE COURSES

Wilfried Bos

Considering the ever-increasing pressure for cooperation between European nations, ethnic and national conflicts in Eastern Europe, increasing violence against foreigners in the European Union, and the progression towards European integration, it is obvious that education must take European issues into greater account. Analysis of different concepts of multicultural, intercultural, and international or anti-racist education,¹ makes it quite obvious that an education system geared towards a homogeneous European culture is not feasible. An education system which does not take the variety of different European national and regional traditions and characteristics and the peculiarities of non-territorial minorities into consideration is antiquated. An education system built upon the idea of one dominating, perhaps even „mono-lingual supra-European culture,“ is most certainly destined to fail.

The prescribed goals, as provided by the architects of the European „house“ are general (i.e. the improvement and realization of human rights, the development of a European identity, and the development of a

¹ W. Bos, „Wie multikulturell ist und will Europa sein?“ in K. Schleicher & W. Bos, eds., *Realisierung der Bildung in Europa. Europäisches Bewußtsein trotz kultureller Identität?* (Darinstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), pp. 311-335.

conscious global responsibility in Europe) and are provided for by programs and networks of cooperation and counsel.² Often these programs tend to cater to university students, the intellectual elite of the future. The four largest programs are PETRA, with youths as its target group, EUROFORM, targeting the working population, and ERASMUS and COMETT II which focus on university students. On average, whereas one student receives 12 ECU, one worker receives 1 ECU to further his/her training, and one juvenile receives just 0.3 ECU to further his/her job training.³ Would the realization of European unity be most effectively achieved through the furthering of the cultural elite, or by drawing on the experiences and practical knowledge of the normal citizenry? This question cannot be decided at this point. The European education systems are being confronted with these facts. They are commissioned to organize and conduct such programs, but often these programs suffer from a lack of funding, especially for financing an evaluation.

The „Europeanization“ of higher education must be studied in more detail. In the case of ERASMUS, the „student tourism program,“ frequently very young students spend a few weeks studying abroad at a university within the European Union. Preliminary results of an evaluation of the ERASMUS program⁴ could indicate that the availability of accompanying social programs in each country is lacking. Because such support programs often depend on the local initiator of the particular program and his/her dedication, the students are frequently left to their own devices when dealing with the problems of cultural integration, making contact

² W. Bos, „Politikberatung. Eine Aufgabe der Vergleichenden Erziehungswissenschaft bei der Integration Europas,“ in Schleicher & Bos, eds., *Realisierung der Bildung in Europa*, pp. 353-361.

³ S. Manning, „Bildungsprogram der EG in den neuen Bundesländern,“ in Schleicher & Bos, eds., *Realisierung der Bildung in Europa*, pp. 137-152.

⁴ U. Teichler, *Experiences of Erasmus Students. Select Findings of the 1988/89 Survey*. Erasmus Monographs No. 13 (Brussels: Erasmus Bureau. [Werkstattberichte Nr. 32. Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum für Berufs- und Hochschulforschung der Gesamthochschule Kassel], 1991); F. Maiworm, W. Steube & U. Teichler, *Experiences of Erasmus Students 1990/91*. Erasmus Monographs No. 17 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities Task Force: Human Resources, Education, Training and Youth. [Werkstattberichte Nr. 42. Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum für Berufs- und Hochschulforschung der Universität Gesamthochschule Kassel], 1993).

with students of their host country, and adapting to the peculiarities of living in a new culture. Integration is frequently limited by subject matter, as foreign participants spend free time with one another, rather than with natives of their host countries. They forge new and deeper friendships, but among co-nationals.

Research Question

The development of the *Kurzzeitpädagogik* (short-term education) by Hahn⁵ has caused an increasing awareness that short term learning processes must be supervised and structured in order to be successful. The prejudices of youth do not simply disappear through contact with other cultures,⁶ as has been shown through international school exchanges⁷ and multinational-national summer camps.⁸ Communication and experience enable the growth of intercultural learning. Research on cultural exchange shows⁹ that foreign students do not learn only through cultural contact, but rather through the use of a mediator who has already been living in the host country for a longer period of time.¹⁰ Through the use of more for-

⁵ K. Hahn, *Short-Term Schools* (Aberdeen: University Press, 1983), quoted from H. Weber & J. Ziegenspeck, *Die deutschen Kurzschulen. Historischer Rückblick - Gegenwärtige Situation - Perspektiven* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1952), p. 278.

⁶ A. Furnham & S. Bochner, *Culture Shock. Psychological Reactions to Unfamiliar Environments* (London: Methuen, 1986).

⁷ Thomas-Morus-Akademie [bearbeitet von E. Bremekamp], *Von Argentinien bis Zimbabwe: Planungshilfen für schulische Aufenthalte im Ausland. Wissenswertes zu Angeboten, Richtlinien, Förderungsmöglichkeiten, Ländern für Schülerinnen/Schüler, Eltern, Lehrerinnen/Lehrer* (Bensberg: Thomas-Morus-Akademie, 1993).

⁸ Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission, ed., *Handreichungen für den interkulturellen Schüleraustausch* (Bonn: Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission, 1991).

⁹ A. Furnham & S. Bochner, „Social Difficulty in a Foreign Culture: An Empirical Analysis of Culture Shock,“ in S. Bochner, ed., *Cultures in Contact. Studies in Cross-Cultural Interaction* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), pp. 161-198; A. Thomas, „Psychologische Wirksamkeit von Kulturstandards im interkulturellen Handeln,“ in A. Thomas, ed., *Kulturstandards in der internationalen Begegnung* (Saarbrücken: Breitenbach, 1991), pp. 55-69.

¹⁰ S. Bochner, ed., *The Mediating Person: Bridges Between Cultures* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1981).

malized methods of support organized through professional, educational direction, the process of intercultural education seems to be sped up.¹¹ For students on short-term exchanges this is supposedly even more true.

Many students are hindered from studying in a foreign country due to lack of time and money, and the possibilities of short-term exchanges through ERASMUS are limited. The alternative lies in international summer courses offered at many universities,¹² often providing students the opportunity to improve a foreign language while promoting intercultural education. Directors of such programs draw on years of experience to maintain quality programs to satisfy the needs of paying students who help to finance the university. In a few well-known studies, the problems involved in host families were discussed;¹³ multicultural learning, however, was somewhat neglected in these studies, making it an even more interesting topic for this pilot study. The focal point in this study is an attempt to get a first impression of whether intercultural learning in short-term exchange courses is possible in higher education. In addition, the format of the learning groups, the organization and the way in which the course is conducted, and the integration of classroom activities with extra-curricular activities will be described. The learning experiences of the course participants will be the basis for this pilot study.

Study Design

In the Summer of 1992 this study was completed in the language center of Nottingham Polytechnic (now the City University of Nottingham). It was carried out through an all-inclusive survey of two three-week courses (from July 19 to August 8 and from August 10 to August 28), offering a „general English course,“ plus options and electives. Twenty hours of language study were planned in the mornings and 11 hours of a language

¹¹ E.S. Deutsch, *International Education and Exchange. A Sociological Analysis* (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970); W. Treuheit, B. Janssen & H. Otten, *Bildung für Europa. Interkulturelles Lernen in Jugendbewegungen* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990).

¹² DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), *Englisch-Sommer-Sprach- und Fachkurse an Hochschulen in Großbritannien und Irland* (Bonn: DAAD, 1992).

¹³ EFL Service, ed., *Students Talking* (Elsworth: EFL Service, Ltd., 1992).

laboratory per week, with observation and guidance, but without correction on an individual basis. To assist with speaking or conversational situations and to incorporate the participants' own personal interests and improve individual language deficits, the language lab utilized video cassettes and special audio cassettes. Practicing grammar, pronunciation, etc. were the tasks for the four-hour morning classes, utilizing current workbooks featuring bicultural (i.e. German/English) orientation. Group work and discussions on science and technology, literature and drama, law, business English, and social science took place in the afternoons. Students were also offered optional courses (i.e. theatre, videography, photography, etc.) that they could select according to personal preferences. These optional courses were taught by academics, but the general language instruction and course offerings were taught by teachers of the Nottingham Language Center who were qualified to teach English as a foreign language. The instructors lead discussions about the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the students, often causing difficulties due to conflicts between respective cultures. For example, in a discussion about abortion, the irreconcilable and contrary attitudes of the participants of different traditions and cultures would clearly assert themselves. The morning instruction was divided up into groups of 5 to 10 people assigned on the basis of ability, while attempting to maintain a cultural balance. Entrance tests determined the ability of each participant, dividing the groups into four levels of lower intermediate, upper intermediate, advanced and academic. The optional courses were done in multicultural groups of 3 to 10 people not divided up by language ability. Special learning materials (standard English books of different fields) were used in the specialized courses, as well as excursions planned in connection with the courses, including visits to the court building (law), to schools (social sciences), the airport (technology), etc. During the week videos were often shown and discussed with a consistent emphasis placed on cultural comparisons.

In addition to the formal instruction program, social activities were considered a learning opportunity outside of the classroom. Students went on tours through the pubs of Nottingham, visited the castle and park of Lord Byron, and a local Rock and Reggae festival, as well as excursions to other famous sights. Almost every evening or weekend another activity was offered, organized by a graduate student at Nottingham Polytechnic.

This student was assigned the task of establishing this program, but also assisted students with every day problems. The student chosen for this position was preparing for his own study-trip abroad, therefore, his interest and enthusiasm for the job were excellent. Language instructors were also present at all activities of the social program.

Data from the first course were collected by myself and from the second course by colleagues from the Language Center.¹⁴ Data were primarily based on standardized questionnaires completed by participants in both courses, in addition to the impressions and experiences of an unscheduled, participatory observation in the first course. Working together, students and instructors developed the questionnaire into its final form, consisting of six main areas with 32 variables subjectively evaluated by the participants. Participants graded the items on a four-point scale (e.g. 1: not much, 2: a little, 3: much, 4: very much). The social program, the attractiveness of the course in general, the success in improvement of language skills, the causes of successful learning, the multicultural learning situation, and the contact and the communication situation were the six main areas to be evaluated. In addition, data were collected as to age, gender, nationality, residential situation, occupation, and whether the participants desired further communication with the host country, fellow students, etc.

Results

Both courses consisted of approximately 30 participants. In the first course 26 students completed the questionnaire and in the second course 27 students. Of these students half were in the two higher levels of instruction and half were in the two lower levels. The course participants were between 18 and 51 years old (= 28.4 years), 54.9 percent were female, and 45.1 percent were male. The participants came from ten nations. In addition to the different countries in the EU, there were nine participants from Asia (Japan, Taiwan, and Nepal) and seven participants from Eastern Europe (Romania). The largest portion of participants was students (61.2 percent). In Nottingham, 60.4 percent of the course partici-

¹⁴ I thank my colleagues from Nottingham Polytechnic, especially Donna Huinphrey.

pants lived in student flats, 34 percent lived with host families, and 5.7 percent lived with friends or relatives.

For all of the participants, at least those in the first course, it was discovered through conversations during participatory observation that the language course at Nottingham was the first one of its kind that these students had experienced. None of the students had previous experience in a multicultural learning situation. The English instruction they had had to this juncture was bicultural (i.e. French/English), including a large proportion of British social studies, English literature, history, politics, etc. None of the participants were studying English. Many of the students chose an International Summer Language Course in order to have contact with students from other nations. In many conversations it became clear that English was considered as the „lingua franca.“ In the everyday life of these students, English was spoken more frequently with people of other nations than with native British speakers.

After in an earlier analysis the essential areas of the questionnaire had been analyzed by means of a Latent Class Analysis (LCA)¹⁵ and classified by various learning types,¹⁶ the question of the influence the multicultural learning situation had on the subjective evaluation of the success achieved is here placed into the foreground. Since LCA is a multivariate analysis procedure that unites the advantages of factor analysis and cluster analysis but is without their disadvantages, single variable complexes that influence the evaluation of a successful learning of the language were observed, established and summarized into constructs on the basis of the ordinality determined with LCA. In this way numerous significant phenomena between single variables, which are presented as bivariate statistics, should be concentrated.

The construct SOCIAL describes the opportunity to learn in an extra-curricular social program that accompanies the course and is organized by

¹⁵ J. Rost, *LACORD. Latent Class Analysis for Ordinal Variables* (Kiel: Institut für die Pädagogik der Naturwissenschaften, 1990).

¹⁶ W. Bos, „International Summer Language Courses: Their Role in Learning to Appreciate Multiculturalism and Developing a Sense of „Europeanness,“ in W. Bos & R.H. Lehmann, eds., *Reflections on Educational Achievement. Papers in Honor of T. Neville Postlethwaite to Mark the Occasion of his Retirement from his Chair in Comparative Education at the University of Hamburg* (Münster: Waxmann, 1995), pp. 50-68.

language instructing personnel. It consists of the following four items: *opportunity to learn more about the culture of the UK* (V4), *opportunity for informal contact with students from other countries* (V5), *opportunity for informal contact with teachers* (V7) and, *opportunity to practice English skills* (V8) These were determined using the question „What do you think about the social program?“

The construct ACADEMIC describes the traditional opportunities to learn within the framework of school oriented instruction. It consists of the items *work with teaching materials* (V18), *classroom activities* (V19) and, *language lab* (V20). The construct INDIVIDUAL describes the private activities undertaken outside of the language instruction and only marginally organized by language instructing personnel. It consists of the following items: *optional course* (V21), *private contact with foreign students* (V23) and, *private contact with native English people* (V24). Both constructs were determined using the question „Which activities do you think have improved your English skills?“ The construct MULTICULT consists of the items ascertained with the question about whether the multiethnic composition of the course was seen as an advantage or as a disadvantage for improving English skills. The construct IMPROVEMENT summarizes the evaluation of the question about improving English skills. Both MULTICULT (V26 to V31) and IMPROVEMENT (V12 to V17) registered the learning areas *grammar*, *listening*, *writing*, *speaking*, *pronunciation* and *discussion* as individual items.

A path model, in a heuristic sense, for the influences of the constructs ACADEMIC, INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL and MULTICULT with reference to IMPROVEMENT (see Fig. 1) can be displayed by using a Partial Least Squared (PLS) analysis.¹⁷

¹⁷ N. Sellin, *PLSPATH Version 3.01* (Hamburg: Sellin, 1989).